Narcissus and Beauty: A Renaissance of Paterian Aesthetics by Dagan, Amir
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
6-2020 
Narcissus and Beauty: A Renaissance of Paterian Aesthetics 
Amir Dagan 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3822 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 





NARCISSUS AND BEAUTY: 











A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of English in partial fulfillment of the 



























All Rights Reserved 
Amir Dagan iii 
 
 
Narcissus and Beauty: 







This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in 







Date 5/10/20  Richard Kaye 
Chair of Examining Committee 





Richard Kaye  
Mary Ann Caws 




THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
 
Amir Dagan iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
Narcissus and Beauty: 






Advisor: Richard Kaye 
 
This dissertation is intended as a correction to the almost universal contemporary assumption 
that beauty is either nonexistent or a tool of oppression, and that the arts should be judged less by 
their aesthetic value than their social, political, or moral dimensions. This dissertation will 
propose a fivefold argument. First, I will assert that the experience of beauty is real, pleasurable, 
and not in any way culturally determined, second, that beauty is the most significant and 
characteristic feature of art, third, that the rejection of the reality of beauty is motivated more by 
the fragility of the mass man’s ego than by honest appraisal of aesthetic experience, fourth, that 
all art is aristocratic in nature, and finally that there is a legitimate ground for the ontological 
reality of beauty. To that end I will examine, in the Introduction, both the arguments against the 
existence of beauty and its legitimacy in the analysis of art—which to different degrees over 
history have been eclipsed by moral, religious, and in our time, social and political 
considerations. Against these arguments I will employ both Kant’s notion of the aesthetic and his 
exploration of intersubjective appreciation of beauty, as well as Pater’s ‘hedonistic’ notion of 
aesthetics, which prioritizes pleasure in art, and which elevates an art that prioritizes aesthetic 
experience over that of referentiality or non-aesthetic considerations. In the first chapter, I will 
employ the myth of Narcissus in order to offer a hypothesis regarding the contemporary reaction 
to art. Using the thesis of Ortega y Gasset’s Revolt of the Masses, I posit that the modern hatred 
of beauty finds its origin less in beauty’s illegitimacy but rather in an envy of beauty whose only 
palliative is the denial of beauty’s existence. In the next two chapters I explore the ideas of 
aestheticism through the prism of two of its most celebrated Anglophone proponents, Pater and 
his student Oscar Wilde. In Chapter 2, I perform a reading of Pater’s novel Marius the Epicurean 
in order to illustrate the pragmatic basis in the philosophy of pleasure that animates aesthetic 
experience, while in Chapter 3, through readings of Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, 
Salome, and Henry James’ short story “The Author of Beltraffio,” I analyze the conflicting 
claims upon literary works to express either aesthetic or moral values. In the fourth chapter, I 
turn to a reading of Isak Dinesen’s short story “Babette’s Feast” to argue the essentially 
aristocratic nature of art characterized by aesthetic excellence, the definition of aristocracy 
posited as an antithesis of the politicization of aesthetic experience described in chapter 1. 
Finally, in the fifth chapter, I make a philosophical argument for treating beauty and aesthetic 
judgment as though they are objective, arguing that the unfalsifiability of beauty is a condition 
characteristic also of moral considerations, and that just as ethical conduct is demanded by 
means of imperative, so too should the belief that beauty exists and can be judged.  
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“Every day I set less store on intellect.”  
So Proust opens his unpublished essay, “Contre Sainte-Beuve,” his last and perhaps only 
significant work prior to A le Recherche. By a certain measure, it seems a perplexing sentiment 
for Proust, particularly in this early attempt at an ars poetica. Because by any measure, he is the 
most intellectual of writers—it’s beyond argument to say that few writers could match his 
erudition, the scope of his learning, the depth of his reasoning and analysis. Even if one were to 
find his work off-putting or his conclusions, bluntly, wrong, its general orientation and character 
and texture and subject is nothing if not obsessed with employing the intellect to unravel and 
synthesize all facets of art and life and history and thought…in some banal way, it seems almost 
a paean to intellect. And yet, simply to be able to understand Proust’s sentence is at the very 
same moment to prove it. His sentiment simply cannot be understood by intellect, but only by a 
sympathetic perception. Perhaps, perhaps, it is left to intellect to describe that perception’s 
nature.  
 If in some ordinary way we believe it is self-evident that Proust is a writer of intellect, we 
must clarify what is the meaning of the intellect by which he sets diminishing store, and which, if 
I may presume to guess his sentiments, he is more and more inclined to distrust. It cannot 
possibly be the type of analysis in which he himself engages, both in his novel and in the very 
essay with which the sentence opens. It must be an intellect of a different sort—different, 
perhaps, not in the pattern of its faculties, but guilty for being used in a certain way, for certain 
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ends. Yes, it’s the intellect—which is, to Proust, as to many others, merely a tool, to be used for 
higher ends of experience—attempting to make itself into its own end, and thereby eclipsing 
experience. In a word, it is the intellect where intellect is impudent.  
  “Sainte-Beuve’s method,” Proust says, referring to the most influential French critic of 
the 19th century, dead two years before Proust’s birth, “is not, at first sight, such an important 
affair,” (25) perhaps still less so for us, except insofar as Proust has commented on it. But, he 
adds, “it touches on very important intellectual problems, and on what for an artist the greatest of 
them all; [the] relative inferiority of intellect[.]” It is in Proust’s attack on Sainte-Beuve’s 
method, in this defense by art against a form of intellect that seeks to stifle art, that one can find 
presaged, more elegantly, less overwhelmingly and absolutely, the eclipse of beauty which this 
dissertation shall attempt to describe and, hopefully, at least in part, to remedy.  
 Sainte-Beuve’s method, as described by Proust, seems, if not crude, then singularly 
naive. Yet one suspects that, if one were account for the peculiar intellectual tastes of his period 
and ours, that his method appears familiar, if not in its particular content, then in those things it 
chooses both to emphasize and neglect: “To have devised the Natural History of Intellectuals, to 
have elicited from the biography of the man, from his family history, and from all his 
peculiarities, the sense of his work, and the nature of his genius—this is what we all recognize as 
Sainte-Beuve’s special achievement.” (95) Proust then permits Sainte-Beuve to bury himself 
with his own words— to those sensibilities, it must be added retrospectively, who see such 
words as a form of self-immolation:  
 
‘I do not look on literature,’ said Sainte-Beuve ‘as a thing apart, or, at least, detachable, 
from the rest of the man and his nature…One cannot provide oneself with too many 
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means or too many objectives if one is to know the man—by which I mean something 
other than a pure intelligence. So long as one has not asked an author a certain number of 
questions and received answers to them, though these were only whispered in confidence, 
one cannot be certain of having a complete grasp of him, even though these questions 
might seem at the furthest remove from his writings. What were his religious views? 
How did he react to the sight of nature? How did he conduct himself in regard to women, 
in regard to money? Was he rich, was he poor? What governed his actions, what was his 
daily way of life? What was his vice, or weakness? No answer to these questions is 
irrelevant in judging the author or a book, nor the book itself, short of a treatise on pure 
geometry, above all, if it be a literary work, that is, one into which everything enters.’  
(98-99) 
 
Proust immediately comments that, “Sainte-Beuve’s work does not go very deep.” But it might 
be instructive, and amusing, to rewrite his questions as they might appear in the language of 
contemporary analysis.  
  
Was his view toward nature anthropocentric? Is he marginalized, is he privileged?  
 
The essence of Sainte-Beuve’s historicist method is to enlighten a reader of a work of literature, 
by assembling as much information as possible, information upon which, he believes, the given 
piece of literature was based. Art was, to him, more or less an empirical object. Like a researcher 
of some natural phenomenon he sought to compile the information that would clarify the 
phenomenon, though in this he resembles perhaps more a pharmaceutical researcher whose 
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method is blind, somewhat aimless, open to all facts and without necessary hypotheses. What the 
method implies is that the books and poems Sainte-Beuve elucidates are not in their nature 
fundamentally different from the information he investigates, and which he believes went into 
their making, and that is precisely what Proust finds appalling:  
 
[Sainte-Beuve’s method,] which consists of not separating the man and his work, of 
holding the opinion that in forming judgment of the author[…] it is not immaterial to 
begin by knowing the answers to questions which seem at the furthest remove from his 
work (How did he conduct himself, etc), nor to surround oneself with every possible 
piece of information…this method ignores what a very slight degree of self-acquaintance 
teaches us [italics added]: that a book is the product of a different self from the self we 
manifest in our habits, in our social life, in our vices. If we try to understand that 
particular self, it is by searching our own bosoms, and trying to reconstruct it there, that 
we may arrive at it. Nothing can exempt us from this pilgrimage of the heart. (99-100)1 
 
Proust’s argument may be labeled aestheticist or modernist (whatever their differences), but 
these labels, like certain forms of intellect, only serve to create arguments where none really are 
necessary, to obscure what should be apparent prior to an excess of analysis and learning. This 
method ignores what a very slight degree of self-acquaintance teaches us. Proust here gives us 
both an aesthetics and a method, which, like any creative method, is impossible for 
unsympathetic sensibilities to follow.  
 
1 To elaborate: “[His method] consists, if you would understand a poet or a writer, in greedily catechizing those who 
knew him, who saw quite a lot of him, who can ell us how he conducted himself in regard to women, etc—precisely, 
that is, at every point where the poet’s true self is not involved.“ (106) 
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 For Proust, it is self-evident that an artwork has qualities that distinguish it from the 
material world that spawned it and which, in some cases, it might seem to imitate. His 
language—touching, romantic, perhaps a bit precious—which locates the world of art in what he 
calls “a different self” or the domain “of the heart,” alludes to an undefined while nevertheless 
apparent quality, one that divides literature from life. It is a division that, as he says, is only too 
obvious, and those who are unable to perceive that difference despite familiarity with the objects 
at hand have had their perception eclipsed by the vagaries of a tyrannical intellect.  The 
perception of self-acquaintance teaches something that the intellect obscures. What intellect, 
which for Proust is a dogmatic obsession with information, fact, learning, with social or political 
or theological concerns, what intellect obscures is beauty. It is a term to we shall come to define 
more—but not too—precisely, but let it suffice here as a marker for everything Sainte-Beuve, in 
his emphasis on life, seems to miss in art. And further, Proust seems to say, that certain forms of 
intellectual understanding, which may have relevance in other fields, are irrelevant to art.  
 
At no time does Sainte-Beuve seem to have understood that there is something special 
about creative writing and that this makes it different in kind from what busies other men 
and, at other times, busies writers. He drew no dividing line between the state of being 
engaged in a piece of writing and the state when in solitude, stopping our ears against 
those phrases which belong to others as much as to ourselves, and which whenever we 
are not truly ourselves….we make use of in our consideration of things, we confront 
ourselves and try to catch the true voice of the heart, to write down that, and not small 
talk. (103) 
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How, but for the “intellect,” could Sainte-Beuve and his many followers, then as now, have 
failed to understand what “a slight degree of self-acquaintance teaches us?” How this self-
deception occurs will perhaps only be understood by attempting to describe the nature of that 
self-acquaintance. Definitions may follow—now it is only required to follow the basic outline of 
Proust’s reasoning. One reads a novel, or poem—Proust goes on to detail Sainte-Beuve’s 
relations with both Balzac and Baudelaire—and one derives a unique sensation, “different in 
kind from what busies other men.” No one of any sensitivity can conceivably ignore this. And 
yet, to explain, if not to justify poor Sainte-Beuve, one must empathize with what follows upon 
this sensation. The sensation is not understood. It is in many ways marvelous, but equally is it 
mystifying. Proust describes Sainte-Beuve’s clumsy attempts at creativity, whether by an 
absence of natural talent, or because the objects of his fascination were governed by rules that 
eluded his understanding. It is worth imagining that there was something discomfiting to Sainte-
Beuve about the very possibility of Proust’s thesis, which although he obviously never knew it, 
he must somewhere, in the depths of himself, have known—as Proust says, it’s self-evident, and 
I would propose that everyone who denies it, knows it also. And so, the intellect, shamed at its 
impotence in explaining sensations of beauty outside its capacities of elucidation, attempts to 
equate beauty with those things it does, of course, understand: 
 
“Was he poor, was he rich?” 
 “Was he marginalized? Was he privileged?” 
Proust, ever an amiable sort of snob, seems to sense that there is something in Sainte-Beuve’s 
character that makes him blind as the puppeteers in Plato’s cave to the unique qualities of art. 
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And so, we must turn to this critic as a man, because though his life, “might not be an important 
affair, it is nevertheless instructive.” 
 
The implication that there is something more superficial and empty in a writer’s 
authorship, something deeper and more contemplative in his private life, is due to nothing 
else than the special pleading metaphor of Necessity. (104) 
 
Necessity, for Sainte-Beuve, is nothing less than the responsibility of writing reviews every 
single week for his life, for decades. Proust admits some backhanded admiration for the critic’s 
industry, but asserts quite reasonably that such rote production may be at odds with the 
exploration of other, more transcendent ends.  
 
…from the time Sainte-Beuve began writing the Lundis, he did not only change his way 
of life; he attained to the idea—not a very elevated one—that a life of forced labour, such 
as he was leading, is inherently more fertile….[he failed] to see the gulf that separates the 
writer from the man of the world, by failing to understand that a writer’s true self is in his 
books alone[.] (106) 
and again: 
No doubt, this industry compelled him to put forth a throng of ideas which, had he 
persevered in the idle life that was his first choice, might never have seen the light of 
day….Their title, Les Lundis, reminds us what they were for Sainte-Beuve: the feverish 
enchanting work of a week, and the triumphant Monday morning’s awakening in that 
small house on Rue de Montparnasse” (108-109) 
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The critic, as painted here, punches his timecard, works the appointed hours, and that is all. 
There’s no shame in it, but that’s hardly how a man cultivates his senses and his soul, and 
thereby gains access to the higher planes that are ultimately Proust’s subject, and his love…they 
are his subject because they are his love. Proust shows us two conflicting types that are 
inherently at odds: the artist, who is aware of beauty by a sort of interior sensibility and 
cultivation, and the quotidian man of the world, concerned, as such a man is, with ordinary 
things. It is because the artwork self-evidently is marked by a unique quality, indeed is defined 
by a quality, beauty, which is extraordinary, such an ordinary man must, through the quotidian 
use of his intellect, explain that beauty into nonexistence with his quotidian information.  
 Such analysis no doubt strikes more democratic sensibilities as offensive, but what must 
be clear is that Proust is not claiming that everyday world to have no innate value. Rather, he is 
saying it is insufficient in the exploration of aesthetic phenomena. His often harsh jeremiad 
against Sainte-Beuve, we must note, is not an attack against a poor innocent, but rather a defense 
of the art he sees misunderstood and often eclipsed by the demands of quotidian intelligence. If 
Sainte-Beuve is to dominate understanding, then there is no Proust, and that is because Sainte-
Beuve will not admit to the reality of what is most precious in someone like Proust. Beauty, and 
the variety of ways that it is denied and impeded by quotidian concerns, is the subject of this 
dissertation.  
  When Proust came to write his great novel, he displaced his Judaism and homosexuality 
onto secondary characters rather than the protagonist and narrator. Perhaps this might now seem 
as a gesture of submission to the dominant culture of his time and its structures of power. But 
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actually, it was wholly consistent with his aesthetic ideals.2 Naturally, he took the experiences of 
his life as the matter from which to mold his work, but if he placed his material, factual self, at 
the center, the self with its innately un-literary concerns, then he would be writing the sort of 
book that someone like Sainte-Beuve could understand.  He wanted to do something different 
from that, just as he claimed art is different from life. It is not the purpose of this book to prove 
that Proust was invariably right. Rather, it’s my purpose to claim that presently, since an updated 
version of Sainte-Beuve’s doctrine has conquered both the academy and, more importantly, the 
general public discourse about aesthetics…all I want to claim is that Proust was not invariably 
wrong.  
 Well, and that he was more right than wrong.  
 And that his rightness is more significant than any contradiction one could call a wrong.  




In 2017, an online petition reaching 8,000 signatures demanded the Metropolitan Museum’s 
removal of Balthus’ “Therese Dreaming.” Painted in 1938, the canvas is a portrait of a young 
girl, asleep, her arms behind her head, one foot propped indiscreetly on her chair in a manner that 
“permits” the viewer to see her underwear. Below a cat occasions the opportunity for a vulgar 
pun, perhaps reminiscent of the one in Manet’s Olympia. The petition’s argument is incredibly 
 
2 “But the philosophers who have failed to discover what there is in art that is authentic and independent of anything 
scientific, have to tell themselves that literature, criticism, etc. are like the sciences, where the man before is 
inevitably less advanced than the man who succeeds him. But in art there is no such thing as an originator, a 
precursor…every man takes up the continuous attempt of art or literature on his own account….a present day writer 
of genius has it all on his hands. He is not much further forward than Homer.” (96-7)  
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familiar, and can serve as an emblem for a contemporary desire to make art submit to the dictate 
of politics: 
 
‘Given the current climate around sexual assault and allegations that become more public 
each day, in showcasing this work for the masses, The Met is romanticizing voyeurism 
and the objectification of children,’ [the petition] reads....The petition’s author, Mia 
Merrill, suggested that the painting be replaced by a painting by a female painter from the 
same time period as Balthus, who died in 2001. Ms. Merrill also insisted she was not 
trying to encourage censorship. “But the blatant objectification and sexualization of a 
child is where I draw the line,” Ms. Merrill said by phone on Friday. 3 
 
Merrill does not consider the possibility that her line is not contiguous with others’. This is 
common enough. But it is worth examining her reasoning, as well as those who disagreed with 
her. Claiming that the painting “romanticizes voyeurism and the objectification of children,” 
Merrill is making an explicitly moralistic argument about the nature of art itself. To her mind, it 
is, put simply, “bad,” not in terms of its value as art, but in terms of its “values,” its “message.” 
Balthus was a pervert, and the painting either legitimizes perversion, “gives it a platform,” as 
people say nowadays, or encourages this form of perversion in others.  
 The painting was not taken down. But its defenses were somewhat of a piece with 
Merrill’s criticism. In an article defending Balthus, Lauren Elkin writes, 
 
 
3 Libbey, Peter. “Met Defends Suggestive Painting of Girl After Petition Calls for Its 
Removal.” The New York Times. 4 Dec. 2017 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/arts/met-museum-balthus-painting-girl.html 
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There is a way to look at Thérèse that doesn’t make us complicit in the abusive 
sexualization of children. Yes, Balthus is a perv. But look again at the painting: Thérèse 
is as pervy as the artist. Look at her enraptured face, her closed eyes; you can almost feel 
the quickening of her breath. What do the signatories think she's dreaming about? If we 
only see abuse when we look at the painting, then, somehow, the abusers have won; the 
men have won…I’ve always loved this painting. It makes me feel sexy; but in an 
adolescent way; it restores to me, retroactively, the diffuse desire I felt at 12 or 13. I 
didn’t know who or what I desired, if it was sex or something more nebulous; just like 
boys, young girls that age are desiring machines. And as I spoke to female friends, and 
read what women have written about the painting, I found I wasn't alone.”4 
 
Whereas to Merrill Therese is a victim, to Elkin she a symbol of young girls’ agency, and 
censorship of the painting would remove the subversive power implicit in the girl’s budding 
sexuality. These interpretations might seem diametrically opposed, but in fact they are only so 
within a very similar framework. For each, the value of the painting resides in its moral content, 
and the degree to which it is an acceptable work of art contingent upon how one interprets its 
content with regard to its moral or socio-political implications. If this work, and by extension any 
other, is consistent with the spectator’s personal politics, it is good, and if not, Savonarola always 
has the answer. However different the complaint’s specific politics, we are not so far away from 
something like the scandal surrounding Wilde, or those around the novels of Joyce or D.H. 
 
4 Elkin, Lauren. “Showing Balthus at the Met Isn’t About Voyeurism, It’s About the Right 
to Unsettle.” Frieze. 19 Dec. 2017, 
https://frieze.com/article/showing-balthus-met-isnt-about-voyeurism-its-about-right-unsettle 
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Lawrence—in each case, there is an outrage to moral and political sensibilities, and those 
sensibilities may be left quite as well as right wing. 
 Elkin does feel uncomfortable with the specter of censorship Merrill takes minimal pins 
to assuage, but her fear of censorship again belies an essentially moralistic interpretation. “It is 
not the work of art to make us feel safe; if it does, it probably isn’t art at all.” For her, art has a 
definite purpose, and that purpose is the subversion of repressive proprieties. Alice Lloyd 
agrees.5   
 
His girls should unnerve us, and not only because Balthus intended them to. I see 
Thérèse's poses and remember my grandmother instructing me always to cross my legs 
when I wore a skirt; I never asked why because, on another unspoken level, beyond my 
understanding, I already knew. Art’s purpose is, at some unspoken level, always to 
provoke within us that which cannot be confined by manners or contemporary 
expectations. 
 
Even Balthus himself can be said to be complicit in this form of defense. Cagily justifying the 
apparent provocation in his work, he explained, “it is how they (young girls) sit.”6 This is likely 
true. But the debate raises broader question. Suppose that the painting were perverted, that it did 
not subvert traditional notions of sexuality. Suppose that this is not how little girls sit. Suppose 
that it were, in some pronounced way, evil. Should it be taken down then? 
 
5 Lloyd, Alice B. “#Metoo vs. the Museum.” The Washington Examiner. 15 Dec. 2017, 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/alice-b-lloyd/metoo-vs-the-museum 
6 George, Jen. “Together Young.” The Paris Review Blog. 21 Oct, 2016, 
https://www.theparisreview.org/blog/2016/10/21/together-young/ 
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“There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book,” Oscar Wilde wrote in his preface 
to Dorian Gray. “Books are well written, or badly written. That is all.” In this rather provocative 
statement, Wilde is locating for his reader a peculiar form of value that bears no relation to either 
the moralistic or the socio-political debates we have seen so far employed with regard to the 
Balthus. What indeed if the painting were evil? Would it still be without worth? Is there value 
that is unique to an artwork, a value which is utterly divorced from the terms of the above 
debate? Is it perhaps even possible that this value is the central one by which artworks ought to 
be judged, in the face of which, moral and political concerns are irrelevant? Broadly, this 
dissertation will contend that yes, these are the primary qualities of art, that aesthetic distinction 
is the characteristic feature of an artwork and in fact defines an object as being a work of art in 
the first place, and that any sort of concern that might be applied to objects or ideas outside of art 
have less bearing on the judgment of an artwork than does its beauty.  
A final detail in this faintly ridiculous story is particularly striking. Merrill, who had 
never seen or heard of the painting prior to the traumatic incident she presumably wants to spare 
others, is a Human Resources manager at Manhattan Financial firm.7  
No artist, so to speak, is going to Merrill’s office and slapping the memo out of her hand. 
And yet she proposes, not merely to control her own personal likes and dislikes, but to make 
judgments of an artwork, to publicize this judgment, and, most absurd of all, to attempt to control 
the availability of said artwork to others. By what strange and irrational path this young woman 
concluded that these options were in any way appropriate, that art requires no expertise, that 
objects whose primary characteristic is political maybe judged solely by the exigencies of 
 
7 Alexander, Harriet. “New York’s Met Museum refuses to remove Balthus painting 
despite petition against promoting paedophilia.” The Telegraph. 6 Dec. 2017, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/06/new-yorks-met-museum-refuses-remove-balthus-
painting-despite/ 
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politics, is worthy of consideration if we re to re-establish the significance of beauty both in the 
engagement with art and with our lived experience in general.  
 
III 
In her late essay, “An Argument About Beauty,” (2005) Susan Sontag traces, deftly if briefly, the 
West’s gradual withdrawal from an emphasis on the beautiful in favor of what she terms the 
“interesting.” Discussing Pope John Paul II’s deployment of a domesticated form of beauty—
eternal, venerable, unerringly ethical—Sontag explores the way the popular sense of beauty’s 
prestige came to be associated with political forces to which it bore little relation. “Beauty, as a 
term,” signified, “an indisputable excellence,” and the appropriation of that excellence to 
moralistic or political ends either stifled or willfully ignored the fact that beauty is in its nature 
not necessary “uplifting,” often “evanescent” or “wreathed in pathos.” Some artistic innovators 
of the early twentieth century understandably rebelled at this sanctimonious, neutered version of 
beauty: 
 
It also seems inevitable that when, almost a century ago, the most prestigious 
communities concerned with the fine arts dedicated themselves to drastic projects of 
innovation, beauty would turn up on the front line of notions to be discredited. Beauty 
could not but appear a conservative standard to the makers and proclaimers of the new; 
Gertrude Stein said that to call a work of art beautiful means that it is dead. Beautiful has 
come to mean ‘merely’ beautiful: there is no more vapid or philistine compliment. (209) 
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The domesticated quality of the beauty rejected, the philistine nature of the “merely beautiful,” 
led to an enlightened retreat from the term itself. And yet, “beauty still reigns, irrepressible.” 
Though Wilde wittily claimed in The Decay of Lying, “sunsets are quite old fashioned,” Sontag 
points out that, “sunsets reeled under the blow, then recovered.” Like Proust’s “slight degree of 
self-acquaintance,” some sensations are immune to intellectual fashions. What has not remained 
immune, Sontag argues, is the very “belief in something called art,” and the idea of “beauty as a 
standard for art.” (209) 
 Sontag admits that even “when beauty was an unquestioned criterion of value in the arts,” 
(209) it was ill-defined…perhaps so, we can add, by its very nature. In place of a functional 
definition of the characteristic itself, beauty came to be understood by relation rather than 
essence, that is, with regard to the individual capacity to apprehend and enjoy it: “there was 
supposed to be an organ or capacity for registering beauty (that is, value) in the arts, called 
‘taste,’ and a canon of works discerned by people of taste, seekers after more rarefied 
gratifications, adepts of connoisseurship.” (209) Of course, even when tastes appeared fairly 
uniform within given cultural milieus, even in the less cacophonous environment of earlier 
periods, the fact that taste could differ, however slightly, between individuals made it susceptible 
to criticisms of subjectivity. Kant’s effort to formulate an intersubjective faculty of judgment, 
was an attempt—unsuccessful by Sontag’s standards—to escape the tyranny of relativism. 
Sontag claims Kant’s concept of judgment, and its apparent relation to the “pliable, empirical 
criterion of taste,” did little to fortify the proposition that particular works of art were 
“incontestably beautiful.” (210) As history’s surge of democratic values made the very concept 
of taste “a far weaker, more assailable notion,” so, naturally perhaps, did they undermine the 
reality of beauty that the concept of taste was intended to justify.  
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 The category of beauty, she argues, requires the “prestige of judgment itself,” and for that 
prestige to exist, beauty must exist in opposition to its antithesis, which is, quite naturally, the 
ugly. “Beauty,” she argues, “defines itself as the antithesis of the ugly.”8 It may be that Sontag is 
being slightly extreme for the purpose of provocation—at its core her point is that, if a judgment 
is made that an object has the quality of beauty, then it follows that, unless all objects share this 
quality—which would make the faculty of judging beauty redundant—then an acknowledgement 
of beauty implicitly dictates that not all objects are beautiful. It is true we have yet to determine 
whether there is indeed a spectrum of beauty or whether beauty is qualitatively different from the 
unbeautiful as life from death (which obviously does not, as Plato would have it, exist along a 
spectrum). But prior to such analysis, it is nevertheless quite clear that claiming some objects are 
beautiful implies other objects are not. Moreover, there may possibly be objects that are more or 
less beautiful, and perhaps by a similar logic, objects that are more or less un-beautiful. Though 
the existence of beauty may not necessarily entail the ugly, it hardly contradicts the notion of 
ugliness, and seems, at least, to imply its existence.9 Yet the exact definition of these terms is 
irrelevant to the way in which our culture understands them, and Sontag is correct to claim that,   
 
There are more and more taboos about calling something, anything, ugly[….Similarly, 
there is more and more resistance to the idea of ‘good taste,’ that is, to the dichotomy 
 
8 Here we need to note the inconsistency of these terms as they have been used in history. When Gauguin says, “The 
ugly can be beautiful. The pretty, never,” it is self-evident he is using “ugly” in an entirely different sense than is 
Sontag. His ugliness refers to visually unpleasant elements of reality, hers to the lower end of the aesthetic spectrum 
with beauty as its summit.  
9 The situation is less obvious than Sontag makes it appear— the ugly may exist but not as an antithesis to the 
beautiful.  
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good taste/bad taste, except for occasions that allow one to celebrate the defeat of 
snobbery and the triumph of what was once condescended to as bad taste.10 
 
Where, one presumes, ugliness itself, at one time, offended, now the very notion that ugliness 
exists causes offense. Who indeed enjoys being called ugly? Or even wondering whether other 
people think them so? And, if assessments of human beauty in any way mirror the proportionate 
distribution of artworks treasured and those discarded as rubbish, such worries would, in the 
majority of a given population, be likely justified. It would seem our culture discovered an 
elegant solution…like Alexander it simply cut the knot, removed the concept of ugliness itself 
from discourse, along with her snobbish sister beauty.  So, “as the relativistic stance in cultural 
matters pressed harder on the old assessments,” people, she claims, became uncomfortable with 
the notion of beauty, believed it to be too self-serving or exclusionary, and “discrimination, once 
a positive faculty (meaning refined judgment, high standards, fastidiousness), turned negative: it 
meant prejudice, bigotry, blindness to the virtues of what was not identical with oneself.” (210)  
“’Who sez?’” she imagines those resentful of an old order of discernment, implied if 
never very clearly defined, revolting against a unique capacity “for registering beauty (that is, 
value) in the arts, called ‘taste,’ and a canon of works discerned by people of taste, seekers after 
more rarefied gratifications, adepts of connoisseurship. For in the arts—unlike life, beauty was 
not assumed to be necessarily apparent, evident, obvious.” (209) The argument against this 
attitude is too familiar even to be worth describing… “who sez?” seems to suffice in evoking all 
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Implicit in her description of this phenomenon is the belief—espoused not by Sontag but 
by those discrediting beauty as a criterion for judgment—that the language of politics or ethics or 
social criticism can be translated into the realm of aesthetics. One can see the conceptual, if not 
literal, similarity to Sainte-Beuve’s method. Because while the emphasis and values of the 
contemporary anti-aesthete differ markedly from Sainte-Beuve’s, each has attempted, and in his 
time largely succeeded, to place the domain of beauty under the thumb of outside, primarily 
material considerations, for Sainte-Beuve the empirical notion that beauty may be explained, 
indeed explained away, by fact, information, anecdote, for those opposed to beauty the notion 
that questions of beauty or ugliness must be decided—or rather, eliminated—by political and 
social exigencies, exigencies which, while abstract in their articulation, naturally apply to those 
material realities their proponents would like to see realized. And is there not, in each them, a 
discernible note of envy? It seems like each feels as though beauty or art has rejected him and 
who reacts like some nymph courting Narcissus, who after she has failed insists frantically and 
tearfully, “I am glad he is dead! I hope he stays dead, and I hope he is forgotten forever!” 
In Sontag’s view, the flight from beauty has, naturally if not entirely reasonably, elevated 
the ugly, indeed eclipsed the beautiful with the ugly, albeit renaming the latter with the 
innocuous, neutered praise of “interesting:” 
 
One calls something interesting precisely so as not to have to commit to a judgment of 
beauty (or of goodness). The interesting is now mainly a consumerist concept, bent on 
enlarging its domain: the more things that become interesting, the more the marketplace 
grows. The boring - understood as an absence, an emptiness - implies its antidote: the 
promiscuous, empty affirmations of the interesting. (211) 
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Interest is ultimately any description that avoids making a listener or speaker uncomfortable in 
the presence of an aesthetic hierarchy. “Obviously, you can't say something is beautiful if you're 
not willing to say something is ugly. But there are more and more taboos about calling 
something, anything, ugly.” (210) Everything, then, that is not beautiful is merely “interesting” 
(of course this seems to degrade somewhat the idea of “interest,” but if contemporary criticism is 
any indication, there is hardly anything in existence that is not of interest—or at least of 
purported interest—to someone). 
 To someone, to anyone. What do people find interesting, and why? One scratches one’s 
head at the sorts of things people find interesting. Anyone is free to imagine such a list. There is 
of course passionate interest, the desire to immerse oneself in something, based on a kind of 
inexplicable sympathy between subject and object, like something dictated by the movement of 
the spheres, that one may find in Kantian notions of beauty. This bespeaks a pleasure, and is not 
unlike beauty in its pursuit of what Kant terms disinterested pleasures. Yet there are many things 
people may find interesting for, shall we say, interested reasons. One may find things interesting 
for the sake of prestige (this, surely, beauty can no longer bring), one may find common interests 
with others to feel sheltered by community. Some of these may be noble, more often they are 
not. One may have a political or social cause one wishes to promote, and this cause may be 
disinterested or interested, based upon dogmatism or magnanimity or even one’s own 
resentment. And like Sainte-Beuve with his Lundis, it might be one’s job to find certain things 
interesting. It might even be in the interest of his job to say interesting things are, in the end, 
more interesting than beauty. And, of course, so is he! 
 In an insightful parenthetical comment to her earlier statement about the taboo of ugliness, 
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Sontag points to the way in which political exigencies can serve as a mask for most cynical self 
interest: “(For an explanation, look first not at the rise of so-called political correctness, but at the 
evolving ideology of consumerism, then at the complicity between these two.)” (210) And 
indeed, when one attempts, as we shall, to turn inward, as though prior to these learned pieties, 
and begin as if anew that we might examine our own reactions to beauty of various kinds, one 
sees that there is something almost mercenary in the dismissal of the beautiful as it is currently 
expressed. Where beauty has the ring, as Sontag says, of elitism, the supposed egalitarianism 
which replaced it has, upon examination, almost sinister roots: 
 
One calls something interesting precisely so as not to have to commit to a judgment of 
beauty (or of goodness). The interesting is now mainly a consumerist concept, bent on 
enlarging its domain: the more things that become interesting, the more the marketplace 
grows. The boring–understood as an absence, an emptiness–implies its antidote: the 
promiscuous, empty affirmations of the interesting. It is a peculiarly inconclusive way of 
experiencing reality.  
In order to enrich this deprived take on our experiences, one would have to 
acknowledge a full notion of boredom: depression, rage (suppressed despair). Then one 
could work toward a full notion of the interesting. But that quality of experience–of 
feeling–one would probably no longer even want to call interesting. (211) 
 
Barely subdued throughout the essay is a profound sense of sadness or regret at what has been 
lost by our adherence to contemporary pieties. Within her wry taxonomy of people’s often 
confused descriptions of art is a sense that something wonderful has gone out of the world.  
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What is beautiful…stimulates and deepens our sense of the sheer spread and fullness of 
reality, inanimate as well as pulsing, that surrounds us all… beauty regains its solidity, its 
inevitability, as a judgment needed to make sense of a large portion of one's energies, 
affinities, and admirations; and the usurping notions appear ludicrous. Imagine saying, 
"That sunset is interesting." (213) 
 
The discomfort with judgment she describes seems everywhere in evidence, how ever absurd the 
sentiments to which we may see it reduced, and the quantity of material validating Sontag’s 
broad claim is far too voluminous to go over.11  
 Sontag may be accused of overgeneralization, but to anyone familiar with the 
contemporary scene, her generalizations seem so obvious and ubiquitous that any attempt at 
comprehensive tabulation would—given the abundance of contemporary records, run thousands 
of volumes. It may suffice to point out that any time the matter is brought up, the general trend is 
mentioned as a given. In their introduction to the second of edition of The New Aestheticism, 
John J. Joughin and Simon Malpas write, “the rise of critical theory in disciplines across the 
humanities during the 1908’s and 1990’s has all but swept aestheticism off the map—and, some 
would argue, rightly so….Theories of textuality, subjectivity, ideology, class, race and gender 
 
11 Here a note on method should be made. It is perhaps uncharacteristic of current discourse to make broad claims at 
all. But if we are incapable of making leaps, of appealing to the reader’s common understanding, then we will be 
forever mired in specificities, we will be all trees, no forest. I contend that anyone remotely aware of the 
contemporary climate will see exactly what she means, though they are of course entitled to derive different 
conclusions or judgments about that climate. Some few examples maybe given, but to address the many criticisms is 
to stare into the abyss, so to speak. It should be noted that no one who seeks to take an anti-aesthetic stance is in any 
way required to justify his or her position, while the aesthetic stance must always be defended, and this is evidence 
enough of a normative contemporary belief in the inconsequentiality of aesthetics. It may also be worth noting that if 
every term, every idea, must explicate its own grounding, then this grounding too must be explicated, to the point of 
ending in one of Borges’ infinite loops too grand for the human mind to follow. Where does it stop? Better an 
occasional leap.
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have shown such notions of universal human value to be without foundation, and even to act as 
means of safeguarding the beliefs and values of an elitist culture from challenge or 
transformation.” (1) Edith Hall, in a review Jeffrey M. Duban’s The Lesbian Lyre, which 
attempts to reclaim aesthetic delight in the process of translation, explains matter-of-factly that 
the Left, from Marx and Engels via Piscator, Brecht and Critical Theory to New Historicism and 
Poststructuralism, has consistently evaded aesthetics,” and that the reasons why, “critics of the 
Left have run away from concepts of beauty, sublimity and value are that they do not want to 
endorse a type of language associated with elites, and that ‘sublimity and beauty have often lain 
in the contingent, subjective eye of ruling-class beholders).”12 (26) Elizabeth Prettejohn, in her 
lovely book Beauty and Art, makes similar observations that would best be appreciated as 
truisms: questions of beauty, she says, “mark a significant departure from the recent concerns of 
academic art history, which since the 1970’s has focused predominantly on questions of 
historical, social, and political context….The love of beauty has seemed at best an evasion or 
escape form the problems of social reality, at worst a way of shoring up the status of the rich and 
powerful. Judgments of aesthetic value have been seen as tainted by associations with the art 
market, or with the self-interest of the wealthy and patrician.” (9) She later repeats, in a 
discussion nineteenth century French aesthetics, “most twentieth century art historians followed 
the agenda of nineteenth-century humanitarian criticism to give overwhelming priority to works 
that directly engage with modern life…this is a moralizing position,” and then posits the 
question: “we may reasonably ask why we should forgo the sensuous and erotic delights of 
[Theophile] Gautier’s exceptionally catholic tastes,” (101) a question which we broadly shall 
return to again and again.  
 
12 Hall, Edith. “Sublime to the ridiculous.” TLS. 6 Jan. 2017, 
https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/sublime-to-the-ridiculous/ 
Amir Dagan 23 
 Denis Dutton explains the post-Aesthetic relativism by invoking cultural differences: 
 
In the generations that have followed the Second World War humanistic scholarship has 
tended to emphasize the cultural context of all human activities. This has meant that in 
aesthetics…relativism has become the dominant orthodoxy; aesthetic values were 
understood as having their reality only relative to local cultural nod historical conditions. a 
good work of art was therefore ‘good’ only in a specific culture….a dismissive attitude 
toward universal values in art has been bolstered by countless anecdotes….One such oft 
repeated story concerns the Indian sitarist who, performing before a naïve Western 
audience, was vigorously applauded when he had finished tuning his instrument. (Gaute 
and Lopes, 228)13  
 
The relativism described here is a mild variation of Sontag’s “who sez,” which we could put 
ungrammatically as “when sez? or “Where sez?” At its most innocuous reading, some see the 
perception of beauty as a culturally prescribed view based on a set of historical contingencies, 
while others may read more insidious causes into its existence, such as the promotion of certain 
power structures…in either case, beauty does not exist independently of ideology, politics, 
history, morals, which in some way is saying that it is simply a mirage, does not exist at all.  
 
13 An amusing riposte to this attitude is given, before the fact, by Donald Francis Tovey, in an analysis of Dvorak’s 
Ninth Symphony (then known as the fifth), unfortunately burdened by the bigotries of which older writers are often 
unable to extricate themselves: 
“Whether the composer has adopted melodies from the negroes, or whether the negroes, finding Dvorak’s 
style congenial, have taken up themes from this symphony and sung Massa dear to them, is a matter for historians. 
Dvorak’s phrasing was primitive, Bohemian, and childlike before he went to America….and the pentatonic scale 
pervades folk-music from China to Peru. and Abraham Lincoln emancipated the negroes in America. The negroes in 
America are very musical…. This paragraph is my exhaustive magnum opus on Racial Characteristics I music.  
 Now let us examine Dvorak’s Fifth symphony.” (285-6) 
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 Of greater interest is the interpretation of Dutton’s anecdote. He seems to imply that the 
audience is merely ignorant of the nature of Indian music. That may well be, but of greater 
interest is the fact that they “vigorously” applaud. Assuming that not taste itself, but the capacity 
to knowingly enjoy, is predicated, as Dutton suggests contemporary generations have believed, 
in knowledge of a culture, the Western audience was evidently incapable of accessing the sitar 
player’s qualities. The fact that their applause was vigorous seems to indicate that rather than 
enjoying the work itself, they were excited by the idea of enjoying a work from a cultural sphere 
alien to their own. What there was to enjoy they did not know, they enjoyed the idea of enjoying 
something Non-Western. Now I think it is excessive to suppose they would be incapable of 
knowing how to appreciate the sitar music, merely that they did not yet know how to do so. But 
in this case, it wasn’t necessarily that the emperor had no clothes, it was that they couldn’t see 
his clothes, but insisted that they could.  
What could compel people to deceive themselves in this manner, but still desire to say 
“Who sez?” with regard to the culture in which they were raised? In this case, the hippie-ish 
ignorance and naiveté exudes a sort of simple charm, but its manifestation some generations later 
embodies a relativism altogether more implacable and belligerent. Roger Scruton describes the 
contemporary state of affairs succinctly: 
 
 In a democratic culture people are inclined to believe that it is presumptuous to claim to 
have better taste than your neighbor. By doing so you are implicitly denying his right to 
be the thing he is. You like Bach, she likes U2; You like Leonardo, he likes Mucha; she 
likes Jane Austen, you like Danielle Steele. Each of you exists in his own enclosed 
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aesthetic world, and so long as neither harms the other, and each says good morning over 
the fence, there is nothing further to be said. (112) 
 
The summary is familiar refrain, and Scruton’s description of neighbors greeting one another 
alludes to the social circumstances that have made standards of judgment appear unacceptable. It 
seems that in contemporary life, the idea of demonstrable aesthetic hierarchy is an infringement 
on people’s sense, not only of civility, but safety and independence, that the very idea of their 
taste being inadequate or lacking is a violation of their sense of self, and their position of equality 
in a democratic society. A ridiculous feud in contemporary popular culture can provide an 
unfortunately idiotic example. In a blog post (note the settings of these debates, here, and with 
Balthus), the late night comedian Bill Maher mocked what he found to be the excessive 
lamentations attending the death of the comic book writer Stan Lee, “to express my dismay at 
people who think comic books are literature and superhero movies are great cinema:” 
 
The guy who created Spider-Man and the Hulk has died, and America is in mourning. 
Deep, deep mourning for a man who inspired millions to, I don’t know, watch a movie, I 
guess. …Now, I have nothing against comic books – I read them now and then when I 
was a kid and I was all out of Hardy Boys. But the assumption everyone had back then, 
both the adults and the kids, was that comics were for kids, and when you grew up you 




Maher, Bill. “Adulting.” Real Time With Bill Maher Blog. 17 Nov. 2018, 
  https://www.real-time-with-bill-maher-blog.com/index/2018/11/16/adulting 
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In his simplistic though not unamusing way, Maher is making an argument for standards of 
judgment in literature. He later referred to a counterargument, in which he hear, once again, 
echoes of Sontag’s “who sez:” 
 
Maher then referenced Pow! Entertainment’s open letter to him saying Maher has a right 
to his opinion about comic books being “unsophisticated” just as “many said the same 
about Dickens, Steinbeck, Melville and even Shakespeare,” 
 
to which he bluntly, incredulously, mockingly yells, 
 
 
“No they didn’t!” 
 
 
Why do we laugh at this joke (if indeed we laugh)? I suspect it is from a sort of exasperation 




This dissertation is intended as a correction to this almost universal judgment regarding beauty 
and the arts. This book will propose a fivefold argument. First, I will assert that the experience of 
beauty is real, pleasurable, and not in any way culturally determined, second, that beauty is the 
most significant and characteristic feature of art15, third, that the rejection of the reality of beauty 
is motivated more by the fragility of the mass man’s ego than by honest appraisal of aesthetic 
experience, fourth, that all art is aristocratic in nature, and finally that there is a legitimate ground 
for the ontological reality of beauty. To that end I will examine, in the Introduction, both the 
 
15 For our purposes, something like Monroe Beardsley’s definition of art is roughly suitable: “an arrangement of 
conditions intended to be capable of affording an experience with marked aesthetic character.” 
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arguments against the existence of beauty and its legitimacy in the analysis of art—which to 
different degrees over history have been eclipsed by moral, religious, and in our time, social and 
political considerations. Against these arguments I will employ both Kant’s notion of the 
aesthetic and his exploration of intersubjective appreciation of beauty, as well as Pater’s 
‘hedonistic’ notion of aesthetics, which prioritizes pleasure in art, and which elevates an art that 
prioritizes aesthetic experience over that of referentiality or non-aesthetic considerations. In the 
first chapter, I will employ the myth of Narcissus in order to offer a hypothesis regarding the 
modern reaction to art. Using the thesis of Ortega y Gasset’s Revolt of the Masses, I posit that the 
modern hatred of beauty finds its origin less in beauty’s illegitimacy but rather in an envy of 
beauty whose only palliative is the denial of beauty’s existence. In the next two chapters I 
explore the ideas of aestheticism through the prism of two of its most celebrated Anglophone 
proponents, Pater and his student Oscar Wilde. In Chapter 2, I perform a reading of Pater’s novel 
Marius the Epicurean in order to illustrate the pragmatic basis in the philosophy of pleasure that 
animates aesthetic experience, while in chapter 3, through readings of Wilde’s The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, Salome, and Henry James’ short story “The Author of Beltraffio,” I analyze the 
conflicting claims upon literary works to express either aesthetic or moral values. In the fourth 
chapter, I turn to a reading of Isak Dinesen’s short story “Babette’s Feast” to argue the 
essentially aristocratic nature of art characterized by aesthetic excellence, the definition of 
aristocracy posited as an antithesis of the democratization of aesthetic experience described in 
chapter 1. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I make a philosophical argument for treating beauty and 
aesthetic judgment as though they are objective, arguing that the unfalsifiability of beauty is a 
condition characteristic also of moral considerations, and that just as ethical conduct is demanded 
by means of imperative, so too should the belief that beauty exists and can be judged.  
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IV 
Sontag enjoins us to imagine saying a sunset is interesting. Well, it is in our capacity to imagine 
awful things. Bourdieu has already presented us with an example of the pleasure of sunsets 
reduced to a sociological analysis of bourgeois habits. But Sontag is asking, I think, a question 
that seems at once preposterous and sad: what might it look like if all moments of pleasure were 
dissected upon the intellect’s operating table? And what is that wonderful thing that has gone out 
of the world if such a tendency were to become ubiquitous? 
 It may be premature as yet to attempt to define beauty—we must begin, as with an 
interrogation, into our first reactions. And perhaps no one has ever defined the impression of 
beauty better than Walter Pater. A University don who lived a measured, bachelor’s life, which 
he shared with his two sisters, seems temperamentally unsuited to articulating a philosophy of 
aesthetic hedonism, nevertheless in Pater’s writings one finds perhaps the most lasting 
expression of the aesthetic worldview. And where Scruton and Sontag seem remiss utterly to 
separate aesthetic delight from moral intuition, Pater quite bravely makes the hyperbolic insight 
that the defining quality of art is precisely located in its detachment from inartistic concerns.  
 The brief Renaissance of thought which Pater inaugurated is perhaps as ill-named as the 
period which lent his book its title, for while the seeds of his insight had been present in every 
dab of color, every note, every word with which artists have composed their work, it required a 
more skeptical age than theirs to distinguish that quality in art which was neither reproducible 
nor lucid. We shall have cause elsewhere to explore the hedonistic dimension of Pater’s thought. 
Perhaps more radical, and yet a natural outgrowth of the gradual dissolution of the old verities to 
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which Pater alludes in his conclusion,16 is his logical isolation of the aesthetic from any 
referential qualities in representational art or literature. Fittingly, he does so in an essay on 
Venetian art, on the works of Titian and Giorgione, who beyond the familiar claim of their 
emphasis on color over Florentine art, which itself bespeaks a dimming of imitation in favor of a 
peculiar chromatic vision, seem, in their increasingly differing ways, to bestow upon the world a 
poetry respectively glamorous and dreamy, each with only the faintest connection to the extant 
beauties of material reality. He opens with a warning out cultural critics might do well to heed,  
 
It is the mistake of much popular criticism to regard poetry, music, and painting — all the 
various products of art — as but translations into different languages of one and the same 
fixed quantity of imaginative thought, supplemented by certain technical qualities of 
colour, in painting; of sound, in music; of rhythmical words, in poetry. In this way, the 
sensuous element in art, and with it almost everything in art that is essentially artistic, is 
made a matter of indifference; and a clear apprehension of the opposite principle — that 
the sensuous material of each art brings with it a special phase or quality of beauty, 
untranslatable into the forms of any other, an order of impressions distinct in kind — is 
the beginning of all true aesthetic criticism. (83) 
 
Without yet defining beauty, Pater has made a significant shift of emphasis. Undoubtedly the 
criticism he feels was popular in his own day is equally popular in ours—the reasons for this 
consistency of outlook will be explored in the first chapter. Enough for now to say merely that as 
Voltaire said “God made man in his image, and man returned the favor,” men (and, naturally, 
 
16 “To regard all things and principles of things as inconstant modes or fashions has more and more become the 
tendency of modern thought.” (150) 
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women) tend to see everything in their own image. Pater has, in his gentle, reserved way, 
effected a Copernican revolution. For where otherwise there is an almost ubiquitous tendency to 
view varying artworks as but manifestations of whatever subject—socio-politico-historico-
gender-ethnic-sexuality-etc—Sainte-Beuve’s contemporaries in Pater’s England no less than his 
descendants now, where it seems the various arts, their various works, even the constitutive 
elements of those very works orbit the critic or reader’s obsession like fragments about an 
immense star, Pater informs us, more politely than perhaps he needed to, that just as the 
Ptolemaic universe had something a bit vain, more than a bit hubristic about it, so too here: that 
star was merely the earth, itself of secondary importance when examining the unified system of 
an aesthetic object. 
 To suppose that the various arts are but translations of one another is to by the transitive 
property also to suppose that they are translations of some other thing. So we may find a critic 
complaining of orientalism in a novel of Jane Austen as in a painting of Delacroix or Ingres. 
Pater’s argument will no doubt require defense, and it is a defense that must account of two 
arguments, one of truth and the other an ironically moral expediency. You cannot convey love to 
someone who has not loved. Those who insist on its absence are rather like virgins decrying the 
pleasures of sex or teetolars decrying the pleasures of alcohol. The other is that those who love 
the arts refuse to have their beauties subsumed in the quotidian concerns of those blind to those 
very arts.  
 This argument in itself requires the foundational assumption that there is such a quality as 
beauty present, if not necessarily in the object (though this is not the impossibility some suppose 
it to be), then certainly to the experience, and this is not an assumption that is at the current 
moment much appreciated. Yet Pater’s method is not Sainte-Beuve's. Somewhat like Conrad, he 
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tries in his way to make the reader see, and the continuation of the paragraph serves slightly to 
recreate the unique conditions of sensual delight that seem to contradict the notion that the arts 
are translations of concepts that might be divorced from the manner and organization and 
substance of the artwork itself: 
 
For, as art addresses not pure sense, still less the pure intellect, but the "imaginative 
reason" through the senses, there are differences of kind in aesthetic beauty, 
corresponding to the differences in kind of the gifts of sense themselves. Each art, 
therefore, having its own peculiar and untranslatable sensuous charm, has its own special 
mode of reaching the imagination, its own special responsibilities to its material. One of 
the functions of aesthetic criticism is to define these limitations; to estimate the degree in 
which a given work of art fulfils its responsibilities to its special material; to note in a 
picture that true pictorial charm, which is neither a mere poetical thought or sentiment, on 
the one hand, nor a mere result of communicable technical skill in colour or design, on 
the other; to define in a poem that true poetical quality, which is neither descriptive nor 
meditative merely, but comes of an inventive handling of rhythmical language, the 
element of song in the singing; to note in music the musical charm, that essential music, 
which presents no words, no matter of sentiment or thought, separable from the special 
form in which it is conveyed to us. (83) 
 
The debate has, in this passage, been fixed. Pater frequently uses the word “peculiar,” when 
describing the uniqueness of an individual artwork, not in its modern sense of “odd, or curious,” 
but to mean an attribute belonging exclusively to one group or thing, from the Latin adjective 
Amir Dagan 32 
peculiaris, meaning privately owned or special. Pater’s emphasis on the “untranslatable” quality 
of an artwork indicates that the inability to translate is both the most characteristic of an artwork, 
and its most significant or striking feature, an element uniquely located in its own nature and 
organization. True, this is only a more theoretical expression of what artists of all types have 
been saying for quite a long time when asked about their works. Asked what Tolstoy meant by 
Anna Karenina, he said, “I meant that,” an expression all too often used by writers, and, I 
believe, all too often believed by readers to indicate some sort of preciosity in the writers’ 
character. We may do better to take the best practitioners of language at their words—they are 
not being evasive, and know precisely what they mean to say. Which is, more or less MacLeish’s 
claim that a “poem should not mean but be,” that the most significant aspect of an artwork is 
something that cannot possibly be divorced from the artwork itself, that exists in its manner and 
the organization of its materials as much as if not more than in its supposed content.  
 Shelley understood this when he discussed the “vanity of translation; it were as wise to 
cast a violet into a crucible that you might discover the formal principle of its colour or odour, as 
seek to transfuse from one language to another the creations of the poet. (Abrams, 793) More 
pertinent to our purposes is a point he makes even while calling attention to what he believes is 
poetry’s moral nature, which speaks to the peculiarity, the untranslatability of art:  
 
The exertions of Locke, Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire, Rousseau and their disciples, in favour 
of oppressed and deluded humanity, are entitled to the gratitude of mankind. Yet it is 
easy to calculate the degree of moral and intellectual improvement which the world 
would have exhibited, had they never lived. A little more nonsense would have been 
talked for a century or two; and perhaps a few more men, women, and children, burnt as 
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heretics. We might not at this moment have been congratulating ourselves on the 
abolition of the Inquisition in Spain. But it exceeds all imagination to conceive what 
would have been the moral condition of the world if neither Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, 
Chaucer, Calderon, Lord Bacon, nor Milton, had ever existed, if Raphael and Michael 
Angelo had never been born; if the Hebrew poetry had never been translated if a revival 
of the study of Greek literature had never taken place; if no monuments of antient 
sculpture had been handed down to us; and if the poetry of the religion of the antient 
world had been extinguished together with its belief. The human mind could never, 
except by the intervention of these excitements, have been awakened to the invention of 
those grosser sciences, and that application of analytic reasoning to the aberrations of 
society, which it is now attempted to exalt over the direct expression of the inventive and 
creative faculty itself. (797) 
 
The grosser sciences indeed. And it appears their attempt at exaltation has succeeded…one 
sighs….in any case, even while arguing the moral value of the imaginative faculty, Shelley 
points out what, in retrospect, is all too obvious. The work of political or moral philosophers, as 
with all the other “grosser sciences,” all those that use the “application of analytic reasoning,” is, 
on a work-by-work basis, a man-by-man case, inessential. And this because, whatever brilliance, 
even genius, it may have required to reach any one of their conclusions, these conclusions 
already were there to be discovered. Like the insights of empirical natural science, these ideas 
may be said to exist prior to human discovery—they are implicit in the existence of humanity 
itself. As Newton and Leibniz discovered, utterly independently of the other, the principles of 
calculus, so too may most if not all ideas be translated into different forms, different languages. 
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The ideas of politics and science are not uniquely rooted to their mode of expression, and indeed 
one may suppose, probably witness, the proliferation of an idea among people when the 
document announcing its discovery has ceased to exist. People describe their vision of morals, of 
human freedom, of the tenets of religion in as various ways as there are people, sometimes 
eloquently, often crudely and thoughtlessly, and yet we may see that fundamentally the decisive 
quality of the differing expressions is essentially identical, no more than a simple arithmetic 
equation, written in Arabic or Roman or Chinese characters, differs as to its fundamental nature. 
How different, then, is the nature of an artwork. Once that particular work has gone out of the 
world, it has gone forever. There is nothing that can ever reproduce, as Pater says, “its 
untranslatable charm.” 
 Nor should we be distracted by his frankly charming use of the word “charm,” and 
suppose it is something paltry or insignificant. Indeed the common use of his word peculiar, to 
mean “strange” is close to the mark as well. What is charm but magic? There is indeed 
something almost inexplicable, miraculous in the incarnation of beauty. To reduce it to a 
translation is to be blind to this magic. And as Sainte-Beuve’s banal emphases strike us as not 
merely paltry, but frankly a little dull, there a joylessness in focusing exclusively upon 
translatable meanings at the expense of peculiar magic. Pater’s “special form,” in each of its 
unlike manifestations, is startling, and strange, as everything wonderful is strange. And why 
should it not be so, when what it is most in its nature can never be experienced but in that unique 
object itself. There is something wonderful, and new…nowhere but there. It is this characteristic 
of beauty, which is never alike to any other beauty, which makes an exploration of the beautiful 
object by any means but aesthetics ultimately impossible, which effaces beauty when we seek to 
impose upon it mere ideas, that might be repeated two or ten thousand times. There is an 
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aristocracy to beauty, and to deprive it of that quality is to send the psalmist’s dove, which forms 
the epigraph to Pater’s book, back down among the pots.17 
 
 In his scholarly way, Pater writes with a subdued rapture, and his argument’s logical 
progress seems to trace the rising motion of those organic or constructed ecstasies, before 
breaking upon a climactic epiphany which, like Lucretius’ statement “Therefore death is nothing 
to us,”18 like most great expressions of wisdom, derives a measure of its force from the fact that 
it tells something we should have known already,  
 
“All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.” 19 
 
And he explains, 
 
For while in all other kinds of art it is possible to distinguish the matter from the form, 
and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art 
to obliterate it. That the mere matter of a poem, for instance, its subject, namely, its given 
incidents or situation — that the mere matter of a picture, the actual circumstances of an 
event, the actual topography of a landscape — should be nothing without the form, the 
spirit, of the handling, that this form, this mode of handling, should become an end in 
itself, should penetrate every part of the matter: this is what all art constantly strives after, 
and achieves in different degrees. 
 
17 “Though ye have lain upon the pots, yet shall ye be as the wings of the dove covered with silver, and her feathers 
with yellow gold.” Psalm 68: 13 
18 “Nil igitur mors est ad nos.” Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, III, line 831 
19 One must view the roughly contemporaneous advent of program music as something of an aesthetic aberration.  
Amir Dagan 36 
 
Let us first correct potential misunderstandings. Pater is not saying the greatest is necessarily 
musical, but that what is characteristic of all art is music’s natural condition. To this end it is 
probably helpful to imagine he is referring to abstract instrumental music (or wordless vocal 
music), in my mind, preferably of classical or Baroque, or possibly modern periods (postdating 
Pater himself). Pater is in a sense clearing away all the misapprehensions that preceded and, 
unfortunately, succeeding him…a noble attempt.  
 Let us attempt to illustrate his model of art with a broad example. Take a sonata or 
symphony of Haydn or Mozart, mostly at random (excepting perhaps those Haydn works that 
have some overt programmatic relevance like his 26th or 45th symphonies). In what ways can 
we distinguish its construction, our apprehension, and the nature of the work itself? No doubt, to 
varying degrees known or impossible to know, some affect or event or feeling might have gone 
into the construction. Similarly shall we have our reactions to the work, which are themselves 
infinitely varied, both from one another and, more so, from the secret causes, if such exist, that 
led to the work’s existence. A man might, on the day his child has perished, write a piece that 
draws from his audience a sense of jollity or brilliance, or inversely he may while playing 
billiards construct something that evokes pathos, or despair…or, his auditor might simply follow 
the music’s lines, its construction, the progress of its harmonies and the tensions of its 
counterpoint…or still like a scent or taste he might be drawn from his attention into some kind of 
reverie, some memory, some concern which just then he has not realized is pressing cruelly 
down upon his heart.  
 All of these reactions are of course natural, and in their way productive, but only the 
listener following the sound is following something that is actually, necessarily there. In large 
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part, such music does not make reference to anything outside its own sounds and their 
organization, and the structures, tensions, resolutions, etc that are thereby entailed. This is not to 
say they are not capable of evoking things outside themselves—almost any experience, naturally, 
is ripe with the capacity to evoke—only that such music is by nature non-referential. This is what 
Pater means when he says it is impossible to distinguish the matter from the form (we must also 
remember the sorts of artworks that had so far presented themselves to his scrutiny)—the matter 
in a symphony by Mozart is, broadly, comprised of sounds as he has formally organized them. 
And as the pleasure we derive therein has no reference to anything in life but those sounds, we 
must concede that those sounds are beautiful.  
 
Art, then, is thus always striving to be independent of the mere intelligence, to become a 
matter of pure perception, to get rid of its responsibilities to its subject or material; the 
ideal examples of poetry and painting being those in which the constituent elements of 
the composition are so welded together, that the material or subject no longer strikes the 
intellect only; nor the form, the eye or the ear only; but form and matter, in their union or 
identity, present one single effect to the "imaginative reason," that complex faculty for 
which every thought and feeling is twin-born with its sensible analogue or symbol. 
It is the art of music which most completely realizes this artistic ideal, this perfect 
identification of matter and form. In its consummate moments, the end is not distinct 
from the means, the form from the matter, the subject from the expression; they inhere in 
and completely saturate each other; and to it, therefore, to the condition of its perfect 
moments, all the arts may be supposed constantly to tend and aspire. In music, then, 
rather than in poetry, is to be found the true type or measure of perfected art. Therefore, 
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although each art has its incommunicable element, its untranslatable order of 
impressions, its unique mode of reaching the "imaginative reason," yet the arts may be 
represented as continually struggling after the law or principle of music, to a condition 
which music alone completely realizes; and one of the chief functions of aesthetic 
criticism, dealing with the products of art, new or old, is to estimate the degree in which 
each of those products approaches, in this sense, to musical law. (88-89) 
 
Pater suggests that the ideal union of matter and form exists in music where form is essentially 
the same as the matter—sound. In this case, one cannot say that the intellect is the primary 
faculty that is being cultivated, because the mind is focused only on the sensuous materials 
themselves, and not their extra-musical meaning. In this it becomes an object of “pure 
perception” for the subject, and all art aspires to this union of mater and form so that perception 
alone will be the goal, rather than thought.  The degree to which this condition, as Pater says, of 
music, may be present in the other arts, may be simply illustrated by an example. But we should 
say first, that this condition of music has always been in every art that is great or beautiful, 
abstract or no, referential or no—the degree to which its manner is irreducible, untranslatable, is 
what we call beauty.   
 Picture, at random, two representations in painting of the Madonna and child. The history 
of painting has furnished us with perhaps hundreds of thousands of such examples. Of course 
they may differ between periods, between artists, between individual examples in a given artist’s 
work, and so in size, and style, in their varied allusions, in their color and form, in their purpose 
whether liturgical or personal, whether made for churches or the private chapel of an aristocrat or 
the academy of the Louvre or a holiday calendar, etc, etc. It cannot but be conceded that, in the 
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main, they all have as their subject matter, something roughly identical—the representation of 
Mary with the infant Jesus. And yet these objects are as various as there are different paintings—
they vary by degrees, it is true, but no two are identical except in the possible instance where the 
literal organization of forms and colors and lines are identical. 
 
 
Giovanni Bellini, Madonna del Prato, 1505 
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William-Adolphe Bougerau, Regina Angelorum, 1900 
  
What is it that distinguishes them? If we say, for example, verisimilitude, surely another painting 
can be found that will approach each in that capacity. If it is style, the same, if it is historical 
context, the same, allusions, the same as well. But is this not arguing as if against the immense 
tide of an obvious fact, that it is not their content which distinguishes them, but their form? 
Everything but the thing represented is what Pater calls the condition of music, and that is the 
feature that is characteristic of art and unique to it. The difference in a color, the difference in its 
interaction with another, the shapeliness of a curve, a jarring angle, a strangeness present as 
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much in something distant and foreign as something lush and inviting, these are the music of 
such works. Everything else is, however fascinating or informative, ultimately comparable to 
Sainte-Beuve’s Lundis. And to the degree that music may be evaluated, this is what we call 
judgment, or taste, and to the degree that a good judgment is deserved, that music is beautiful. 
 True, one may argue that in fact they have slightly different symbols, or references, that 
they allude to political matters or philosophical debates, or issues of trade, or vary in their 
depictions of region or nationality or city or race or gender, or that some variation reflects a 
certain patron, a historical event, the painter’s gout, his impotence, his fondness for chocolate or 
prostitutes or eels. These may be true, some or all, or many others. But to say that they are the 
primary reasons for the paintings’ different evaluation is really a pedantry almost to the point of 
parody. It’s rather like discovering the person with whom you have fallen in love has some 
minor quirk, or hobby, and then claiming that this latter is the source of your love. Why must we 
continuously lie to ourselves? (that will be explained also, in the first chapter). It’s not the 
reference to a pope or a Borgia, it’s not the subtle indication of a position in a debate between 
Platonism and Aristotelianism, it’s not the color’s indication of changes in a city’s fortune or 
trade routes that matter when we distinguish these things, when we love one and ignore 
another…it is what Pater calls music, and we may call beauty.  
 Or, to take an example in another medium, let us turn to a line of Homer’ Odyssey, 
translated by Robert Fitzgerald, the dramatic recognition of Odysseus and Telemachus: 
          Salt tears 
  rose in the wells of longing in both men (XIV, 255-256).  
 
It is clear that there is both factual information that is being provided, a compelling metaphorical 
transmission of that information (“wells of longing’), and the myriad contingencies of style, of 
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rhythm and sound and the arrangements of meaning within the subtle and complex music of 
language. Yet obviously the same essential content may be expressed in an infinite number of 
ways, for example: 
  the wells of longing in both men yielded salt tears, 
or the more literal: 
  father and son wept upon seeing one another 
or the terrible: 
  saline discharge was secreted from the ocular cavities of two adult males.  
These are four of what are probably infinite ways of expressing essentially the same concept, and 
though the same information is represented, these are clearly not alike. Some are not good 
poetry, some are not poetry at all, and some, very rarely, are beautiful, whereas most are not. As 
Etienne Gilson points out, with reference to Shakespeare, “those who think the problem is to put 
into verse what could be sais equally well in prose are verisfiers not poets…verbal fireworks are 
there for their own sake; their very presence transfigures the poetic element. (Gilson, 65). By 
“prose,” he means content—the poetic, element, or style, is the one that may achieve beauty.  
 We may turn as well to two of Shelley’s examples, Hebrew poetry and the “antient 
monuments” handed down to us. When Pater used a verse of the psalms in its gorgeous English 
translation for his epigraph, we may assume he had no very fine religious feeling, unless it was 
that feeling which approaches a sense of divinity in the pleasure of beauty. One may ponder the 
religious feeling that informed the writing of the psalms, if so it was, the building of Chartres, a 
Madonna of Bellini, a Cantata of Bach. It may be that each or all of these creations was informed 
by a devotion and piety largely distant from the majority of those who today encounter them—it 
may be too that some or all of those creators sought to instill a piety like or greater to their own 
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in those who encountered their creations. A man may also build a mausoleum for his wife, and 
she, dead 1000 years, and those who visit it admire not the wife, but the mausoleum. Which is to 
say, whatever their feelings were, they were artists, they made art that was marked by what Pater 
calls music, the untranslatable magic, divorced from its subject even as the subject may form the 
materials of that music, or kindle the creator’s will to create it. 
 Shelley speaks of ancient monuments, which unlike the religions of the ancient world, 
have not been extinguished. I do not know, and probably shall never know, who among the 
makers of those sculptures was devout in the service of the god he represented in bronze. Was 
Phidias as profound in his prayers to Athena as Praxiteles to Hermes? Did either pray? Does the 
answer to these sorts of questions really change the sculpture to those who view them? If the 
answer is no, then we are viewing it aesthetically, for its music, for its beauty. The Greek 
religion is dead, and the rites that were held about these sculptures, in its temples, the fires that 
kindled and the flowers that were scattered and the smell of burning fat all are gone. What 
remains? What remains in Apollo’s face, in Hermes’ torso, later, in Aphrodite’s breasts, is not 
belief, is not an idea…it is, like music, a form, which aspires to—and sometimes achieves—a 
state of beauty.  
 Pater, acknowledging that art is both composed and enjoyed by a roughly congruent set 
of humans, divorces the peculiar quality that defines art as art from anything that might reference 
the phenomenal world. The materialist view of art as representation, by which politically and 
philosophically minded thinkers from Plato onward have viewed art, often suspiciously, is 
abolished by a metaphor in which is implicit the most scientific knowledge—if music is to be the 
purest of arts and the symbol for them all, no work of art in the sense that it might be considered 
art, is beholden to its subject in any degree. A poem may recount precisely those same incidents 
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as a history, a landscape painting a gardener’s data, a sublime picture of a Madonna quite the 
same as an abysmal one. What unites the former examples does not proceed from their subject 
but from a quality shared with music, which has no subject but its own organization, and it is this 
quality that is named the aesthetic.  
 This attitude, in which the materials from which an artwork is constructed cannot be said 
to define its aesthetic nature, achieved probably its greatest currency among artists and writers in 
the period of early modernism. Mallarme, whose use of language seems eminently suited to 
Pater’s notions of music, said of his poetry: “They are the same words that the Bourgeois reads 
every morning—the very same! But then (and here his smile broadened), if he finds them again 
in one of my poems he no longer understands them! That’s because they have been rewritten by 
a poet.” (Butler, 4-5) The same idea of verbal patterning akin to music is self-evident among 
other modernist poets, or prose writers such as Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner. Similarly, Emile 
Bernard said of his art that it was the, “raising of form towards a decorative conception and of 
colour towards the most music pitch. So that as the artist works on, the further he gets from 
objectivity, from the opacity of the model he started from, and the deeper he goes into sheer 
painting for its own sake[,]”  (13) or Braque, of his Grand Nu, “I couldn’t portray a woman in 
her natural loveliness…I haven’t the skill. No one has. I must, therefore, create a new sort of 
thing, the beauty that appears to me in terms of volume, of line, of weight, and through that 
beauty interpret my subjective impression. Nature is a mere pretext for decorative composition, 
plus sentiment.” (18) 
 The principle of imitating the idea of music is perhaps best seen in the work and thought 
of Kandinsky, who specifically likened his abstract creation to music, and was known to have 
achieved his breakthrough into abstraction simultaneously with and in awareness of 
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Schoenberg’s abandonment of tonality (the latter comparison here is perhaps less relevant tot his 
study, as all music, tonal and atonal, must fit Pater’s ideas). As Butler says, “By turning away 
from ‘the third dimension’ of material objects ‘into a realm of the abstract,’ Kandinsky wanted to 
construct ‘some ideal plane which shall be expressed in terms of the material plane of the 
canvas.’ (41)20 Walter Frisch, in exploring Kandinsky’s relation to Schoenberg, notes that 
Kandinsky hoped, “each art will display that extra element which is essential and peculiar to 
itself,” (Frisch, 116) and quotes Kandinsky as saying that, “an artist who sees that the imitation 
of natural appearances however artistic is not for him—the kind of creative artist who wants to, 
and has to, express his own inner world—sees with envy how naturally and easily such goals can 
be attained in music, the least material of the arts today.” (Kandinsky, 154) Each of these figures 
seems to wish to isolate the materials of his art in manner akin to musical composition, to free 
their art from the exigencies of actual life and achieve a dimension that here we and Pater might 
call aesthetic.  
 This idea, which in Pater found maybe its most cogent and lasting expression, did not 
originate in him. To the extent that such are ideas are mere expressions of what in nature is 
already deducible, they had been present in art of the Greeks, in Ruskin’s Gothic, in Bach’s 
“glory of God” quite as much as in Mozart’s idea of “taste.” As a coherent ideology, the 
precursors were, quite naturally, to be found in France: in Baudelaire, and in Gautier’s maxim 
against utilitarianism: “the most useful room in the house is the latrine.” More significantly, 
perhaps, they influenced the dominant forms of creativity in the West roughly from the First until 
 
20 The theosophical ideas of Kandinsky or Scriabin or Yeats do not need to be taken so seriously by us in and of 
themselves…their pseudo-religious character may be said to correspond to the anti-positivist nature of art as it came 
to be more properly understood. 
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the Second World War, when the broad ethical, democratic, and more importantly utilitarian 
movements in culture attempted to extinguish their memory.  
His is an assertion that has, certainly in the latter part of the twentieth century, been 
viewed with increasing distaste.  To the extent that aestheticism has always been a rebellion 
against utilitarian ideas, one may say that once the dominant ideologies of economics and 
politics had infected that of art, the downfall of aestheticism was inevitable. But to call 
aestheticism a rebellion is to beg the question: perhaps it was only that the aesthetic credo needed 
articulation in the face of the utilitarian onslaught. Two forms of criticism attached at the hip to 
the utilitarian worldview have essentially vanquished Pater’s, and it is this state of affairs that 
this dissertation seeks to begin to rectify. From a philosophical perspective, empiricism has 
undermined the epistemological possibility of an objective aestheticism. More consistently in 
academe, political interpretations have relegated aestheticism to an oppressive ideology precisely 
for those aristocratic tendencies that, while lacking any political import, have permitted it to 
come closest among critical methods to, at the very least, approaching the phenomenon of beauty 
freely, without the fetters of utility. 
 
V 
To the degree that the trends Sontag and others describe might be set in diametric opposition 
with another view, or by which a stance may be articulated that is in favor of aesthetics and 
opposed to existing trends, this position is necessarily dependent upon terminology introduced 
and defined by Immanuel Kant. It is not proposed here that Kant is the originator of the 
sensations he describes or necessarily always the most accurate in all his formulations about 
beauty, but merely that, to the degree that his cautious and methodical cast of mind attempted to 
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separate peculiar sensations from either those related to pure empiricism or pure intellect, and 
codify the nature of said experiences to an extent more logical than any that had preceded it, all 
later arguments in aesthetics without recourse either to morals or relativistic hedonism are in a 
sense neo-Kantian.  
After his first two critiques, which focused broadly on the ability for reason to make 
synthetic judgments a priori of experience—i.e., for the Reason to come to conclusions without 
empirical data—and his attempt to ascertain whether there was a reasonable ground for moral 
judgment, Kant embarked on the perhaps unenviable task of ascertaining whether there are 
grounds for aesthetic judgment.  The problem has been perhaps oversimplified in favor of 
disbelief. It is true that people enjoy aesthetic experiences, and yet there seems to be no possible 
rule by which to justify objective judgments. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant investigated the 
nature of aesthetic sensation to determine whether it had any intersubjective validity, that is, 
whether judgments could be made more broadly applicable than to the relative subject. He took it 
as a given that beauty could not be determined to be the property of an object, a claim which 
requires its own investigation.  
 The concept of the aesthetic can be traced to the theories of Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten, who “called for the establishment of a science of aesthetics—a science that would 
deal with human perception….Baumgarten introduces the possibility that perception might have 
its own excellence—that a vivid sensory experience…might offer something special that would 
not be improved by analyzing it.” (Prettejohn, 40) Yet it was Kant who attempted to define with 
precision what was the nature of the excellence perceived, and what could and could not 
rationally be attributed to our sensation of beauty.  It may be most useful for the purposes of the 
argument advanced here to begin with his definition of judgment itself, since that is what Sontag 
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points out is currently unacceptable in so many quarters. With his unique capacity for the 
exceedingly precise definition of familiar concepts, Kant states in his introduction that: 
 
“Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the 
Universal.” 
 
That is, in order to make an evaluation of a particular manifestation of reality, be it object or 
action, the evaluation can only be made with reference to a universal principle. Already we see 
the problem that, using this logic (or simply our intuitions in the matte) will attend making 
aesthetic judgments. Because it is clear that we possess no universal by which to measure 
individual moments of aesthetic delight. It is for this reason that Kant proposes two sorts of 
judgments, the determinant, in which the universal is given, and the reflective judgment, which 
he contends is that employed in aesthetic matters: 
 
“If only the particular be given for which the universal has to be found, the Judgment is 
merely reflective.” 
 
Kant’s phrasing is significant—he says, “has to be found,” rather than merely saying “does not 
exist.” It is the latter option that seems to inform, subconsciously, Sontag’s “who sez?” But Kant, 
characteristically, is more careful in his formulation. There may indeed be a universal, only we 
are not currently in possession of it. Whether it is possible ever to possess it is a question without 
an easy answer; suffice to say now that aesthetic judgments, which Kant places within the 
category of reflective ones, are made without reference to a known universal.  
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 The natural question one may ask is, if there is not universal to be found, which might in 
turn mean that no such universal exists, what purpose is there in proposing the existence of 
reflective judgments at all? For within the logic of his own definitions, judgments require 
universals. To put this in more contemporary terms, if there’s no objective ground for judgment, 
why not just forget the whole concept of judgment when dealing with objects for which we have 
no objective or agreed upon (intersubjective) standard for measurement?  
 Intuition tells us this is not quite adequate. As Proust enjoins us sometimes to refer to 
what is self-evident, what “a slight degree of self-acquaintance” teaches us, we can see by our 
own experience that the absence of a known universal measure does not fully account for the 
experience of beauty. In fact, the search for universal standards, and the supposed failure of that 
search come quite late in the process, after the experience of beauty has already taken place. 
Before that, we have a sense that it isn’t only a subjective experience at all, but that we are in the 
presence of something akin to objective truth, and when we seek to compare our judgments with 
others, we have the sense, long since culturally repressed, that judgments may be compared with 
regard to their accuracy.  
To account for his characteristic, Kant employs the concept of ‘purposiveness.’ Because 
we lack a universal measure, we must find a principle by which to find the universal, and 
purposiveness is such a principle: 
 
This indeterminate concept is the concept of nature's "subjective purposiveness," i.e., 
nature's purposiveness for our (the subject's) power of judgment: and the principle of 
judgment to which this concept gives rise is simply the assumption that nature in its 
particular (as we find it in empirical intuition) is "subjectively purposive," i.e., purposive 
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for our power of judgment in the sense of lending itself to being judged by us. (Pluhar, 
lvi.) 
 
Purposiveness, then, is a feature of subjectivity which leads us to feel the inclination or necessity 
of judgment, or put another way, it gives the indelible impression that subjective experience of 
judgment is not local, is not unique only to the subjectivity making a judgment, but which 
implies that said judgment is universally applicable—i.e., it contains the seeds of the universality 
that have yet to be found.  
 
When the form of an object (rather than what is material in its presentation, viz., in 
sensation) is judged in mere reflection on it (without regard to a concept that is to be 
acquired from it) to be the basis of a pleasure in such an object's presentation, then the 
presentation of this object is also judged to be connected necessarily with this pleasure, 
and hence connected with it not merely for the subject apprehending this form but in 
general for everyone who judges. The object is then called beautiful, and our ability to 
judge by such a pleasure (and hence also with universal validity) is called taste. For the 
basis of the pleasure is posited merely in the form of the object for reflection in general, 
and hence not in a sensation of the object, nor with a reference to any concept that might 
involve some intention or other. Therefore, the harmony we are dealing with is only a 
harmony in reflection. whose a priori conditions are valid universally, between the 
presentation of the object and the lawfulness [inherent] in the empirical use in general of 
the subject's power of judgment (Intro, VII) 
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Note here it is the form of the object, not its mere sensation, and practically all those who argue 
in the validity of aesthetic judgment believe such judgment is related to form. Kant says the 
presentation of this object is “necessarily” concerned with the subject’s pleasure—this is its 
purposiveness, because it is not contingent merely on the subject, even though pleasure is 
experienced by the subject, but must inevitably or necessarily be true. Its purposiveness implies 
that the sensation of pleasure, and the judgment of the object as beautiful will have “universal 
validity,” or a “lawfulness.” Purposiveness then, is the sense of lawfulness in absence of the law 
(universal).  
 Yet what is the nature of pleasure at the experience of beauty, and how does it differ from 
other forms of experiential pleasure? This is, for our purposes perhaps the most significant aspect 
of Kant’s vocabulary.  Despite the object’s purposiveness, the primary experience of beauty is 
sensory, not cognitive, and is related to the perceptions of pleasure or pain/displeasure. Yet there 
are forms of pleasure that are fundamentally different from the pleasure we take in beauty, such 
as “liking” (or satisfaction) bound up in interest: 
 
Interest is what we call the liking we connect with the presentation of an object's 
existence. Hence such a liking always refers at once to our power of desire, either as the 
basis that determines it, or at any rate as necessarily connected with that determining 
basis. But if the question is whether something is beautiful, what we want to know is not 
whether we or anyone cares, or so much as might care, in any way, about the thing's 
existence, but rather how we judge it in our mere contemplation of it (intuition or 
reflection). (45) 
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We are all familiar with what it means in common parlance to be interested; Kant here defines it 
in opposition to the pleasure of contemplation. In other words, disinterested pleasure is not 
predicated upon the general existence of the object, except insofar as one is contemplating it. He 
illustrates this by means of an example (presented in a footnote below). 21 He describes various 
living accommodations, starting with a palace about which an interlocutor asks whether it is 
beautiful. One may, Kant explains, analyze whether one likes to live in this sort of 
accommodation or that, whether certain forms of life are more or less consistent with one’s 
beliefs, etc. But none of these questions is relevant to the questions of beauty, because for 
disinterested pleasure to exist, the palace would not have to be investigated as a possession or an 
accommodation, but merely as it presents itself to the perceiving subject.  
 The liking or satisfaction, Kant claims, has three manifestations, the aesthetic, the 
agreeable (or pleasant), and an interest in the good. The sense of the agreeable or pleasant is 
located purely in sensation: 
 
When [something determines the feeling of pleasure or displeasure and this] 
determination of that feeling is called sensation, this term means something quite 
different from what it means when I apply it to the presentation of a thing (through the 
senses, a receptivity that belongs to the cognitive power). For in the second case the 
 
21 Suppose someone asks me whether I consider the palace I see before me beautiful. I might reply that I am not fond of things of that sort, made 
merely to be gaped at. Or I might reply like that Iroquois sachem who said that he liked nothing better in Paris than the eating-houses. I might 
even go on, as Rousseau would, to rebuke the vanity of the great who spend the people's sweat on such superfluous things. I might, finally, quite 
easily convince myself that, if I were on some uninhabited island with no hope of ever again coming among people, and could conjure up such a 
splendid edifice by a mere wish, I would not even take that much trouble for it if I already had a sufficiently comfortable hut. The questioner may 
grant all this and approve of it; but it is not to the point. All he wants to know is whether my mere presentation of the object is accompanied by a 
liking, no matter how indifferent I may be about the existence of the object of this presentation. We can easily see that, in order for me to say that 
an object is beautiful, and to prove that I have taste, what matters is what I do with this presentation within myself, and not the [respect] in which 
I depend on the object's existence. (46) 
Amir Dagan 53 
presentation is referred to the object, but in the first it is referred solely to the subject and 
is not used for cognition at all, not even for that by which the subject cognizes himself. 
(47) 
 
When we have a sensation purely of pleasure that is not aesthetic, we only perceive it insofar as 
it affects us and not in relation to the object. This is fundamentally different from aesthetic 
pleasure, because while aesthetic pleasure does give us the sensation of pleasure, which we can 
call pleasant or agreeable in a sense different than that in which it used here, our pleasure is 
uniquely linked to our interaction with that object, and located in our perception of that object. 
Kant focuses on the cognitive element in aesthetic relations. Unlike normal pleasure, aesthetic 
pleasure is connected to the object experienced. A liking for the good, on the other hand, is 
purely related to ideas, i.e. the universal of good, rather than in the local interaction with a 
specific instant: 
 
In order to consider something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is 
[meant] to be, i.e., I must have a [determinate) concept of it. But I do not need this in 
order to find beauty in something. Flowers, free designs, lines aimlessly intertwined and 
called foliage: these have no significance, depend on no determinate concept, and yet we 
like [gefallen] them. A liking [Wohlgefallen 14] for the beautiful must depend on the 
reflection, regarding an object, that leads to some concept or other (but it is indeterminate 
which concept this is). This dependence on reflection also distinguishes the liking for the 
beautiful from (that for) the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation. (49) 
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Like Schiller who took the notion from him, Kant sees the aesthetic as a link between the world 
of sensation and the world of ideas. A judgment of whether something is good fits into the 
category described earlier of determinant judgments, ones that contain within them a known 
universal. Beauty, however, reveals itself to us in unpredictable particularities, a piece of music, 
a landscape, a line of poetry, a face. These cannot be understood in terms of preconceived 
notions but themselves imply the potential for universals that make them appropriate for 
judgment. Beauty then leads us to a potential universal through the experience of particularity—
we might say instances of the beautiful lead us to the concept of beauty.  
 
Kant is a great systemizer of thinking, but I think in the definition discussed above, his is 
not an intellect contrary to the self-knowledge Proust puts forward. Indeed, the sense of 
disinterestedness seems fairly self-evident—Kant merely provides a relatively detailed analysis 
of its nature. Yet it is a reality graspable by intuition as well—it is perhaps the defining 
distinction of aesthetic experience, and it is likely from the reality of disinterestedness that the 
more hyperbolic mottoes of art for art’s sake or l’art pour l’art emerged. Kant himself, in an 
earlier work, Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, made a less methodical 
observation about the distinction between aesthetic delight and other, interested pleasure:  
 
Now it is customary to call useful only what can provide  sufficiency for our coarser 
sensation, which can supply us with a surplus in eating and drinking, display in clothing 
and in furniture, and lavishness in entertainment…he whom self-interest governs is a man 
with whom one must never reason concerning the finer taste> In this respect a hen is 
more useful than a parrot, a kitchen pot is more useful than a porcelain vase, all the witty 
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heads in the world have not the value of a peasant, and the effort to discover the distance 
if the fixed stars can be set aside until it has been decided how to drive the plow to best 
advantage. (72-3) 
 
The suspicion of the relevance of utility in relation to observations of beauty is here not so 
distant from Gautier or Wilde. The language might seem a bit pompous and elitist by current 
standards (this shall be a pattern with those who believe in beauty), and the tenor rather opposed 
to the utilitarian values of the present, but the concept of disinterestedness is nascent here as, 
presumably, in all such “finer feelings.” The plow, the kitchen pot, the hen, these all are values 
for what they can produce for the individuals person, the advancement of his own existence, 
which, once usefulness is achieved, becomes divorced from anything without that individual, 
while the finer feelings are always in some kind of communion with something else, whether the 
colors of the parrot or the curiosity and majesty associated with a study of the stars.  
 The intuitive nature of this understanding, which is aided by Kant’s terminology but not 
strictly reliant upon it, is evident in any experience of beauty, and is the foundation of what is 
perhaps Kant’s most controversial doctrine, his belief in intersubjective validity of aesthetic 
judgment, or the sensus communis. Because he claims it is impossible to find the universal, we 
cannot strictly say that beauty is a characteristic of the objects described as beautiful, but that 
judgments of beauty may have universal validity among men and women. Kant is aware that it is 
both impossible to expect universal assent for a particular judgment, and impossible to possess 
sufficient experience of like judgments to supply a universal rule for this judgment: 
 
Rather, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called 
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exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the assent of everyone to a judgment that is regarded as an 
example of a universal rule that we are unable to state. Since an aesthetic judgment is not 
an objective and cognitive one, this necessity cannot be derived from determinate 
concepts and hence is not apodeictic. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of 
experience (from a thorough agreement among judgments about the beauty of a certain 
object). For not only would experience hardly furnish a sufficient amount of evidence for 
this, but a concept of the necessity of these judgments cannot be based on empirical 
judgments. (85-6) 
 
The stumbling block is that judgment is not apodeictic, or established beyond dispute. Kant is 
nevertheless proposing that even if this is not possible for aesthetic judgment, the judgment can 
still be exemplary. This means that there is potential universal assent of a rule as yet 
undiscovered, or “unable to state.” The principle by which we arrive at this exemplary judgment  
in his estimation: 
 
could only be regarded as a common sense. This common sense is essentially distinct 
from the common understanding that is sometimes also called common sense (sensus 
communis); for the latter judges not by feeling but always by concepts, even though these 
concepts are usually only principles conceived obscurely. (87) 
 
I would reframe this argument in slightly Aristotelian terms. Each person maybe said to have a 
telos, an ideal end for which they are made, and similarly, there is the ideal apogee of their 
capacity for accurate aesthetic judgment, which reaches in various degrees of proximity to the 
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unknown universal to which Kant refers, i.e. the exemplary judgment. In the sense that there is a 
universal to which all men are varyingly aware, the exemplary judgment which if they achieve 
their ideal capacity for judgment is an aesthetic sense shared in common. Kant defends his idea 
by the supposition that to some degree all cognition must be communicable, and that if the act of 
judgment is a cognition referring to an unknown universal, then the commonality of the 
exemplary judgment must be shared too. As Karl Jaspers summarizes: 
  
Everyone is expected to experience [the object’s] beauty as valid…this universal validity 
is fundamentally different from that of a logical judgment. 
  In beholding a beautiful object, we form an idea of purposiveness but not of any 
particular purpose. If perfection of an object is seen as fitness for a purpose, such 
perfection is not beauty….In beauty we behold a radiant truth, but not the knowledge of 
any object. (Jaspers, 78)  
 
The defense of this concept will appear in the final chapter—for now, it is merely important to 
note the basic tenets of Kantian aesthetics: disinterestedness, purposiveness, the definition of 




Defenders of beauty or the art’s aesthetic integrity and independence have a difficult time 
defining the thing they wish to defend, which in itself is not a criticism. Beauty is a 
notoriously difficult concept to define, as Pater points out in his introduction to the 
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Renaissance: any attempts have been made by writers on art and poetry to define beauty 
in the abstract, to express it in the most general terms, to find some universal formula for 
it. The value of these attempts has most often been in the suggestive and penetrating 
things said by the way. Such discussions help us very little to enjoy what has been well 
done in art or poetry, to discriminate between what is more and what is less excellent in 
them, or to use words like beauty, excellence, art, poetry, with a more precise meaning 
than they would otherwise have. Beauty, like all other qualities presented to human 
experience, is relative; and the definition of it becomes unmeaning and useless in 
proportion to its abstractness. (Preface to The Renaissance, xxix) 
 
Whether the concept is indeed relative is open to debate—here it is viewed as too various to 
formulate any empirical definition. The reasons for this are fairly obvious. Beauty encompasses 
such a wide variety of unlike objects: music, language, color and line, nature, the human face, 
etc, with such a variety within those and other categories, that to solve for the variable of beauty 
would be to solve an equation with infinite variables…an impossible task. There is simply no 
way to isolate this variable to the point where we might derive a precise definition of its features 
common to all these examples. This is not to say that such a definition does not exist…merely 
that it may be beyond the capacity for human intellect to derive it. In this case Pater’s approach 
seems reasonable, in that it avoids any tendency towards wild inaccuracy. And indeed, as his 
goal is pleasure, the theoretical justification of beauty’s existence does little in itself, as he says, 
to enhance pleasure.  
 What Pater mostly ignores—it cannot be he failed to consider it—is that the mass 
rejection of the concept of beauty, or as Sontag put it, “the decline in the belief that there is 
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something called art,” has from a practical perspective limited the opportunity to enjoy beauty by 
gradually erasing its significance from the wider culture. As Denis Donoghue says in his 
discussion of Pater’s aesthetic theories, “It would not be necessary to say anything about ‘art for 
art’s sake’ if readers still held the view of art an literature that A.C. Bradley elucidated in his 
inaugural lecture as professor of poetry at oxford….[a] state of mind I should try to maintain, 
against would  other considerations, in reading a poem.” (279-280)22 To that end, the legitimacy 
of art requires a defense against the forces that seek to and have largely succeeded in displacing 
it.  
 
 Although not explicitly about beauty, William Marx’s The Hatred of Literature, 2015, 
provides a useful outline for examining the opposition to art and beauty which is roughly 
comparable to the opposition of an equally vague definition of literature’s values. Marx divides 
anti-literature into four discreet but sometimes related trials, which follow upon one another 
historically while often overlapping: trial by authority, truth, morality and society. It is the latter 
two that will primarily concern us, but a brief understanding of the earliest roots of opposition to 
art certainly inform the contemporary hatred of beauty.  
 The first two trials belong to debates outside the scope of the book. The first concerns 
political and sometimes religious fear of literature’s excessive influence on society as it is 
governed. The second, the trial on truth, as exemplified in C.P. Snow’s attacks on the 
 
22 “First, this experience [of poetry] is an end in itself, is worth having on its own account, has an intrinsic value. 
Next, its poetic value is this intrinsic worth alone. Poetry might have an ulterior value as a means to culture or 
religion….so much the better….but its ulterior worth neither is not can directly determine its poetic worth….and this 
is to be judged entirely from within…..its nature is to be not a part, nor yet a copy, of the real world…but to be a 
world by itself, independent, complete, autonomous; and to possess it fully, you must enter that world, conform to 
its laws, and ignore for the time the beliefs, aims, and particular conditions which belong to you in the other world 
of reality.” (quoted in Donoghue, 279-80) 
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humanities,23 largely considers science’s war on the accuracy of literary statements, and reduces 
literary insight to verifiable or unverifiable statements. Marx traces back the early arguments 
against poetry to Plato, admitting that since Plato’s attack, literature has lost much of its 
authority, not entirely to its detriment…one wishes, for example, parts of Genesis were read 
more for aesthetic pleasure than literal guidance. Marx of course refers to how, in his ideal 
Republic, Plato famously banished all poets who brought mere delight: 
 
Then what if someone should arrive in our city who is clever enough to play all sorts of 
roles and to imitate anything? If he proposes to put on a performance and recite the 
poetry he has brought with him, we shall certainly bow to him and pay him homage, 
calling him sweet, blessed, and wonderful, and say there is none like him in the city. But 
we shall also say the law forbids his kind to remain in the city. Then we shall anoint him 
with myrrh, garland his head with wool, and send him away to some other place. (3.398a) 
 
In opposition to this poet, Plato finds acceptable one who is “more austere,” who speaks in the 
“style of the good man and will tell stories in accordance with the rules we laid down …[for] the 
education of our soldiers.” (3.398b) Which makes sense, as the inhabitants of Plato’s Republic 
are “single-minded people, each doing one thing only.” (3.397d) As Marx points out (33), it is 
almost impossible to imagine nowadays, Plato’s fear of poetry’s seduction of the masses—it has 
no capacity to do so. Yet his fear in its seductive power was rooted in his distrust of its still 
extant properties, a pleasure that is apparently dissimilar from truth. Plato’s criticism sets, one 
 
23 Specifically in his 1959 Cambridge Lecture, “The Two Cultures,” which afterward was published as a book 
frequently assigned in American universities, notably Columbia, where it was made required reading in 1960. 
(Marx, 59) 
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may argue, a precedent for the misunderstanding of aesthetics that continues to the present day. 
In his early dialogue Ion, Socrates interrogates a rhapsode in that manner of his, somehow at 
once irritating and charming. Ion, Socrates wants to prove, is an idiot. 
 Like most rhapsodes, Ion would chant Homeric poetry, sometimes embodying Homer’s 
characters in a dramatic form. Like only some rhapsodes, however, he lectured: 
 
For the Greeks regarded Homer not only as an authoritative teacher of human 
relationships and conduct, but also as a repository of worthwhile information on technical 
matters….The rhapsodes undertook to elucidate Homer’s lines and to expiate…on their 
practical and moral relevance. This side of their activities was in effect an early form of 
literary criticism.  (39-40) 
 
Perhaps Ion’s expanded activities provided him with too easy a foil for Socrates’ outstanding 
cleverness. Yet it is not the quite the arguments that Socrates makes that pertain here, but the 
assumptions upon which the arguments are based, and with which Ion naively agrees, that 
concern us. Socrates first chastises Ion for claiming Homer is superior, when he knows only 
Homer and none of the other poets: 
 
SOCRATES[…]both Homer and Hesiod say something about divination….in their 
descriptions of divination these two poets sometimes agree and sometimes differ. In 
either case, who would give a better explanation of their words, you or one of the good 
prophets.  
ION: One of the good prophets.  
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SOCRATES: And if you were a prophet, then since you’d be capable of explaining the 
points on which poets’ statements agree, you’d also know how to expound those on 
which their statements differ, wouldn’t you? 
ION: Obviously.  
SOCRATES: Then why on earth does your prowess extend to Homer, but not to Hesiod 
or the other poets? or does Homer have themes which are different from themes which all 
other poets have? Hasn’t he mostly described warfare, and how men associate with one 
another…and about how gods behave….and about what goes on in the heavens and in 
Hades….Isn’t this the subject-matter on which Homer has composed his poetry? 
ION: That’s right, Socrates.  
SOCRATES:  What of the other poets? Don’t they talk about these same topics? 
ION: Yes—but Socrates, they haven’t composed like Homer has. (50-51) 
 
Ion’s tendency to lecture has perhaps incited Socrates’ criticism. How, Socrates asks, can Ion 
speak accurately on divination, when he is less equipped to deal with the topic than “one of the 
good prophets?” It is a question contemporary literary critics might do well to ponder. Yet Plato 
too is guilty in a sense of Ion’s misunderstanding, if not his hubris. Socrates suggests that if 
Homer and Hesiod both speak of divination, or warfare, or of the gods, or husbandry or what 
have you, and if it is observed that they speak differently, then it must be supposed that one of 
them must have a greater expertise in the subject. Naturally, only the greatest expert in each 
respective subject—a prophet, a soldier or general, a priest, a farmer—could function as the 
authority on that subject, and the value of Homer or Hesiod’s representation, or consequently of 
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Ion’s exposition of that representation, is inferior if it is not in keeping with expert opinion on the 
subject.  
 Yet it seems obvious that, if it is true Homer was taken as an “authoritative teacher” on 
all manner of subjects he addresses in his poetry, this assumption occurred, historically, 
subsequent to the adulation of his poetry, which cannot possibly have achieved renown merely as 
a handbook for day to day activities. Socrates criticizes Ion for assuming such expertise, but he 
too is guilty for assuming Homer’s value lies in the degree of Homer’s expertise. From our 
vantage we may regard some of these activities as more ridiculous in even assuming expertise 
than others, but let us take one in which there is a conceivable degree of accuracy, and by which 
the poets may be compared. Let us suppose that Homer and Hesiod both described certain 
techniques of farming. Will the accuracy of the description as advice in farming correspond to 
the superior poetry? If Hesiod’s description of farming is more useful, does that make him the 
better poet? So, unwittingly, Ion utters something true, of which it seems neither he nor Socrates 
know the true meaning, “they haven’t composed like Homer has.” They haven’t composed 
poetry like Homer has…the question is whether poetry, and by extension all art, is fundamentally 
a different sort of thing than other human endeavors.  
 Later in the dialogue, Socrates once more takes Ion to task for his ignorance of the affairs 
described in Homer. After quoting Nestor’s advice on maneuvering turns during a chariot race, 
from Book XXIII of the Iliad, he asks,  
  
SOCRATES: Now, in these lines Ion, which will know better whether Homer’s 
description is correct or not — a doctor or a charioteer? 
ION: A charioteer, of course.  
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SOCRATES: Because he posses this particular skill, or in virtue of something 
else?….then anyone who does not possess a given skill will not be able to have a good 
knowledge of the words and deeds that lie within its province….So in the case of the 
lines you quoted, will it be you or a charioteer who knows better whether Homer puts the 
matter well or not? 
ION: A charioteer.  
SOCRATES: Presumably because you are a rhapsode, not a charioteer.  
ION: Yes.  
SOCRATES: And the skill of a rhapsode is different from that of a charioteer? 
ION: Yes.  
SOCRATES: So then, if it is different, it is also a knowledge of different objects. (59-60) 
 
Socrates proceeds to demonstrate Ion’s ignorance in the fields of medicine, fishing, prophecy, 
steering, cow herding, and military strategy. Now it may be true that Ion should not have been 
lecturing on these matters. But the question isn’t really Ion…it’s Homer. Socrates says explicitly, 
“will it be you or a charioteer who knows better whether Homer puts the matter well or not?” 
This is indeed rather more democratic than Plato would like, the concept of soldiers judging 
Homer. Plato’s assumption is that the strength of Homer’s art lies primarily in the content of that 
art. This is the bête noire of art that Plato initiated and that has continued unabated to the present 
day.  
 One might take a verse of Homer, at random, or for that matter that of any other great 
poet, that describes a realistic matter with questionable accuracy, and apply to it the principle we 
have derived from comparison of the various Madonnas. We have seen that any representational 
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fragment of poetry can surely be written in infinite ways. Their content would remain identical—
though some would be Homer, some merely competent, and most, doggerel. Surely the accuracy 
of Homer’s representations of various skills and objects do not account for our evaluation of his 
poetry. Contrary, probably, to the charioteer’s technical criticisms, the poetry of Homer attains 
whatever value it possesses by factors unrelated to accuracy, just as, say, the New Yorker fact 
checkers have negligible insight on how to improve a short story. If one asks how Homer’s 
inaccurate description of a familiar object or rite might have merit, the answer is: rather as does a 
fine, inaccurate still life of some fruit or bird. 
 If Homer’s expertise on, say, medicine, were a measure of his excellence, then art would 
progress with roughly the same linear improvement as all technology, all knowledge, whether 
technical, scientific, or even moral. By that token, Homer would be an inferior poet to a 
contemporary doctor who wrote in favor of women’s abortion rights. But of course, such an 
assumption would be ludicrous. We do not judge art by the measures accorded to other 
endeavors, which is why an ancient work can contend with and often surpass a more accurate, 
contemporary work in its aesthetic excellence. As we say Proust said of the modern poet, “he is 
not much further forward than Homer.”  More likely he is not further at all. The arts have no 
linear progress—nor, might we add, is there any sort of progress in the analysis of art (take heed, 
critics). As in the example from Shelley, the information the demos repeats can not dislodge 
Homer’s aristocratic superiority except by a deliberate overturning of the very standards which 
gives art value in the first place.  
 In his Defense of Poetry, Shelley discussed the qualities of monuments that are left to us 
long after the religion that has spawned them has vanished. We discussed that what remains is 
the aesthetic. What we must add now is that what remains was always there, even when people 
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didn’t realize it was, and that whatever they thought was the authoritative, or religious, or 
historical importance at that time or any other, what has remained was always the most 
important feature of that artwork. It is perhaps to anthropologists or historians to measure the 
importance of aesthetics in contributing to the beliefs of cultures who viewed their artworks as 
serving other purposes, but it seems clear enough that the only reason certain sculptures, or 
stained glass, or temples or cathedrals were perceived as glorifying those ideas was for properties 
that were not themselves directly related to the ideas. Naturally two pieces of stained glass could 
be of comparable piety, yet one must surmise that, barring the sort of dogmatism that all too 
often leads to the destruction of the beautiful—and it is a sad fact of beauty that it is often also 
fragile—that it is the more pleasing object, aesthetically, which seems to uphold in times prior to 
the consideration of aesthetics those ideals which are central to a given culture. If a stained glass’ 
purpose was to elevate God, it only appeared to do so best because it was beautiful. So if Homer 
was treated, perhaps foolishly, as the “teacher of Greece,” he only attained that status for reasons 
that had very little to do with teaching. Which is all to say that what remains when the ideas and 
dogmas are dead is what was always perceived, even when it was not explicitly known. The 
beauty of artworks has always been their defining characteristic—it is only in later times that we 
have been able to know what always was the case.  
 Plato too knows, in his way. Where he tries to berate, it sometimes comes out as praise: 
 
SOCRATES. I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain to you what I imagine to be 
the reason of this. The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not 
an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that 
contained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known 
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as the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a 
similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of 
iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of 
them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse 
first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons 
is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose 
their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the 
Corybantian revellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are 
not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when 
falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic 
maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of 
Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does 
the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed 
fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, 
winging their way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light 
and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired 
and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this 
state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles.  
Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of men; 
but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak of them by any rules of 
art: they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only; 
and when inspired, one of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another 
choral strains, another epic or iambic verses- and he who is good at one is not good 
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any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had he 
learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of 
all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as 
he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know them 
to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of 
unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, and that through them he is 
conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what 
I am saying: he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous paean 
which; in every one's mouth, one of the finest poems ever written, simply an invention of 
the Muses, as he himself says. For in this way, the God would seem to indicate to us and 
not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but 
divine and the work of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by 
whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to 
teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? 24 
 
Clearly Socrates’ criticism extends well beyond the paltry vocation of rhapsode. Where he means 
art, we may say “skill,” or to elaborate, skill which employs reason, knowledge, or expertise, 
rather than inexplicable intuition or inspiration. Yet where Socrates criticizes, he inadvertently 
begins to free art from the shackles of association with other human activity. We have seen 
already how it is fallacious to judge art or beauty by the standards of mere factuality. Socrates is 
quite right, whatever his judgment, in saying that this is another sort of activity entirely. The 
domain of beauty and art must not be judged according to standards that have no authority there.  
 
24 I’ve preferred to use the Benjamin Jowett translation for this passage—it’s not perfectly aesthetic either, but I 
think it captures some of the joy in what Socrates calls madness.  
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 Socrates’ argument is twofold. First, he claims that even if artistic production bespeaks 
excellence, it cannot be attributed to the poet, but to the goddess who has possessed him. For us 
the goddess is a fine metaphor, and it does as well to say that the poet’s concern is not with those 
“grosser sciences.” There are, of course, rules, and that is why the field itself has come to be 
called art—it’s simply another set of rules, entirely unlike the laws that govern other fields. And 
these laws too, may be logical, in their way, but it’s quite easy to see why their articulation 
eludes artist and laymen alike, and why it may appear to others if not as madness, then as 
caprice. We have explained how beauty covers such a wide array of unlike objects that it would 
take an intellect far beyond any man’s to predict with any accuracy a universal pattern by which 
they should be governed. So too the laws effecting an individual creation…a poet or composer or 
artist is constantly judging innumerable possibilities, fitting words and sounds and colors in 
solutions to such specific problems—such minute, almost invisible problems, that shall never be 
posed to anyone but his own intellect and talent, and which he may forget shortly after having 
solved them—that the intricate process by which artistic creation is effected may indeed seem 
random to someone observing from without.  
 Socrates’ second criticism might make a reader smile. There is a marked prudishness, a 
joylessness of attitude in most critics hateful of art, that strikes me as somewhere between a 
school marm and Torquemada. Those wild Bacchantes! Someone had better get some clothes on 
those girls! Yes, the bacchantes are wild, and dangerous, and they are also joyful…not simply 
joyful, but in ecstasy. To be merely happy would perhaps indicate interest, but to be in ecstasy is 
to abandon oneself to perception itself, a pinnacle of disinterested pleasure. To draw milk and 
honey from a river is miraculous, as all beauty is miraculous. Those critics may do better eating 
locusts’ honey with John the Baptist and the hermit monks of Egypt. Because to care only for 
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knowledge, or justice, is to be hateful of joy. But there’s hope, because no one needs to be John 
the Baptist. He could have simply kissed Salome, and kept his head.  
 So. The enemy of beauty, at least conceptually, is a dogmatic obsession either with 
“reality” or “truth.” One may say philosophically that this reaches a peak in medieval times, to 
which human culture did not return until the present day (to say that the perceptions of reality or 
truth are dissimilar is not to negate the fact that they might be equally inimical to the joy in 
formal beauty).  Umberto Eco gives a useful survey of the similar sorts of criticisms of aesthetics 
pleasure in medieval life. One may of course distinguish their particular ideology, but it is not 
inaccurate to say that all measures repressing pleasure and beauty stem from a similar character, 
just all manifestations of love of beauty are united by the same intrinsic impulse.  
 Nor does this imply that artistic production of the period was bereft of beauty. Indeed the 
tension between didacticism and the desire to appropriate formal beauty for didactic purposes 
without giving into hedonism or indulgence seems to be the defining feature of medieval art, 
much at it was later in the music of the Counterreformation. Whether the ascetic rejecting beauty 
and pleasure or the scholastic justifying it, Eco makes it seem the medieval man hated beauty 
less than we do now—in fact, his occasional fear of purely aesthetic pleasure seems only to 
clarify his awareness of it. Yet the conflict between (translatable) belief and singular aesthetic 
object is everywhere apparent. 
 The hateful note, to be expected, is sounded by St. Bernard of Clairvaux, “We who have 
turned aside from society, relinquishing for Christ’s sake all the precious and beautiful things in 
the world, its wondrous light and colour, its sweet sounds and odours, for us all bodily delights 
are nothing but dung.” (Eco, 7) Yet as Eco points out, “ascetics, in all ages, are not unaware of 
the seductiveness of worldly pleasures; if anything feel it more keenly than most. The drama of 
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the ascetic discipline lies precisely in a tension between the call of earthbound pleasure and a 
striving after the supernatural.” (6) Ironically, the fear of pleasure shows pleasure’s reality, as in 
Alcuin’s somewhat touching admission that while, “it was easier to love beautiful creatures, 
sweet scents, and lovely sounds than to love God…[we should only use] them as an aid to the 
greater love of God.” (5) 
To the extent that man loves beautiful things, by nature that beauty will have the capacity 
to please him, but equally to the extent his mind is overwhelmed with extra-aesthetic concerns, 
he will fundamentally misunderstand the nature of that beauty. This is the didacticism Eco 
describes, and which I argue has infected contemporary conceptions of beauty: “Now it is 
undeniable…that art for the medievals was above all didactic. As Aquinas wrote, ‘it is the mark 
of the poetic arts to indicate the truth of things by means of invented similitudes.’” (60) Hence 
the allegorical readings both of ancient secular literature and the composition of their own 
allegorical writing, which inherently emphasizes something other than what art is, an inverted 
relationship to the one detailed in Sainte-Beuve, and with an obviously theological rather than 
materialist character, but essentially commensurate in its marginalization of art-as-form, as 
Pater’s “music.” Eco stresses the “integrated sensibility” (80) of medievals, for whom beauty and 
morality were not inherently opposed…they “found it extremely difficult to separate the two 
realms of value, not because of some defect in their critical sense, but because of the unity of 
their moral and aesthetic responses to things.” (16) Yet it must be conceded that whenever 
beauty is united with the good, from Plato onward, the unified conception must appear to us to 
be more good than beautiful, to subordinate beauty to goodness. Even praised, it seems 
subordinate: “Honorius of Autun wrote that the end of painting was threefold: one was ‘that the 
House of God should be beautified’: a second was that it should recall to mind the lives of the 
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Saints; and finally, ‘Painting…is the literature of the laity.’ (16) Similarly Suger, Abbott of St. 
Denis, whom Huizinga says seems to delight less in beauty itself than in abundance of wealth, 
must justify his pleasure by claiming that in his opulent palace he is, “transported from this 
inferior to that higher world in an analogical manner.” (14) Eco says that its purpose is to, in Sir 
Philip Sidney’s phrase, “instruct and delight,” but it seems evident that here, delight is always at 
the service of instruction, and never for its own sake. 
If on the one hand we have the moralistic justification of beauty, on the other hand we 
can see in Aquinas and the scholastics a kind of proto-scientistic25 devaluation of experience not 
instrumental in the acquisition of knowledge. Aquinas, for example,  
 
referred to poetry as ‘inferior learning’ (infima doctrina), and said that ‘poetic matters 
cannot be grasped by human reason because they are deficient in truth.’…He was simply 
repeating the conventional opinion about art, that it was a form of ‘making’ and so 
inferior to pure intellectual thought….Poetry’s ‘deficiency in truth’ referred to the fact 
that it is a non-scientific mode of discourse and deals with fictions….Aquinas was aware 
of the aesthetic and the hedonistic value of poetry. His remarks were not a condemnation, 
but reflected a theorist’s lack of interest in the pleasure of poetry, especially if it does not 
have a didactic function….If poetry did contain any truth that was independently 
verifiable, the most that it could do was to express it in a pleasing manner. (105-6) 
 
Eco attributes this prejudice to Aristotle’s distinction between the servile and liberal arts (97), 
emphasizing that was what physical was innately inferior to those abstractions contemplated by 
 
25 By which I mean, evincing the attributes of scientism, not science. 
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reason: “the highest goods were knowledge and contemplation, goods of the intellect.” (98) In 
fact, this particular distinction seems eerily reminiscent of contemporary intellectualism: 
“Perhaps the Medievals remembered Quintilian: ‘the learned understand the nature of art, the 
unlearned its voluptuousness.’ Artistic theory provided definitions of art in terms of what could 
be experienced by the learned, while artistic practice and pedagogy had to do with voluptas.” 
(98) In each case of aesthetic blindness, we see some other concern remaking beauty in its own 
image, whether an emphasis on morality, theology, truth, or science, or as in our own day, their 
manifestations in politics or social considerations.  
 Such moralizing arguments continue into the present, expounded by our new moralizers, 
and these bear a starting resemblance to those medieval priests who would probably have had 
our moralizers burned or quartered…though perhaps the sentiment works both ways. Marx, in 
his trial or morality, describes the various ethical criticisms of literature seen since the nineteenth 
century, beginning with the bourgeois reaction against Madame Bovary, and culminating in our 
own period of trigger warnings and identity politics. One observes dual criticisms of Twain, first 
from the right and then from the left: 
 
The nineteenth century was scandalized by the rudeness and vulgarity of Twain’s 
novel….this could be termed right wing, conservative censorship. 
A century later, the pendulum has swung the other way and censorship came from 
the left. If Huckleberry Finn sparks controversy, it is ….because of its treatment of the 
question of race. The problem is as follows: Does the book denounce the racial prejudices 
it describes, or does it make them its own? (Marx, 130) 
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Marx proceeds to detail similar issues with the teaching of Ovid: 
 
Even more recently, the Latin poet Ovid, who was himself exiled by the Emperor 
Augustus because of the licentiousness of his writings, continued to cause scandal in the 
United States. In 2015, a student at Columbia University complained that reading 
passages in the metamorphoses describing the abductions of Persephone and Daphne had 
triggered a memory of her own traumatic rape: she now felt unsafe in the classroom. 
(131) 
 
Marx emphasizes a different dimension of literature than we are concerned with here, yet his 
diagnosis of this conflict is consistent with our previous observations: 
 
The specific condemnations leveled at the works mentioned above entail something other 
than being merely inappropriate in the context of contemporary American society. They 
are the result of a reductive and castrating vision of literature. They promote an art of 
language that would no longer be literature such as we know it, as an autonomous and 
independent art, but a system in which works would ideally limit themselves to providing 
a pure and, if possible, improved reflection of the society in which they are read….should 
I force literature into silence and deprive my contemporaries of it just because it does not 
correspond with my expectations and values and personally disturbs or upsets me?” (132) 
 
This all is summarized in a curious pedagogical anecdote involving Rousseau’s criticisms of La 
Fontaine’s “le Corbeau et le Renard.” After some rather inane nitpicking—how could one smell 
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a cheese at the top of a tree from a fox’s hole? Why isn’t the fox’s flattery more succinct?—the 
ambiguity of the moral is the real problem. “Children identify less with the crow than the fox, 
who takes advantage of another’s credulity.” (137) Leave it to a man who left all his infant 
children at an orphanage to be so sanctimonious, but really there’s no need for an ad hominem 
attack. The lesson is clear: certain kinds of readers demand that the arts reproduce their precise 
beliefs. If they do not, the art is a problem. Clearly aesthetics are not a question.  
 The unfortunate prevalence in popular discourse of this sort of anti-aesthetic, navel-
gazing prudery can be surmised by from the example given earlier of a petition to remove 
Balthus. Similar complaints have emerged about Gauguin,26 and Waterhouse’s Hylas and the 
Nymphs,27 (admittedly not the greatest painting on earth) the former because of the painter’s 
relationship with teenage girls and his condescending attitude towards indigenous peoples, the 
latter alternately for over-sexualizing the nymphs and ignoring the homoerotic subtext of the 
Theocritus story on which the painting was based. More spectacular, perhaps, in popular culture 
is the recent rise of the Australian comedienne Hannah Gadsby, who sounds rather as Sainte-
Beuve might if he were a twenty first century lesbian and victim of rape-induced trauma. Which 
is to say, as King Solomon might have, nothing here is terribly new…though one wouldn’t know 
that from the accolades.28 
 
26 Nayeri, Farah. “Is It Time Gaugin Got Cancelled?” The New York Times. 18 Nov. 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/arts/design/gauguin-national-gallery-london.html 
27
Boyce, Sonia. “Our removal of Waterhouse’s naked nymphs was art in action.” The 
Guardian. 6 Feb. 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/06/takedown-waterhouse-naked-nymphs-art-action-
manchester-art-gallery-sonia-boyce 
28 Moskowitz, Peter. “The ‘Nanette’ Problem. The Outline. 20 Aug. 2018, 
https://theoutline.com/post/5962/the-nanette-problem-hannah-gadsby-netflix-review?zd=1&zi=2pdd3fl4 
The article provides a short summary of its accolades: “remarkable” (Washington Post), “soul-affirming” (The 
New York Times),“groundbreaking” (Vice) 
Amir Dagan 76 
Now much of Gasdby’s fame must be attributable to her channeling a collective rage 
against straight white men (Ecclesiastes, again), but of greater interest here is her surprising ire 
towards the arts. Or not so surprising, as we have seen.29 Her discussion of Van Gogh, which is 
nominally sympathetic, seems a reincarnation of Sainte-Beuve. Railing against a (straight) man 
who suggested that as an artist, she should avoid anti-depressants because, “if Vincent van Gogh 
had have taken medication, we wouldn’t have the sunflowers,” she cheerfully, as she says, “tore 
that man a college debt-sized new arsehole.”  
 
I said, “Good opinion, mate. Except that he did medicate. A lot. He self-medicated a lot. 
He drank a lot. He even nibbled on his own paints. Problem. And also, you know what 
else? He didn’t just paint sunflowers, he did quite a few portraits of psychiatrists. Not 
even random ones. Psychiatrists who were treating him. And medicating him. And 
there’s one particular portrait of one particular psychiatrist, and he’s holding a flower, 
and it isn’t a sunflower. It’s a foxglove. And that foxglove forms part of a medication that 
Van Gogh… took for epilepsy. And that derivative of the foxglove plant medi-fucking-
cation…” I must have skipped a dose that day ’cause I was feeling. “The derivative of the 
foxglove, if you overdose it a bit, you know what happens? You can experience the color 
yellow a little too intensely. So perhaps… we have the sunflowers precisely because… 
Van Gogh medicated. What do you honestly think, mate?” I said. “That creativity means 
you must suffer? That is the burden of creativity? Just so you can enjoy it? Fuck you, 
mate. If you like sunflowers so much, buy a bunch and jerk off into a geranium. 
 
29 All quotations taken from: 
 Gadbsy, Hannah. “Nannette (2018)—Full Transcript.” Scraps from the Loft. 21 July.  2018. 
  https://scrapsfromtheloft.com/2018/07/21/hannah-gadsby-nanette-transcript/ 
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Well, surely that settles it. Except that not everyone epileptic who took foxglove based 
medication painted Van Gogh’s sunflowers, and not all Van Gogh’s paintings are yellow. What 
we have here is what we have seen all too often, an attempt to reduce art, narcissistically, to 
something quotidian and ordinary. Gadsby might not think she has an adversarial relationship to 
van Gogh, but she refuses to let art be something apart—it must be, for her as for so many 
others, folded into something explicable and banal. Hers it seems is a world without wonder—
certainly a world without genius: 
 
And artists are not these incredible, you know, mythical creatures that exist outside of the 
world. No, artists have always been very much part of the world, and very… very firmly 
attached to power. Always. Power and money, art is always there. Right back to the 
Renaissance. Oh, the Turtles? All of them. All of them, they knew how to network. 
Leonardo? Raphael? Donatello? They’re right up there, painting their own business 
cards, schmoozing. Michelangelo was a bit difficult, he was a bit… crazy. But, you 
know, he still networked. He gave gobbies to the Pope. Kissed his ring. Literally. But… I 
think it’s a shame that art history is such an elitist sport. It taught me a lot, you know. 
…art history. I understand the world I live in and my place in it. And I don’t have 
one.….High art. I’m going to call it, guys. Bullshit. High art, my arse.” 
 
Of course. We have, first, the hatred of genius, its reduction to the vicissitudes of history, of 
money, the balking at elitism. We have finally, a judgment based on one’s own desires and 
insecurities rather than the object observed. It doesn’t seem to matter that no artist who ever 
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lived claimed his work was created in order to make Hannah Gadsby, or anyone else for that 
matter, feel as though they have a place in the world. Honorius of Autun wanted painting to 
glorify God; Gadsby and her contemporaries want it to glorify themselves. Is there much of a 
difference? The logic reaches a shrieking pitch in her analysis of Picasso, whose work must be 
judged exclusively on his affair with Marie-Therese Walter, which began when he was 45 years 
old, and she 17: 
 
Pablo Picasso. I hate him, but you’re not allowed to. I hate him. …I don’t like Picasso. I 
fucking hate him. I really– I just– He’s rotten in the face cavity. I hate Picasso! I hate 
him! And you can’t make me like– But you get it a lot: “Oh, cubism…” And I know I 
should be more generous about him too because he suffered a mental illness. …But he 
did suffer a mental illness. Picasso did. He suffered badly and it got worse as he got 
older. Picasso suffered… the mental illness of misogyny. 
 
She repeats that it is impossible to separate the art from the artist, Sainte-Beuve in the flesh. 
Unlike Sainte-Beuve, the judgment is colored by a judgment of the moral life of the man—if he 
is not in keeping with contemporary social values, his art is an abomination. It is amusing, after 
making these claims, that she supposes, “Having… said that, I think I’ve ruined any chance of 
getting a job in a gallery now.” Nothing, of course could be further from the truth. Gadbsy’s cry 
of hatred is expressed in a language perfectly suited to our times. One wonders whether, if she 
had cancer, Gadsby would refuse a misogynist’s cure.  
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 In his conclusion to the Renaissance, Pater instructs the reader to fix his attention upon 
one of life’s more exquisite intervals,  “the moment, for instance, of delicious recoil from the 
flood of water in summer heat.” I suppose we live in a more complicated time. Can someone 
even suggest that there are such a thing as exquisite moments of life, that there is something like 
pleasure, or joy, that isn’t conditioned, that isn’t suspect, that isn’t determined by some idea? 
Where Pater or Proust saw moments of experience, it seems our intellectual life, now, has 
encased experience in a mass of ideas so intricate and dense, one wonders if a thinking person 
could reach out his finger and touch water, a leaf, another person…one wonders if he could even 
see those things.  You would need something like a new phenomenological reduction merely to 
recapture a sense of being unburdened by this tortuous chain of explanation and thought.  
Well, there is a simple reduction: whatever complex series of ideas one has to explain away 
lived reality, they all melt away at a slap in the face. The immediacy of certain experience is 
more powerful than any ideas, as experience precedes ideas. Pain can cause this, humiliation, 
fear, surprise, and perhaps less often, less purely unpleasant sensations, lust (a mixed bag), 
sometimes love, awe, pleasure, and yes, the sense of beauty. If one can attempt, without being 
slapped in the face, to return to that point of simple pleasure preceding its convoluted 
explanations, explanations away, then we will have a hope of finding what beauty means to us.  
We will do so in the following chapter. What we seek to show is, as Sontag concludes in 
her essay, that: 
 
What is beautiful reminds us of nature as such–of what lies beyond the human and the 
made–and thereby stimulates and deepens our sense of the sheer spread and fullness of 
reality, inanimate as well as pulsing, that surrounds us all.  
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A happy by-product of this insight, if insight it is: beauty regains its solidity, its 
inevitability, as a judgment needed to make sense of a large portion of one’s energies, 
affinities, and admirations; and the usurping notions appear ludicrous. (213) 
 
It is our hope, if not to make the usurping notions appear ludicrous, to help beauty regain its 
solidity, if only in men’s estimation—it has, I hope to show, been always quite the same, 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Narcissus the Aesthete: 
Objective Judgment and the Narcissism of Democratic Anti-Aesthetics 
 
I hate the poems in the Epic Cycle, I don’t like highways 
      that are heavily traveled, I despise 
a promiscuous lover, and I don’t drink from the public fountains: 
      Everything that is public disgusts me. And yes, Lysanias, 
you are handsome as handsome, but before I can even say it, 
     back comes the Echo: “Some other man has him.” 
-Callimachus, epigram 58 
 
“With a single blow I could strike him down for good and all; the energy that ravished Bilhah 
would work well for that, too, and the thief of my rights as first born would feel that energy as a 
man, just as Bilhah did as a woman. But what good would it do me? Abel would lie slain, and I 
would be the man I do not wish to be—Cain, whom I don’t understand. How can a man act 
against his own conviction, as Cain did, and with eyes wide open slay what is pleasing because 
he himself cannot please?”  
     -Mann, Joseph and His Brothers 
 
“Mr. Philouza’s march was inspired and brilliant. Too brilliant. You see, brilliance upsets people. 
It makes them feel….inferior.” 
     -Mr. Show, “The Great Philouza” 
 
It is a curious feature of most people’s intellect the degree, not only to which they will remain 
unmoved by any argument opposing those beliefs essential to their conception of themselves—a 
conception needless to say that is not only inaccurate but outlandishly inflated—but also that 
they will misinterpret to themselves any image or idea they encounter in order to remain ever 
consistent with that conception. The beliefs held by most people, one is forced to imagine, are so 
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fragile and so false—so fragile because their owners know them somewhere to be false—that 
even an innocent tale of some dissimilar tenor, which prior to interpretation breathes as it were 
an air inconsistent with those unfounded principles cherished all too close to a person’s heart, 
must be operated upon by one’s mind with all the viciousness and brutality of a Soviet or 
Christian censor. What emerges from this attempt to corral all experience into the limited 
confines of one’s self-serving ideas naturally is something inaccurate, if not perverse.  
“God made man in his image, and man returned the favor,” Voltaire says, and it is an 
attitude that may be applied to every idea that takes hold of a man’s sense of his own worth, for 
every such idea is like a god to him. Furthermore, it is not enough to say man has invented god, 
or even that cultures have...for most men, one concludes, have heard of god, and yet each hears 
and reshapes, individually and collectively, the idea of god into something that pleases his 
vanity. Masses of men, the majority of men, please themselves by making all ideas in their 
image. And this we sometimes call narcissism.  
The relationship between a term and its linguistic origin, interesting when it follows a 
linear trajectory without contradiction, is of peculiar interest when the latter contradicts the 
former. How this comes to be requires long investigation, and may uncover any of the manifold 
causes by which humans inflict some destiny upon themselves: mere accident, misunderstanding, 
intentional obscurity, or those vast invisible pressures of culture whereby one truth, as evident as 
the necessity of air or water, is turned into another. Just as with Darwin’s theories, a process 
often misperceived as progress is merely one of change. A climate pushes down upon a creature, 
one of snow coats it in white fur, one of darkness dilates its eyes, and just as the endless blue 
expanse might take some small, haggard, crawling thing and alter it again and again until it 
mirrors the oceans before it, moving steadily through the waters with all their majesty and calm, 
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so too might it crush a proud creature into something vile, covered in slime and scurrying. So too 
might other more local pressures affect a single life, as when a beaten pup goes through life full 
of nervousness and fear, or an infant who might have grown to become Achilles or Dante spends 
his days in a white collar, hunched over, eating lunch before a screen. 
So is it with words and ideas. The vagaries of society, formed by pressures edifying and 
repressive, push upon thought as upon men, sometimes lifting them to some new vision or 
freedom, more often enjoining then to submit, until an idea and even its memory are 
extinguished. 
In fact we may say the masses have remade Narcissus in their image, and in so doing 
have remade the very idea of beauty. For the story of Narcissus is one of the oldest and truest 
about the nature of beauty, and its grotesque metamorphosis into an image of vanity reflects the 
spirit of its interlocutors far more than the spirit of the tale. Narcissism, in common parlance, is 
an excessive vanity, etc. and so in recent times we have bestowed psychological terms like 
narcissistic personality disorder on figures singularly devoid of human beauty. Yet this definition 
derives from a ubiquitous misreading of the story, one based in a misapprehension about the 
nature of beauty. The precise nature of the misunderstanding and its significance will only 
become clear once the tale is understood in its simplicity.  
 The story of Narcissus if of ancient stock or derivation, and its contents relatively 
familiar: the beautiful youth, his unsuccessful suitors, the nymph Echo, the love of his reflection, 
finally, as we recall, his pining away, until nothing is left of him but that flower few would credit 
with any particular distinction, the six petals, often limp, surrounding a corona of yellow or 
white. His story is best known in Ovid’s version in the Metamorphoses, though retellings exist in 
Pausanius, in Conon’s Diegeseis, a fragment of Parthenius of Nicaea, and in a twelfth century 
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passage of the Byzantine John Tzetzes Chiliades. Some of these we shall have opportunity to 
return to. For our purposes though, it is Ovid’s that is most pertinent, a happy and unexpected 
confluence of literary quality with practical necessity. For it is precisely the fame and canonical 
status that makes his rendition most relevant to an inquiry of the tale’s misreading…his is the 
vision of beauty which people have, no doubt through various oral and written retellings, 
encountered, and it is his which will provide us with a point of reference for the degree of 
misreading the anti-aesthetic mind has initiated. It is perhaps fitting that the Latin poet who gave 
us the canonical version of this myth was also the composer of the Amores, because of course for 
Ovid, the experience of beauty is entwined with a kind of love, and the experience of beauty and 
love are alike not least in their mutual submission to a kind of holy and delightful possession. 
Since the analysis will be thematic rather than chronological, the story will be quoted in large 
sections: 
  
The dark river nymph Liriope was the first to test his reliability and truthfulness. She was 
the nymph from whom Cephisus once embraced with his curving stream, imprisoned in 
his waves, and forcefully ravished. When her time was come, that nymph most fair 
brought forth a child with home one could have fallen in love even in the cradle, and she 
called him Narcissus. When the prophetic seer was asked whether this boy would live to 
ripe old age, he replied, ‘Yes, if he does not come to know himself.’ [….] 
Cephisus’ child had reached his sixteenth year, and could be counted as at once a 
boy and man. Many lads and girls fell in love with him, but his soft body housed a pride 
so unyielding that none of those boys or girls dared to touch him. [echo falls in love with 
him, Juno punishes her with repetition]…. 
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Narcissus treated her as he had previously treated other spirits of the waters and 
woods, and his male admirers too. Then one of these he had scorned raised up his hands 
to heaven and prayed: “may he himself fall in love with another as we have done with 
him! May he too be unable to gain his loved one!” Nemesis heard and granted his 
righteous prayer.  
There was a clear pool, with shining silvery waters, where shepherds had never 
made their way; no goats that pasture on the mountains, no cattle had ever come there. Its 
peace was undisturbed by bird or beast or falling branches. Around it was grassy sward, 
kept evergreen by the nearby waters; encircling woods sheltered the spot from the fierce 
sun, and made it always cool.  
Narcissus, wearied with hunting in the heat of the day, lay down here, for he was 
attracted by the beauty of the place, and by the spring. While he sought to quench his 
thirst, another thirst grew in him, and as he drank, he was enchanted by the beautiful 
reflection that he saw. He fell in love with an insubstantial hope, mistaking a mere 
shadow for a real body. Spellbound by his own self, he remained there motionless, with 
fixed gaze, like a statue carved from Parian marble. As he lay on the bank, he gazed at 
the twin stared that were his eyes, at his flowing locks, worthy of Bacchus or Apollo, his 
smooth cheeks, his ivory neck, his lovely face where a rosy flush stained the snowy 
whiteness of his complexion, admiring all the features for which he was himself admired. 
Unwittingly, he desired himself, and was the object of his own approval, at once seeking 
and sought, himself kindling the flame with which he burned. How often did he vainly 
kiss the treacherous pool, how often plunge his arms deep in the waters, as he tried to 
clasp the neck he saw. But he could not lay hold upon himself. He did not know what he 
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was looking at, but was fired by the sight, and excited by the very illusion that deceived 
his eyes. Poor, foolish boy, why vainly grasp at the fleeting image that eludes you? The 
thing you are seeing does not exist, only turn aside and you will lose what you love. What 
you see is but the shadow cast by your reflection; in itself it is nothing. It comes with you, 
and lasts while you are there, and it will go when you go, if go you can. (83-85) 
 
It is sometimes difficult to find the order in which to articulate our perceptions of reality. For the 
mind wants as by some scientific apparatus to uncover a train of linear causes, this to that, that to 
the next, so by some logical foundation we may understand the object to which we have devoted 
our scrutiny. But in fact experience is more a prism than a spyglass or microscope, our 
knowledge is formed of the imperfect synthesis of myriad imperfect sensations. And if beauty is 
a sensation that is finer and more arresting than those perceptions by which we tend to construct 
our knowledge of the world, so too is it inversely evasive of our understanding. So let us begin 
here not at the story’s beginning, but with the aspect of conventional interpretation that 
immediately strikes us as inaccurate: Narcissus’ vanity. As Narcissus haunts our culture less in 
his floral than the psychological state to which he’s all too unwillingly donated his name, a 
singular detail strikes one in even the most cursory detail of Ovid’s telling—Narcissus does not 
know it is him himself that he is gazing upon. 
 To believe Narcissus vain—or, as it has come to be known, narcissistic—we must 
suppose that he gazes upon his reflection primarily because he knows it to be his reflection. And 
yet it is clear that for the majority of the story, more significantly at the moment of his first 
encounter, he decidedly does not. “Unwittingly,” we are told, “he desired himself.” We must 
take special note that it is “unwittingly.” That it is himself is a dramatic irony, but that irony 
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precludes the influence of vanity upon his judgment. Everything hinges upon his ignorance that 
it is himself. “He did not know what he was looking at.” 
 Indeed it is only later that he discovers it is himself: 
 
Certainly it is not my looks or my years which you shun, for I am one of those the 
Nymphs have loved. With friendly looks you proffer me some hope. When I stretch out 
my arms to you, you stretch yours toward me in return: you laugh when I do, and often I 
have marked your tears when I was weeping. You answer my sins with nods, and, as far 
as I can guess from the movement of your lovely lips, reply to me in words that never 
reach my ears. Alas! I am myself the boy I see. I know it: my own reflection does not 
deceive me. I am on fire with love for my own self. It is I who kindle the flames which I 
must endure. What should I do? Woo or be wooed? But what then shall I seek by my 
wooing? What I desire, I have. My very plenty makes me poor. How I wish I could 
separate myself from my body! A new prayer this, for a lover, to wish the thing he loves 
away! Now grief is sapping my strength; little of life remains for me—I am cut off in the 
flower of my youth. I have no quarrel with death, for in death I shall forget my pain: but I 
could wish that the object of my love might outlive me: as it is, both of us will perish 
together, when this one life is destroyed. (86) 
 
It is true that at the height of his tragedy, he discovers that the figure in the pool is indeed 
himself. But in fact all the change proves is that he had not known before. And so all we may 
conclude from his discovery is that the knowledge that it is himself does not dissuade him from 
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his previous obsession. To find vanity in the story is to avoid what is evidently the crux of the 
story—what is it that enthralls him? 
  It’s all too self-evident; he is enthralled by beauty. That it is his own is secondary. In this 
text there is no arguing about taste, not because it is impossible to reach an agreement, but 
because there simply is no room for disagreement. The text tells us what is right and what is 
wrong in the world that it is describing. The author tells us he is beautiful. It is not for deniers of 
beauty to claim that within the text he is not beautiful—it is pointless, for example, for an atheist 
to claim that there is no god in the bible…to read the bible, one must read it within by the 
internal logic of its construction. Within the text, Narcissus’ beauty is beyond compare. Once 
born he is, “a child with home one could have fallen in love even in the cradle.” (83) “Many lads 
and girls fell in love with him.” Echo too, falls in love with him, as does the one he has scorned, 
who raises his hands and prays to Nemesis. This is no world of aesthetic relativism. It is a world 
of aesthetic hierarchies…a simple reality the ancients knew perhaps better than we do. No 
cultural discourses have compelled the nymphs and shepherds to desire Narcissus, no alternate 
aesthetic paradigm might have made Narcissus favor Echo, and she scorn him. The text is clear: 
he is innately their superior in beauty, and they, healthy creatures that they are, desire madly the 
one who is most beautiful. Beauty is not fair, she is not just, but in her terms she is consistent. 
Even Ovid, we may say, falls in love with his beauty. Where the poet scorns the hunter’s 
obsession, he too, as a poet must, lets himself appreciate the sort of beauty he can only imagine: 
“Spellbound by his own self, he remained there motionless, with fixed gaze, like a statue carved 
from Parian marble. As he lay on the bank, he gazed at the twin stared that were his eyes, at his 
flowing locks, worthy of Bacchus or Apollo, his smooth cheeks, his ivory neck, his lovely face 
where a rosy flush stained the snowy whiteness of his complexion.” 
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Does Narcissus initially know himself to be beautiful? It seems unlikely (or why would 
the reflection confuse him)—perhaps he knows others think him so—but like the proper reading 
of the reflection, it is a moot point. For Narcissus is not merely beautiful, but has the most 
refined and snobbish of tastes. No doubt for anyone else the various nymphs and youths would 
be lovely enough—we know them from Attic sculpture, we know them from ancient poetry, we 
know the Greek ideal of beauty and surely these figures chasing after the aloof son of the dark 
river Liriope embodied those ideals exactly. Yet they are not sufficient to his taste. It is true that 
snobbishness is not an attribute currently favored—though of course, all people are in their 
hearts snobs, for all people believe that what is below them is contemptible and what is above, 
pretentious. A man’s taste is his right—in the context of Ovid’s telling, Narcissus might be 
excessive, but his choices are within the hierarchy of physical beauty not inaccurate.  
Narcissus has a particular taste. And the text makes both Narcissus’ beauty and Ovid’s 
taste for beauty all too evident. Narcissus, we are told, is attracted, “by the beauty of the 
place,”—it is the first thing in fact that we have seen him attracted to. And what sort of a place is 
it? Ideal for the narrative purpose of reflection with its still pool, its silence, like some magical 
set or mirror upon which to reflect the most beautiful and unattainable vision. But more, it is a 
place, “where shepherds never made their way; no goats that pasture on the mountains, no cattle 
had ever come there.” Wilde says all art is quite useless…Gautier that usefulness is ugliness, the 
most useful room in the house the latrine…Baudelaire that, “to be a useful person has always 
appeared to me to be something particularly horrible.” (Intimate Journals, 67) Even in Arcadia, 
shepherds’ work is too vulgar, too utilitarian, it seems, for Narcissus’ conception of beauty. And 
what do sheep, and cattle, and goats produce, but excrement. Ovid has placed us far from the 
world of work, far from the latrine. And this is the place to which Narcissus is attracted. 
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Not only is Narcissus the ultimate symbol of beauty. He is the ultimate Aesthete. He dies 
for beauty. Here it is unfortunately necessary to preemptively counter a potential argument, that 
only vanity could yield such devotion. But of course it is a story of obsession, and obsession is 
hardly so uncommon. And in fact, just as beauty takes him over, so do many of our sensations, 
though these often are the painful ones. At the point of encountering the face (not to his 
knowledge, his own face), Narcissus' experience is overcome solely with the act of seeing -- just 
as Dostoevsky says a man with a toothache is a toothache, Narcissus, seeing the beautiful face, 
becomes his own eyes. 
That it is his own face is, logically, irrelevant. There is no eye of the beholder in this 
story, no aesthetic relativism...all the nymphs concur as by Kant's sensus communis that 
Narcissus is supremely beautiful. Assuming, as we must, that this is true, we must also conclude 
that heretofore, all Narcissus' comrades have had greater contact with the beautiful than he has 
himself. Would it not be absurd that, out of some pale modesty, upon encountering a face that is 
most beautiful, he should deny its objective superiority simply because it is his own? Should he 
deny beauty for fear of being associated with vanity? 
Supposing, further, that upon encountering it, he knew it to be his own, the same reaction 
could occur without any qualification. Of course readers, especially those of our time, who 
shrink at any notion of inequality, would not abide that. They would inevitably say he believes 
himself to be objective, but really is conflating aesthetic pleasure with vanity and self-love. How 
convenient that Ovid has, perhaps intuitively, anticipated their analysis by stating unequivocally 
that at the moment of his encounter Narcissus is unaware the face he gazes on is his own. Having 
discovered that the face is his, what might one expect? The critic who sees narcissism would 
chastise poor Narcissus for not balking at the fact. How shameful to love one’s own face! But 
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why? If it is the most beautiful, and his attraction to it of proven disinterestedness, why should 
modesty supplant objectivity? A beautiful face is not the less beautiful in the unlikely event it is 
one’s own. And even Ovid, we see, judges harshly not Narcissus’ vanity, but the ephemerality to 
which Narcissus is attracted. Ovid’s sensibilities, his albeit limited practicality are offended not 
by the fact that it is his own image that Narcissus loves, but the fact of its being an image at all.   
 
He fell in love with an insubstantial hope, mistaking a mere shadow for a real body. 
But he could not lay hold upon himself. He did not know what he was looking at, but was 
fired by the sight, and excited by the very illusion that deceived his eyes. Poor, foolish 
boy, why vainly grasp at the fleeting image that eludes you? The thing you are seeing 
does not exist, only turn aside and you will lose what you love. What you see is but the 
shadow cast by your reflection; in itself it is nothing. It comes with you, and lasts while 
you are there, and I will go when you go, if go you can. (85) 
 
Ovid chastises Narcissus for loving something insubstantial and ephemeral. We feel almost as 
though Ovid wants his appreciation to be interested, to lead to some pleasure or object he can 
grasp. But that is the nature of an image, and of all objects in which we perceive beauty—they 
are always distant, and the experience of beauty by its nature can never lead to anything that is 
not utterly unlike itself.   
There is a variation of the Narcissus story in which he falls in love with his twin sister,30 
where the separation of beauty from the living object that engenders it is more difficult. Ovid’s 
 
30 “It is said that Narcissus had a twin sister; they were exactly alike in appearance, their hair was the same, they 
wore similar clothes, and went hunting together. The story goes on that Narcissus fell in love with his sister, and 
when the girl died, would go to the spring, knowing that it was his reflection that he saw, but in spite of this 
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sometimes sad, sometimes contemptuous objection to Narcissus’ obsession is that the thing he 
sees cannot be grasped. If Narcissus has made a mistake, and it is neither a moral nor aesthetic 
one, it is perhaps that he has tried to love beauty as one would a human being. The beauty of 
Narcissus as a man is ultimately no different from the beauty in the water. And from this we 
must conclude that such as the beauty appears in the water, insubstantial, so is the beauty of the 
man, even as it emanates from a substantial being. The characteristics of beauty must not be 
confused, as often they all to easily are, with the circumstances of their manifestation to our 
experience.  
Beauty is not the man the man himself, his identity, his being…beauty is merely present 
in the man’s appearance. One cannot possess beauty except insofar as beauty reveals itself to the 
senses under whose boundaries a particular beauty operates. Narcissus’ beauty is his appearance 
to men’s sight. What Ovid calls foolishness is the desire to want only beauty, and not the man (or 
nymph). Beauty can be gazed upon as upon some distant shore…it can never, by its nature, be 
possessed as can a physical entity, it cannot be held or caressed or touched. It is as distant as 
music, as the sun, as, in life, the person who scorns you.  
As Narcissus is cruel, so is beauty cruel, not in its sadism, but in its indifference. To the 
extent that it gives us aesthetic pleasure, beauty is gracious—as Narcissus says, “when I stretch 
out my arms to you, you stretch yours toward me in return,”—yet to the extent it allows no more, 
but flees as we attempt to extract still more from it, beauty is unkind. Beauty is unkind. Beauty is 
indifferent. So are the stars. 
Yet still objections might be made about Narcissus character. It is true that he is haughty, 
that he toys with others’ affections. To which one must ask the question: is scorn of others 
 
knowledge finding some relief for his love in imagining that he saw, not his own reflection, but the likeness of his 
sister.” (Pausanias, 9.31.8) 
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commensurate to vanity? Is snobbery? Or does the conflation of superiority with vanity protest 
rather too much? How often has each of us seen someone, pained at rejection, attempt to degrade 
the object of his desire?  “I didn’t like you anyway!” he says, “You weren’t so great anyway!” he 
whines. It’s but a small step to claim: “in fact, you didn’t much like you either!”  
 Indeed this is Narcissism, not Narcissus’ fanatical aestheticism. It’s reminiscent of a sort 
of a negative variation of Kant’s negation of the ontological concept for god’s existence. When 
someone says they cannot imagine how the world, or life, came to be, and so it must be God who 
created it, Kant replied by wondering why anyone should be perplexed at his own lack of 
understanding. There’s nothing particularly unusual about not knowing something. Similarly, 
just because it is impossible to fall in love with oneself because one’s own beauty is insufficient, 
does that mean that such a beauty could not exist? 
A strange and extreme point of comparison to the Narcissus story is Gustavo Adolfo 
Becquer’s legend “The Green Eyes. Ostensibly a sort of combination between a familiar Undine-
like myth and the menacing Romanticism exemplified in works such as Keats’ “La Belle Dame 
Sans Merci,” this story of a nobleman seduced by a beautiful demoness expresses perhaps a still 
more radical form of aestheticism than the story of Narcissus, and yet, naturally, one that is more    
knowing with regard to what the story may mean (the decadent form of a tale tends towards 
greater knowledge and lesser universality).  Having fallen in love with a beautiful and menacing 
spirit in the forest, who possesses the green eyes of the story’s title, the hero, Fernando de 
Argensola pines for her and yearns to return to the pool in which he found her. His friends try to 
dissuade him, telling him she will be his doom. When he finally confronts her and confesses his 
love, she tells him, before embracing him and pulling him down to his death: 
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“Fernando,” the beautiful woman said in tones resembling music, “ I love you even more 
tan you love me; I, who being pure spirit, descend to a mortal man. I’m not a woman like 
those who exist on earth; I’m a woman worthy of you, you who are superior to all other 
men. I live in the depths of these waters, incorporeal like them, fleeting and 
transparent…I do not punish the man who dares trouble the fountain where I dwell; 
rather, I reward him with my love, as being a mortal superior to the superstitions of the 
mob, as being a suitor capable of understanding my strange, mysterious affection.” 
(Appelbaum, 167) 
 
Here, beauty’s arms do not merely “stretch…in return,” but reach out and drown her admirer. 
And yet, were beauty itself to speak, it could hardly articulate its perspective so clearly. In order 
to understand it, we perhaps must find a way to read her speech not as a ruse to destroy us, but as 
an honest truth.  
 
II 
Pater, in the opening to his Conclusion to The Renaissance, notes it is the tendency of modern 
thought to believe that all ideas are impermanent. Times have changed, somewhat, and it might 
be fair to say that one contemporary tendency of thought at this moment is to claim that all things 
mask other things, that behind each habit of mind or pattern of seeing there lurks (note the 
menacing tone) some secret, insidious belief, some mechanism of control, invariably oppressive. 
We are, for good or ill, or our time. So let us reach behind the veil of simple misinterpretation 
and find the mechanism of control, how it works, who operates it, and why, in the end, they have 
chosen to do so if chosen they have.  
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 The term “narcissism” first came into currency in the late nineteenth century and was 
undoubtedly popularized by Freud. By now, reflexively, the misinterpretation of the story is 
ubiquitous. What is most striking, what differentiates the widespread use of the term 
narcissism—and implicitly the misinterpretation of the story—is not so much the subsuming as 
previously observed of aesthetic values to other ends, not even the justifiable claim that beauty 
doesn’t exist. Rather, it seems to reject the very idea that, objectively, beauty can even said to be 
experienced. 
In his study on the use of the Narcissus myth in Surrealist art, David Lomas gives a 
useful accounting of the interpretations of the Narcissus motif from antiquity to the present day. 
Lomas refers to the way the Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus perceived the story in his 
Enneads, as the “ the dupe of images—‘ copies, vestiges, shadows’—that are mere reflections of 
a higher reality. (18). This we see is consistent with both Ovid’s critique of Narcissus’ supposed 
foolishness and the general platonic distaste for artistic representation as described in Ion, and 
forms an effective transition to the moralizing criticisms we saw outlined in Eco’s survey. In a 
sense the Neoplatonic contempt for Narcissus (which is based not on vanity but on the very fact 
of aesthetic experience) can be seen as a model for the purported reasoning of the anti-aesthete—
“beauty is only skin deep,” he might say (rather than formal or abstract), it’s manifestation as a 
physical, sensory pleasure places it beneath…other things. To Plotinus, these are his emanations 
leading back to the central form of “the one,” an image which may serve as a metaphor for any 
ideological obsession. This “one” can be anything to anybody, but when someone judges 
everything according to his particular one, everything else becomes an emanation, increasingly 
grotesque in proportion to its distance from his obsession, until he finds his own delight in the 
beautiful has become the foolish distraction by copies, vestiges, shadows.  
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Lomas mentions a healthier vision, offered by the Renaissance architect Alberti, who, 
“auspiciously proclaimed Narcissus the first artist: ‘consequently I used to tell my friends that 
the inventor of painting, according to the poets, was Narcissus, who was turned into a flower, 
for, as painting is the flower of the arts, so the tale of Narcissus fits our purpose perfectly. What 
then is a painting, but the act of embracing by means of art the surface of the pool?’” (19) In 
relation to Romanticism, Lomas quotes Ramon Fernandez, who in his 1931 volume on Gide 
claimed, “Narcissus...is the favorite god of symbolist mythology, god of solipsism, of aesthetic 
onanism.” (19) 
Lomas traces the motif’s use in artists who wanted to explore either autoerotic or 
homosexual themes, for example the moralizing Waterhouse (himself moralized by 
contemporary concerns, as seen in the introduction), whose 1903 painting Echo and Narcissus 
Lomas views as a “Victorian morality tale about the dangers that lie in waiting for anyone who 
strays from the straight and narrow.” (21) Somewhat similarly, Havelock Ellis saw the motif in 
what he believed were vain, self-involved behaviors—“Narcissus-like tendencies”—of women 
and more “feminine-minded men,” for whom “the sexual emotions [are] absorbed, and often 
entirely lost, in self-admiration.” 
It is a short way from these moralizing tendencies to our own period’s identification of 
Narcissus and obsessive vanity. The term “narcissism” was coined by Paul Näcke in 1899 in an 
article on Ellis, and afterwards used by Freud, where it “underwent major progressive expansion. 
No longer restricted to an unusual aberration…it is given a role in the regular development of 
human beings.” (22) Yet the term as Freud and, later, Lacan use it is too specialized for the 
purposes of this paper, and more characteristic is Lomas’ description of its use in American 
culture, specifically Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism, which, “tapped into a vein of self-doubt 
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about the unbridled materialism of American consumer society. Lasch appeals to psychoanalytic 
theories about narcissistic personality to describe narcissism as the correlate of a selfish society 
obsessed with consumption….narcissism had become a byword for the American malaise[.]” 
(23). The humiliation of Narcissus has reached a climax in our own time.  We can see how often 
the current president is defined by a mythological character from whom he could not be more 
different, for whereas Trump is belligerent, eager for approval, irrational and, at least while 
president, physically repugnant and overweight, Narcissus is (to his mirror image) tender, gentle, 
wary of the company of others, and perhaps even extremely objective and rational. The final 
point of comparison needs no detailing.31 It finds an ironic mirror perhaps akin to Wilde’s 
equally ironic depiction of Narcissus’ pool, in his prose poem “the disciple.” Here, the pool 
mourns Narcissus’ presence, unaware of Narcissus’ beauty, praised by the Oreads, who assure 
him Narcissus was in fact beautiful. The pool replies, “But I loved Narcissus because, as he lay 
on my banks and looked down at me, in the mirror of his eyes I saw ever my own beauty 
mirrored.” (Wilde, Short Fiction, 255). What might appear a paradoxical musing on the nature of 
beauty’s capacity to make us see our own more clearly seems really to be simply an example of 
vanity. When Narcissus helps people feel better about themselves, he is beloved, when he makes 
them feel worse, he is vain. Our culture truly is comprised of Narcissus’ disciples, in the manner 
of Wilde’s pool.  
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III 
If Narcissus as symbol has assumed a character of vanity, the fortunes of the concept of beauty 
have, as we have seen, suffered a still more precipitous decline. Terry Eagleton’s materialist 
critique of the tenets of aestheticism may be taken as emblematic of the contemporary attitude, 
which can be varied or adjusted to suit particular ideologies. In his Literary Theory: an 
Introduction, Eagleton posits that as the romantics were, “deprived of any proper place within 
the social movements that might have actually transformed industrial capitalism into a just 
society, the writer was increasingly driven back into the solitariness of his own creative mind.” 
(18) Given this unenviable position, Eagleton claims that idealistic philosophies of Kant, 
Schiller, and Coleridge spawned the notion of aesthetics, which attempted to separate artistic 
judgment from material and social realities.  
 
The assumption that there was an unchanging object known as ‘art,’ or an isolatable 
experience called ‘beauty’ or the ‘aesthetic’, was largely a product of the very alienation 
of art from social life which we have already touched on. If literature had ceased to have 
any obvious function then it was possible to turn this fact to literature’s advantage. The 
whole point of creative writing was that it was gloriously useless, an ‘end in itself; loftily 
removed from any social purpose….Art was extricated from the material practices, social 
relations, and ideological meanings in which it his always caught up, and raised to the 
status of a solitary fetish. (18-19) 
 
Even if one agrees with Eagleton that the period of industrial capitalism has marginalized the 
artist, his conclusion about aesthetic ideas is not self-evident, and seems to confuse a 
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phenomenon’s cause with its actual nature. As offered here, the social causes for artistic 
production and aesthetic ideas are not identical with those ideas, and it is equally possible that 
isolation from the main currents of discourse permitted artists and aestheticians to discover art’s 
true nature, that it is not “always caught up” in material practices etc, but merely emerges from 
them, is built from them, but that this unique nature is only clear when it is seen as a thing apart 
from its material origins.  
Yet the question here is not so much the Eagleton’s hypothesis as such, but whether the 
fact that such a hypothesis is treated as a truism might itself have causes beyond a desire for 
accuracy, whether this interpretation is the result of a more universal form of narcissism.  A 
characteristic and respected instance of the narcissism implicit in the flight from beauty may be 
observed in Arthur Danto’s The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art. Danto’s 
arguments about the general irrelevance of beauty to contemporary art are worth exploring both 
for their gracious lack of spitefulness and the way they summarize an almost overwhelming mass 
of anti-aesthetic material. 
 Danto posits an “externalist” view of art, which displaced the “internalist” vision which 
had governed art for several centuries prior, and which we may view as roughly in the neo-
Kantian or Formalist camp. The externalist idea prioritized the positioning of art in relation to 
society, and first became evident to Danto when he tried to explain what made Warhol’s Brillo 
Boxes “art”—clearly, he says, old aesthetic criteria had minimal relevance in determining 
Warhol’s value. Rather, Warhol’s value was formed from historical contingencies like the 
dominant culture, the availability of certain materials, the familiarity of certain frames of 
reference, and so Danto came to believe that, rather than any quality of beauty, “what makes an 
object an artwork is external to it.” (xvii)  
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 The larger external force, also contingent, seems to be the changing political discourse, 
which artists and theorists of the present have inserted into art, or rather, they have allowed it to 
subsume aesthetic concerns themselves.  
 
The mark of the contemporary condition of the philosophy of art is that a philosophical 
definition of art must be consistent with the radical openness that has overtaken the 
domain....In truth, philosophy and avant-garde art in the 1960’s shared a great many 
attitudes. One aim of Pop, for example, was to ironize the distinction between high and 
vernacular art….comparably, it was an effort in analytical philosophy to overcome the 
pretensions of what we might called “high’ philosophy—the cosmo-tragical visions of 
the Existentialists, or of the metaphysical titans who loomed behind them[….] (18-20)  
 
One might ask, why would someone want to do this? The answer is not as self-evident as it might 
appear. Of course nowadays these distinctions exist only as a recollection of something that once 
were firm, and need permanently to be broken down, but we might do well to ask ourselves the 
cause of the desire to shatter these distinctions in the first place. And it must be equally self-
evident that either there are good internal reasons for folding the distinctions—i.e., that the 
distinctions are inaccurate, that they do not properly represent reality and must be exploded in 
order to attain to a greater level of accuracy—or else, that there are external reasons which have 
nothing to do with the distinctions as such, but rather the fact that these distinctions themselves 
make people uncomfortable or unhappy for political, social or personal reasons. “Who sez?” 
again. Put another way, was Narcissus not beautiful (or is he no longer so), or did certain forces 
dislike acknowledging it?  
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The radical openness seems quite in keeping with Sontag’s claim that critics of beauty: 
“Discrimination, once a positive faculty meaning refined judgment, high standards, 
fastidiousness), turned negative: it meant prejudice, bigotry, blindness to the virtues of what was 
not identical with oneself. The strongest, most successful move against beauty was in the arts: 
beauty, and the caring about beauty, was restrictive; as the current idiom has it, elitist.” (210)  
This way of envisioning Danto’s universal openness certainly seems extremely familiar 
in terms of contemporary attitudes and mores. As Danto says of John Cage’s endeavor, “to 
overcome the distinction between music and mere noise,” or the art community Fluxus’ “’closing 
the gap between art and life,’” (21), the project seems a political attempt to democratize 
experience, or existence itself by eliminating aesthetic hierarchy. 32 
 
More surprising perhaps are the motivations Danto associates with the spiritual 
forefathers of these movements, such as Duchamp and the Dadaists.  
 
In conversations that took place in 1967, Duchamp said ‘Since Courbet, it’s been 
believed that painting is addressed to the retina. That was everyone’s error. The retinal 
shudder!’ His argument was quite historical: “before, painting had other functions. It 
could be philosophical, religious, moral.’  (45) 
 
32 A recent article in the NY Times about a Manet exhibit pointed to the revealing wisdom: “Why do I value this 
early Manet so much more? It is only because I think art has a higher vocation than delivering joy? 
Or is it because, poor modern boy that I am, I have been trained by more than a century of artists and 
writers to be suspicious of beauty — that ruse, that luxury, that feminine thing? The received history of modern 
Western painting, over which Manet looms like our great bourgeois Allfather, can feel like a succession of attacks 
on beauty by generations of arrogant men, each more certain than the last that their art would at last redeem an ugly 
society.” 
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Similarly: 
 
It is Dada to which I primarily refer in the project of disconnecting beauty from art as an 
expression of moral revulsion against a society for whom beauty was a cherished value, 
and which cherished art itself because of beauty. (48) 
 
It is faintly amusing to view their productions in this light. What seems subversive is, despite its 
understandable origins, rather Victorian in its prudery. To imagine a life in which our pleasures 
are conditioned by religious, philosophical or moral exigencies is hardly to imagine a life at all. 
And if their rebellion was justified and understandable, if it indeed added something new, surely 
it seems rather ascetic to take it as thesis for everything that follows. As Roger Scruton observes, 
comparing Duchamp, Warhol and the present day, “the first thing you might learn, in 
considering jokes, is that Marcel Duchamp’s urinal is one—quite a good one first time round, 
corny by the time of Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, and downright stupid today.” (83) 
 This ideology is set as a corrective against what Danto sees as Roger Fry’s misguided, 
modernist, idealizing of beauty. Fry’s organization of Post-Impressionist exhibitions in the 
second decade of the 20th century met with public outrage, but whereas Fry believed that the 
public was not yet able to see the beauty of the works displayed, and merely objected to anti-
realist tendencies, Danto attributes their outrage to a “palpable absence of beauty.” (xiv)33  
 
Fry, argued that the new art would be seen as ugly until it was seen as beautiful. To see it 
as beautiful, he implied, required aesthetic education, and that the beauty would be seen 
 
33 This is the first of several curious judgments…or judgments that would appear curious, until we see that beauty is 
being confused with Kantian pleasantness. 
Amir Dagan 103 
in the course of time. Undoubtedly we sometimes do come to see beauty that evaded us at 
first—but suppose we don’t? Is it because we are blind to the beauty—or because we 
have wrongly taken it as a given that art must be beautiful? (xv) 
 
Obviously this is begging the question a bit, and these aren’t the only two possibilities. We could 
create a definition of art that doesn’t require beauty while simultaneously saying that many 
times, people who haven’t seen it have done just that, failed to see it. The “suppose we don’t,” is 
especially telling. It seems just unimaginable that a person in our society could have some failure 
of perception or education that would bar him from experiencing certain things. Well, maybe 
there are more things on heaven and earth than are dreamt of in such a man’s philosophy. It isn’t 
certain that what he doesn’t see is there, but his not seeing it certainly is no proof it isn’t.  
Fry’s defense, in “The Grafton Gallery: An Apologia,” of early modernism, “that every 
new work of creative design is ugly until it becomes beautiful; that we usually apply the word 
beautiful to those works of art in which familiarity has enabled us to grasp the unity easily,” may 
be taken as a characteristic expression of Kant’s sensus communis, wherein the ability to 
perceive a beauty that has heretofore been invisible to the eyes (when perceived, for example, as 
ugliness) is the moment of achieving the exemplary judgment. Danto seems to believe this is 
stretching the definition of beauty too far, because it is too distant from the conventional beauty 
of the world, but Fry distinguishes between mere pleasantness and the apprehension of “unity,” 
which can be understood as the formalism implicit in the beautiful—beauty is not sensory 
pleasantness alone but, as Kant says, some play between sensation and cognition. Danto 
acknowledges that prisoners in “cold damp spaces…surrounded by their own excrement,” 
amounts to some kind of “hell,” (33) and likens it to aesthetic torture, but when he says this isn’t 
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a matter of taste, he is correct because he is speaking of Kant’s ideas of pleasantness, not beauty, 
which we will recall is a concern of the subject only, not his interplay with an object, and which 
involves “interested” pleasure, not disinterested. Danto’s refusal to acknowledge this beauty is 
still more surprising in his evaluation of several of Matisse’s portraits: 
 
“Matisse’s blue nude is a good painting, but someone who claims it is beautiful is talking 
through his or her hat.” (36-37) “Blue Nude is morally rather than visually true. Beauty is 
really as obvious as blue: one does not have to work at seeing it when it is there.” (88-89) 
 
and again, of “woman with hat” (1905)—presumably not the type who would eat hers— 
 
Roger Fry misses the point entirely by saying that Matisse was interested in design and 
that the design is what we should be looking at and would in time find beautiful—that the 
artist distorts is in the interests of design. No: in my view at least it is a strong painting of 
a strong woman. But it is not a beautiful painting of a beautiful woman. And in truth 
there is no way without doing violence to the concept, to see the painting as beautiful. 
(88) 
 
Might there be a beautiful painting of a strong woman? But this is beside the point. What seems 
evident to me is that Danto is looking at the women as though they were real women, about 
whom one might feel repulsion or lust or anything in between. Of course even such beauty isn’t 
always obvious—and no, I’m not speaking of inner beauty—certain faces grow on one, and then 
one is at pains to discover, if ever he can, whether his appreciation for it is because of 
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propinquity or the fact that familiarity has revealed something he couldn’t previously discern. Of 
course the latter is one’s experience with many great artworks, in all media, the nebulous sense 
that there is some sort of merit you can’t quite distinguish, the curiosity that sense engenders, and 
then the pursuit, where bit by bit one follows certain threads, becomes familiar with the work’s 
method or language, until all at once, quite like falling in love, one is given as a gift a the 
peculiar disinterested pleasure that is the encounter with beauty.  
 It seems he has confused beauty with mere prettiness, or desirability. But that is what 
beauty is not. If that were the case (and by Danto’s externalist attitude, he may well believe it is,) 
that the beauty of a given portrait of man or women is commensurate to their attractiveness…and 
by this standards it must be admitted that a Victoria’s Secret catalogue is more beautiful than a 
painting of Titian or Ingres. But it’s quite obvious that whatever Victoria’s Secret models elicit, 
it isn’t a disinterested pleasure, and it certainly doesn’t aspire to the condition of music. Pleasure 
in another person’s appearance (as we shall see in Salome) is almost inevitably bound up with 
interested concerns, and that is precisely why it may be the image of a woman who fits not 
human archetype of attractiveness, or even much resembles reality, which is most deserving of 
being called beautiful. And if art does aspire to the condition of music, is it in any way self-
evident that the beauty of all music is “obvious?” 
 This is the degraded form of the word beautiful that Sontag alludes to as described in the 
introduction, one all too familiar today.34 It also is quite clearly one which takes beauty as rather 
 
34 It should go without saying that, though we have employed mostly pleasant examples of beauty—Proust, Pater, 
Mozart, the myth of Narcissus—that there is no reason that objects of aesthetic delight must be pleasant, of even 
avoid being repellant. Beauty being a quality of disinterested pleasure, it is not bound by the rules of interested 
pleasantness, and music most people find off-putting, for example that of the Second Viennese School, or that of 
Brian Ferneyhough, has quite as much claim to beauty as does Mozart or Chopin, abstract art unrelated to life or 
even repellant, disquieting work quite as much as a painting by Watteau. To recall Gauguin’s maxim—“the ugly can 
be beautiful. The pretty, never,”—we understand that prettiness is an insufficient requisite for beauty, and though it 
may be present in objects of beauty, it is not at all required.   
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paltry when compared with the true, the good…the political, the social (why is a strong woman 
better than a beautiful woman? beats me! One may suppose it’s better to be a strong woman, 
though that’s not necessarily the case either. The least we can say is the strong woman probably 
has a more impressive character, which is a topic that has nothing to do at all with aesthetics).  
A misunderstanding of a phrase in Kant seems quite similar to the Matisse: 
 
[…]Kant’s somewhat surprising remark…”Nature is beautiful is beautiful because it 
looks like art,” when one would have expected the opposite instead. Kant seems to be 
saying that the world is beautiful when it looks the way painters represent it, when one 
thought they represented it because it was beautiful in the first place[.] (81) 
 
It is here that we find that much of contemporary culture has forgotten what Pater and the 
modernists taught us beauty to be. Paintings would only be beautiful the way nature is beautiful 
in the way Danto expects if paintings are a direct reproduction of nature. But similarly would 
Kant’s comment only be surprising in such a context, if one suspected he meant that nature is 
beautiful when it looks precisely like certain paintings. This is of course patently absurd. But 
equally is it absurd, though less obviously so, to suppose that an artwork is beautiful in 
accordance with the beauty of the object represented. What Kant surely means is that paintings 
of nature isolate specifically a visual pictorial beauty, whereas nature itself is, if sometimes 
beautiful, many other things besides. It is in paintings of the kind to which Kant presumably is 
referring, and which are one form of “music,”--i.e., object without specific reference, 
meaningless to the degree that it is aesthetic—that offer us the opportunity of disinterested 
pleasure.  Our contemporary has trouble seeing the import of Kant’s comment because he sees 
Amir Dagan 107 
beauty as merely a mild pleasantness eclipsed by the grand meanings of things, rather than the 
particular pleasure which Kant and Pater in their different ways attempt to explicate.  
 It is perhaps fitting that Danto is a Hegelian for, even if it cannot be said our anti-
aesthetic culture imitates Hegel, it is in many ways a sort of refraction of Hegel’s ideas. In his 
Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel posits that art as a value was relevant only insofar as 
it reflected the sensualist temperament of earlier historical periods, for example the period of 
Classical Greece, whereas the modern period is no longer represented by art but must find its 
expression in philosophy. Hegel views art as the sensual embodiment of the primary 
philosophical ideas and concerns of a particular age, or as he put it, its spirit. In various ages, art 
has been better or more poorly suited to express that spirit. In Classical Greece, for example, it 
was ideally suited to expresses the period’s dominant notions, whereas the Christian religion, 
which is founded on an ideology less concerned with materiality, is not wholly expressed in its 
own art. Finally, in Hegel’s own age, with its propensity for reflection, art is no longer an 
adequate vehicle. Ideally, philosophy, and to an extent religion, are better conduits for achieving 
comprehension of the modern spirit since they transcend sensory experience.  
 Although Hegel can be said to offer art a more preeminent place in his philosophical 
hierarchy than does, say, Plato, both locate the value (or lack thereof) in the content of art rather 
than its form. For Hegel, content is thought reflective of spirit, whereas form seems to be both a 
kind of vessel into which is poured a sensuous manifestation of spirit and itself a sensuous 
extension of spirit: “the more that works of art excel in true beauty of presentation, the more 
profound is the inner truth of content and thought.” (Hegel, CIII) Form here is not aesthetically 
self-sufficient—still less it is something akin to Plato’s absolutes. Rather it is the material 
manifestation of ideas, the ideas themselves being content or thought. If we picture, for example, 
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metal being molded into a variety of shapes, the interest for the Hegelian might be in to the 
scientist’s interests in the properties of the metal itself. Such an ideology, divorced from his 
idealism, can be said to inform most perceptions of artwork in the present day—art is perceived 
as a vessel for ideas, and so is ultimately subordinated to those ideas. It is perhaps not a 
coincidence that the diminished status of art within this ideology is consistent with its diminished 
station in the present climate.  
Such a theory—necessarily without the vast and complex apparatus of Hegel’s 
philosophy—is entirely fitting for today’s culture, which trades in meaning rather than 
disinterested experience, rather like the crude man of the younger Kant’s description in his 
Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime. And yet, it is also characteristic that, as with the 
Matisse, there is a note of contempt regarding the idea of beauty. Discussing Hegel’s essential 
correction of Kant’s notions of beauty, Danto points to Hegel’s “Third Realm” in discussing a 
wedding dress by Mare-ange Guillemot (66)—the dress, he claims, cannot be viewed in a 
Kantian way as a work of art because all of its value derives from the meaning we extract from 
it.  
 
Kant classes ‘all music without words,’ as exemplifying free beauty. The beauty of the 
wedding dress, on the other hand, is quite clearly connected with a concept. The concept 
governs who wears it when and for how long a time and what it means to be in white and 
its wearer veiled. But a wedding dress as art is not covered by the same concept.. Rather, 
it covers the concept, in that it absorbs part of its meaning. It is plain from this that Kant 
has no independent concept of beautiful art, since art possesses neither kind of beauty. 
What Kant lacks is the concept of meaning. (67) 
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It is regrettable to say about what seems so well-intentioned, but this is ultimately the narcissism 
of the age. The art works of course do have the first kind of meaning, they all do if they are 
beautiful; they just might not be only that, as nature is not either. And a wedding dress? It seems 
almost ridiculous to call the dress itself beautiful precisely because it is so over-determined with 
meaning. But it may be beautiful, at moments, from certain angles, and the bride may strike a 
pose in a certain light—“every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face.” It is 
narcissism to say that the things that mean something to us are necessarily one of those forms of 
beauty. And why, one asks, is an artwork that absorbs the concept of “weddings,” and 
“dresses,”—and femininity, and commercialism, and patriarchy, etc, etc—the better, for its 
“meaning” (which, we must admit, is fairly quotidian…and in the picture of the Guillemot, I’d 
suggest the model in white is rather more of interest than anything the artist has to “say”), and 
free beauty, the worse? What is this, but a privileging of oneself over something that, as Kant has 
pointed out, is disinterested? Or, put another way, isn’t the emphasis on “meaning” at the 
expense of “beauty” profoundly interested an act, profoundly narcissistic, and as such, suspect in 
terms of its legitimacy? 
 There is a personal anecdote early in the introduction, which I think is inadvertently 
revealing. Danto describes how he moved to New York in the 1950’s to study philosophy. It was 
the heyday of abstract expressionism, and though the painters seemed obsessed in their manner 
with aesthetic concerns, Danto could see no use of the philosophy of art in explicating anything 
that they were making. (2) (This is likely accurate—the idea of aesthetics doesn’t really explicate 
particular, individual beauty as it is incarnated). Yet by the early 60’s, the new art movements  
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“at odds” with the spirit of abstract expressionism, most notably for Danto, Warhol, had rather a 
different relationship to his discipline: 
 
[…]the brash and irreverent art of the 1960’s seemed to have no room for aesthetics at 
all. It was as if it and analytical philosophy were made for each other….It was for me a 
particularly exhilarating moment. I would have had no interest in being and artist in the 
new period. But I found it intoxicating to be a philosopher of art when …[artists] were 
content to produce works that looked for all the world like the commonplace objects of 
daily life. (2-3) 
 
This is, in its way, shocking. On the other, it’s hardly surprising at all. It is first of interest that 
the art he wished to write about was art he wouldn’t have liked to make…now, it may be too 
much to impute that the art we like best is that which we wish we ourselves made, but certainly 
there seems to be an implication that the art of the second period was more conducive to writing 
about than enjoying on its own merits. Hey, he had a job, right? Or rather, now he had a role.  It 
wasn’t just Narcissus anymore…now all the nymphs had their part to play. It’s just that, when all 
the nymphs have a part, they need to not leave room for Narcissus at all.  
 What’s truly appalling is that he found all this intoxicating. Is there not something of 
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IV 
As we have seen, aesthetics were always treated as a problem and a danger, but never prior the 
twentieth century has beauty been so hated. To explain this phenomenon, which has exacerbated 
the conflict between aesthetics and other modes of thought, it useful to turn to the philosopher 
Jose Ortega y Gasset’s definition of the mass man in his book The Revolt of the Masses. The 
thesis of the book is fairly simple, and probably would be more controversial in the present day 
were it not for its relative obscurity. Essentially, he argues that the material benefits of 
industrialization and modern technology, coupled with a rapid rise in population and standard of 
living, have created a new sort of personality, one who, thanks to the ease of his existence, self-
consciously distinguishes himself from a real or imagined aristocracy of experts:  
  
The Mass is all that which sets no value on itself—good or ill—based on specific 
grounds, but which feels itself “just like everybody,” and nevertheless is not concerned 
about it; is, in fact, quite happy to feel itself as one with everybody else. Imagine a 
humble-minded man who, having tried to estimate his own worth on specific grounds—
asking himself if he has any talent for this or that, if he excels in any direction—realizes  
that he possesses no quality of excellence. Such a man will feel that he is mediocre or 
commonplace, ill-gifted, but he will not feel himself “mass.” (14-15) 
 
To a degree, what this mass man lacks is shame or, more benevolently, humility. As the nymphs 
and fauns who worship Narcissus lack his excellence in the realm of beauty, the man thus 
imagined is by nature mediocre…and mediocrity, it must be intuitively conceded, is the nature of 
almost every human being who has ever existed. Note that Ortega y Gasset does not claim it is 
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‘wrong’ in any way to be so—of course how could it be, when statistically, being mediocre, 
ordinary, is infinitely more characteristic of a human being than being exceptional…That is what 
those words mean! It is perhaps wrong to suppose that such a man should feel shame, but it is 
fitting to call the mass man shameless. Ortega y Gasset defines such a man as one who makes no 
demands upon himself, who has no criteria outside his own experience by which to judge his 
own excellence or decrepitude. Because he feels “just like everybody” and because it is his 
psychology to feel that this is totally acceptable, any other standard ceases to exist in his mind. 
The only factor of judgment becomes whether or not one is in the mass. And indeed, as we shall 
see, to maintain this belief, one must come to despise any other form of measurement, rather as 
sometimes a man can hate the person who divests him of his illusions.  
 Ortega y Gasset is not writing about aesthetics, though he often discusses culture—not as 
it is used more frequently today, but in the sense of high culture or refinement. But the type he 
has invented, or rather defined, is easily applied to the question of Narcissus and narcissism. As 
we have pointed out in the introduction, Sontag claims, “Beauty defines itself as the antithesis of 
the ugly. Obviously, you can’t say something is beautiful if you’re not willing to say something 
is ugly.” For ugly we may, as before, insert un-beautiful. If Narcissus is to be the most beautiful, 
and most others ordinary in their lack of beauty, his very beauty calls attention to their relative 
ugliness. In naming him beautiful, supremely so, it necessarily means that others do not reach the 
same heights by a measure which can be deduced from his very existence. And this is innately in 
conflict with the mass man’s perception of himself, which is dependent upon “set[ting] no value 
on itself—good or ill.” 
 Needless to say, one’s own beliefs about oneself have little effect on reality. Whether we 
believe or not in God does little to effect his existence, no more than my belief that I can lift a 
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300 pound boulder, or play professional basketball, will give me the power to do so. The 
objective world stays as it was, regardless of what we think. And so whatever the mass man 
believes, he likely does not have the qualification, the ability or capacity, let alone the resolve, to 
solve complex math problems, or engineer a rocket ship to the moon, or cure diseases, or write a 
theological epic in terza rima, or paint the Venus of Urbino. Hey, that’s life. As Ortega y Gasset 
says, 
  
There exist…in society, operations, activities, and functions of the most diverse order, 
which are of their nature special, and which consequently cannot be properly carried out 
without special gifts. For examples: certain pleasures of an artistic and refined character, 
or again the functions of government and of political judgment in public affairs. 
Previously these special activities were exercised by gifted minorities, or at least by those 
who claimed such qualifications. The mass asserted no right to intervene in them; they 
realized that if they wanted to intervene they would necessarily have to acquire those 
special qualities and cease being mere mass. They recognized their place in a healthy 
social system. 
[Now, we see] a changed attitude in the mass. They all indicate that the mass has 
to decided to advance to the foreground of social life, to occupy the places, to use the 
instruments and to enjoy the pleasures hitherto reserved to the few. It is evident, for 
example, that the places were never intended for the multitude, for their dimensions are 
too limited, and the crowd is continuously overflowing; thus manifesting to our eyes and 
in the clearest manner the new phenomenon: the mass, without ceasing to be mass, is 
supplanting the minorities. (16-17) 
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Ortega y Gasset uses a language that will undoubtedly offend most ears, but let’s not be mass 
men ourselves and rush to simpleminded judgment. His is not by any means an economic 
definition. We know this because he has defined the mass man by his character. Wealthy people 
are mass as any poor person, no external marker of identity is relevant—only expertise and 
certain capacities, whether learned or inculcated. As Ortega y Gasset points out, if someone 
attains to a level of expertise through judicious self-criticism and successful aspiration to other 
forms of knowledge, he is no longer mass. Ortega y Gasset’s apparent disgust isn't that masses of 
men and women get to eat ice cream and have leisure time and wear nice clothes and gold 
jewelry. It’s that they make themselves heard on issues they have no capacity to judge, without 
ever questioning their own capacity or attempting to improve it, and thereby eclipse the minority 
that does. The argument isn’t remotely as elitist as it seems, because of course, in every 
endeavor, there are gradations of talent and knowledge. It would be presumptuous for me to run 
onto the field during a professional football game and demand that I play quarterback, or 
interrupt a surgery and demand that I, untrained, ignorant of all medicine and human biology and 
physiology, should be the one to cut into the brain of the poor fellow upon the operating table, 
helpless in his anesthetized sleep. Other proclamations of equality are similarly presumptuous. 
On the other hand, 
 
A characteristic of our times is the predominance, even in groups traditionally selective, 
of the mass and the vulgar. Thus, in the intellectual life, which of its essence requires and 
presupposes qualification, one can note the progressive triumph of pseudo-intellectual, 
unqualified, unqualifiable, and by their very mental texture, disqualified.” (16) 
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Of course, in the present day, the arts and perhaps to a slightly less extent the world of ideas is 
more than any other arena of human endeavor the one in which ideas of excellence are displaced 
in favor of “democratic” ideals. Privileged minorities in this paradigm are perceived primarily in 
their political and economic dimensions—and it is true that political and economic power was 
located then, as increasingly now, in the hands of a very few, who hoarded their wealth and 
power and forbade the majority of population from such self-determination and enjoyment as 
those minorities experienced. But these are not the minorities of whom Ortega y Gasset is 
speaking. Rather, he is talking about a minority of the excellent, particularly in fields where it is 
exceedingly rare to achieve excellence. These two ideas do not necessarily need to be opposed to 
one another, though in our political climate it is likely they will be. In any case, to those who 
have ears to hear, his argument is founded on a psychological observation, about the nature of 
such people, now, as have no particular expertise while simultaneously rejecting the notion that 
their understanding is in any way insufficient. It should be noted, once more, that there is no 
inevitable number of mass men, and that being of the mass is not of any genetic inheritance, so 
much as an attitude that is dominant in post-industrial western society As Ortega says, once one 
of the masses becomes an expert, he’s no longer of the mass. It follows that no one innately must 
be mass…though it is unlikely that it is by definition impossible that most people will cease 
being mediocre. The mass man is a psychological state of unmerited self-satisfaction, whereas 
since Socrates (and Confucius, etc), wisdom must always follow on the heels of humility. How 
different the mass man is from the natural mode of the creator in a time dominated by mass men 
is evident in Kandinsky’s bleak picture of the genius: 
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The solitary visionaries are despised or regarded as abnormal and eccentric. Those who 
are not wrapped in lethargy and who feel vague longings for the spiritual life and 
knowledge and progress cry in harsh chorus, without any to comfort them. The night of 
the spirit falls more and more darkly. Deeper becomes the misery of these blind and 
terrified guides, and their followers, tormented and unnerved by fear and doubt, prefer to 
this gradual darkening the final sudden leap into the blackness. (8) 
 
This is not dissimilar from William Gass’ observation regarding the Pulitzer Prize committee, 
that for the judges, “excellence itself is threatening, innovation an outrage,”35 or from a joke 
from the sketch show Mr. Show’s parody of the film Amadeus, which was quoted as an epigraph 
to this chapter. 
Let’s take an emblematic historical incident, and compare the humility of past 
generations with our own. Beethoven died in Vienna in 1827. For years he had been patronized 
by an aristocracy that made no demands upon him but that he live in the Austrian capital. As is 
well known, in the last decade or so of his life, Beethoven’s works assumed an inward character 
and a degree of formal experimentation that made them almost inaccessible to his 
contemporaries and all but a very few immediate successors—indeed his last piano sonatas and 
string quartets did not gain currency among even the connoisseurs of music until the late 
nineteenth century, and even those who knew his music most deeply, such as Brahms, never 
really attempted to follow them (the early Mendelssohn is a counterintuitive exception). Yet 
when Beethoven died, some 20,000 people attended his funeral. It cannot be supposed that all 
 
35 Gass, William H. “Prizes, Surprises, And Consolation Prizes.” The New York Times. 5 May. 1985,  
http://movies2.nytimes.com/books/98/11/01/specials/gass-prizes.html 
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these people had any profound love of Beethoven’s music—it is far more likely that most 
attendees preferred other, more popular fare.  
 
In the 1830’s, the average music lover would have said that Beethoven, Mozart and 
Hummel were the three greatest composers; but at the same time, the average music lover 
was much more comfortable with the music of George Onslow…Ries…Herz 
…Hunten…[and] Kalkbrenner. Those were the composers most often played—the 
commercial men of the period.. They provided music that offered no problems for 
anybody. (Schonberg, 147) 
 
The undeveloped taste of the average music lover is unsurprising and unimportant—what’s 
shocking to a contemporary observer is the fact that these people made no pretensions of 
claiming that what was their favorite was necessarily the best. They were humble—they were 
prepared to make distinctions between their preferences and things that were objectively 
excellent. This is, at the present stage of history, inconceivable. It isn’t just a matter of, as Harold 
Bloom puts it, “department of ‘Cultural Studies’ where Batman comics, Mormon theme parks, 
television, movies, and rock” replace great literature, (Western Canon, 519) nor even the “cool” 
Danto describes (one man’s cool is the next generation’s tool), but an overwhelming confidence 
among almost the entirety of the population that there cannot be a single one of their habitual 
interests that is any way inferior to any of the productions of mankind.  
 Let us contrast this with an emblematic example of the current moment, the instagram 
poetry of Rupi Kaur, who is right now bestselling poet in the Anglophone world. Writing on 
such currently popular themes as, “anger at how the world treats young women, especially 
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women of colour; defiance in the face of dismissal; celebrations of modern femininity,”36 in a 
style evidently that appears to have developed without the burden of reading,37 her poems appear 
to more experienced readers to be devoid of all merit: 
  
if you are not enough for yourself 
 you will never be enough 
 for somebody else. 
 
Naturally given the content and its hallmark-esque, self-help style, parodies began to abound, as 
did a great deal of criticism. This is not unusual–there has always been trash, if not perhaps of so 
uninteresting a sort, and trash always has its detractors. More interesting for our purposes is to 
compare to the attitude of Beethoven’s less musical contemporaries to the reaction of her 
defenders against criticism. Beethoven’s contemporaries were humble—they did not assume 
their taste required equaling what knew to be the best. Rupi Kaur’s supporters are defiant—they 
will not be told that what they prefer is not the best, and will attack anyone who tells them so. 
Her critics are elitist, they say, and are marginalizing the tastes of teenage girls: 
 
 
36 Khaira-Hanks, Priya. “Rupi Kaur: the inevitable backlash against Instagram’s favourite poet.” The Guardian 
Book Blog. 4 Oct. 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2017/oct/04/rupi-kaur-instapoets-the-sun-and-her-flowers 
37 Fischer, Molly. “The Instagram Poet Outselling Homer Ten to One.” The Cut. 2 Oct. 2017 
https://www.thecut.com/2017/10/profile-rupi-kaur-author-of-milk-and-honey.html 
This article gives numerous examples of Kaur’s relative noninterest in books, and preference for book covers and 
marketing. A representative example: 
“’For me it was like less about teaching writing and more about providing an environment where people 
were comfortable enough to express themselves freely, which is what I feel like is needed to write poetry,’ she tells 
me. I ask her if there were particular poems she remembers teaching in class. 
‘There were no particular works,’ she says — but list poetry, she adds, was one of her favorites.” 
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Let girls enjoy things. Especially when those things are made by other girls…of color 
breaking through an industry that's been dominated by old, dead, white dudes since the 
literal dawn of time….Liking Rupi Kaur doesn't make you any less intelligent. It doesn't 
mean your taste is banal, it doesn't mean you don't have the capacity to understand or 
enjoy or connect with what critics consider "real" poetry.38 
 
This is consistent with other contemporary statements attempting to remove the concept of 
judgment from all discourse, such as a peculiar article proposing that the very concept of being 
well-read is elitist.39 Perhaps her readers feel they have achieved autonomy from what they term 
elitist tastes…perhaps. This too is in keeping with the poems’ main quality, which is an 
aggrandizement of author and (a certain kind of) reader alike: 
 
 we are all born  
 so beautiful 
 the greatest tragedy is 
 being convinced we are not 
 
This sentiment is questionable. Even if it were true (and by definition it is not), is it really the 
greatest tragedy? What is certain is that Kaur’s most ardent readers, characteristic mass men all 
of them, have praised themselves so intensely, and fought so hard to be free from criticism, that 
they’ve also won the freedom from ever feeling compelled to read a good poem in their lives, or 
 
38 Ficarra, Jenn. “How about we stop shaming girls for liking Rupi Kaur?” Babe.net. 5 Oct. 
https://babe.net/2017/10/05/stop-dragging-girls-for-liking-rupi-kaur-16066 
39 Jenkins, Morgan. “Is Our Concept of Well-Read Elitist?” bookriot.com. 5 Mar. 2015, 
https://bookriot.com/2015/03/05/is-our-concept-of-a-well-read-elitist/ 
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even to acknowledge that poems of a greater kind than Kaur’s so much as exist. The common 
man of Vienna in the third decade of the nineteenth century at least knew Beethoven’s name.  
Nor are such attitudes are not limited to this particular milieu. James Wood’s observes, in 
How Fiction Works, that one may, “glance at the thousands of foolish reader reviews on 
Amazon.com, with their complaints about ‘dislikeable characters,’ confirms a contagion of moral 
niceness,” nor with a passage Adam Kirsch quotes form Zadie Smith’s novel40 On Beauty, where 
the protagonist‘s unfinished book, 
 
[…]is meant to be a demolition of Rembrandt, whose canvases he sees as key sites for the 
production of the Western ideology of beauty.  
“What we’re trying to ... interrogate here,” Howard drones in a lecture on 
Rembrandt’s Seated Nude, “is the mytheme of artist as autonomous individual with 
privileged insight into the human.... What are we signing up for when we speak of the 
‘beauty’ of this ‘light’?”41 
 
But indeed, don’t we hear the cries of the mass man everywhere, on right and left, in rich and 
poor alike? A hillbilly is mass and so is Kim Kardashian, and the nationalist is mass just as is the 
identity politics warrior. We hear his cry when the wisdom of main street is extolled, we hear it 
in the flyover zone’s hatred of what they imagine to be “elites,” in Joe the Plumber, in the claims 
of the small business owner and the unwarranted vanity of the hedge fund manager. We hear it in 
the anti-intellectualism that pervades every single institution of American life. And we hear it too 
 
40 Kirsch, Adam. “Against Beauty.” The New Republic. 16 March. 2010. 
https://newrepublic.com/article/73506/against-beauty 
41 It bears repeating: for Smith’s satire to work, the reader must have an awareness of what it is she is satirizing. I 
propose that, whether one likes the satire or not, whether one agrees with it or not, we all know what she’s getting at, 
and to deny this fact would be rather insincere. 
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in the proliferation of blogs, in the nonexistent humility that allows most people, with extreme 
and unbecoming ease and comfort, to express their every thought and opinion over social media. 
It’s there when silicon valley and the academy praise the “democratization of information,” and 
claim that the new insights shall be the work of collaboration rather than individual genius. For 
as Ortega y Gasset notes, there can be no genius if the masses are to retain their unearned sense 
of grandeur, this mass that can encompass under one flag both the rube and the technocrat.  
 
If from the view-point of what concerns public life, the psychological structure of this 
new type of mass-man be studied, what we find is as follows: (1) an inborn, root-
impression that life is easy, plentiful, without any grave limitations; consequently, each 
average man finds within himself a sensation of power and triumph which, (2) invites 
him to stand up for himself as he is, to look upon his moral and intellectual endowment as 
excellent, complete. This contentment with himself leads him to shut himself off from 
any court of appeal; not to listen, not to submit his opinions to judgment, not to consider 
others’ existence. His intimate feeling of power urges him always to exercise 
predominance. He will act then as if he and his like were the only beings existing in the 
world [italics added]; and, consequently, (3) will intervene in all matters, imposing his 
own vulgar views without respect or regard for others, without limit or reserve.” (97) 
 
The revolt of the masses is, in an aesthetic reformulation of Ortega y Gasset’s term, a revolt 
against beauty. Sontag points out that notions located in the concept of taste have come to be 
seen as taboo. In essence, the nymphs have declared Narcissus was never so beautiful after all. 
There lie before us several logical options. Either there was the possibility of a fair judgment, or 
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there was not (we do not need to judge the validity of aesthetic judgments from previous eras, 
merely the possibility that there is a conceivable standard of judgment). There is the possibility 
that the very concept of a judgment was always fallacious, and that the taboo against judgment is 
more in keeping with (pseudo)-aesthetic objects’ true nature. Alternately, we may say that the 
taboo against aesthetic judgment is itself a social construction that has obscured the legitimate 
possibility of gradation of values with regard to beauty and taste. 
 In large part the disqualification of the concept of judgment has been predicated on the 
narrowness of certain cultural assumptions associated with those periods in which taste was 
supreme. But this fault is easily rectified—we do not need to reproduce the particular tastes of 
periods that believed in taste in order to believe in taste ourselves—and to consign the concept of 
judgment itself to the dustbin is an erroneous sort of ad hominem attack. If those who, in the 
past, believed in the reality of beauty were narrow in their taste, this does not necessarily imply 
that beauty itself is an illusion. The question is what social construction might have led people to 
treat the concept of beauty, of aesthetic excellence as taboo. Ortega’s theory gives us a plausible 
answer. 
 
The present-day writer, when he takes his pen in hand to treat a subject which he has 
studied deeply, has to bear in mind that the average reader, who has never concerned 
himself with the subject, if he reads does so with the view, not of learning something 
from the writer, but rather, of pronouncing judgment on him when he is not in agreement 
with the commonplaces that the said reader carries in his head. If the individuals who 
make up the mass believed themselves specially qualified, it would be a case of personal 
error, not a sociological subversion. The characteristic of the hour is that the 
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commonplace mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to proclaim the 
rights of the common place and to impose them wherever it will….the mass crushes 
beneath it everything that is different, everything that is excellent, individual, qualified, 
or select. (18)42 
 
It is hard not to recognize our own era in this description. If someone doesn’t see this behavior, it 
means they probably are participating in it. Anyone who has, masochistically, taken time to 
observe the deafening roar of incoherent arguments on the internet knows exactly what Ortega is 
referring to. Ask any random person their opinions on art or music or literature or beauty, and the 
likelihood is that their opinion—their only opinion—is not merely that there is no arguing about 
taste, but that everything is personal, relative, that there does not exist any possibility of 
judgment. In order to assert the dignity of the commonplace, the mass man must forcibly 
extinguish every vision of life that puts mediocrity at a disadvantage. The mass must believe 
Narcissus is narcissistic. Otherwise, there will be such a thing as beauty. And if there is such a 
thing as beauty, the mass man knows that he will have to consider the fact that he is neither 
beautiful nor capable of accessing or appreciating beauty.  
 Indeed, this attitude is consistent with one of the earliest observers of the democratic 
mind, Alexis de Tocqueville. Reflecting upon the beneficial political socials and probably moral 
effects of equality, de Tocqueville observes that there is a passion for equality which, “tends to 
 
42 This recalls a disturbing little anecdote in Johannes Jensen’s 1901 novel, The Fall of the King: “A merry little tale 
about a strange town in Germany….Everyone was a cripple there, and if you wanted to get through town alive you 
had to bind up one of your legs and hobble through town on crutches. Now that was reasonable enough wasn’t it?”  
(171) It recalls, too, to my mind, an observation of Auden’s in his introduction to Baudelaire’s journals: that if the 
member of an undeveloped society is not yet an individual, he may still become one, but the man in modern life has 
had the opportunity to be one, and will never be—“though neither is capable of fatherhood, a boy who has not yet 
reached puberty is considered masculine, a eunuch is not.” (24) We may say the mass man is a eunuch of the soul.  
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elevate the humble to the rank of the great,” but equally there, “exists also in the human heart a 
depraved taste for equality, which impels the weak to lower the powerful to their own level, and 
reduces men to prefer equality in slavery to inequality with freedom.” (48) One may believe in 
the merits of democratic political principles, one may believe too in principles of economic 
equality and even be a proponent of leftist politics (as I’ll admit I am), and still concur with his 
term “depravity,” by which one supposes he means that this tendency compels on not only not to 
judge the world objectively, but to inhibit oneself, one’s own objective experiences, out of the 
spiteful and vain fear of unfavorable comparisons.   
 As stated in the introduction, Sontag points out that judgments of beauty came to be 
perceived as exclusionary. This is true, but it is a truth which has been dishonestly articulated by 
beauty’s detractors (whether this is intentional or not is hard to say). It may be conceded that 
taste in the past was Eurocentric or classist or what have you. But correcting such problems 
would only entail a broadening of taste, one which was being articulated at roughly the same 
time as Ortega wrote his book, and against which Danto argues in his disagreement with Fry. If 
the modern attitude towards aesthetic excellence, which freely admitted of any culture and origin 
provided it met with aesthetic standards, became the rough standard of how taste and aesthetic 
judgment could be understood, then there would be no conceivable exclusion on political or 
social grounds. But this is not the exclusion that Sontag refers to. In the story of Narcissus, there 
is only one Narcissus. And so, roughly, it goes in life. It is not by any conspiracy that a fair 
judgment of beauty or the arts will exclude most people and their production—it is by beauty’s 
very nature to be exclusionary. So were Apollo and Dionysus and Aphrodite depicted often as 
cold or indifferent to human woe. If beauty offers a consolation in life, it is not of the sort that 
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will make a person feel better about their own capacities. As Kant pointed out, disinterested 
pleasure in beauty cannot pertain to one’s self-interest. 
In Rainer Maria Rilke’s sonnet, “Archaic Torso of Apollo,”  we find a description both of 
the excellence of beauty, and its exclusionary, sometimes distant nature, and I would contend his 
description evokes exactly the experience the mass man fears most: 
 
We have no inkling of the fabled head 
Wherein the eyeballs ripened. Even so  
His trunk stills sends a candelabrum glow 
By which his gaze, with just its wick set low, 
Persists and gleams. Else could the torso’s curve  
Not so bedazzle you, nor with the shifting 
Of loins could then a vagrant smile be drifting 
Towards the center point, begetting’s nerve.  
Else would this boulder stand, defaced and squat,  
Beneath the shoulders’ lucent fall, and not 
Ashimmer like the coat of some wild beast; 
Nor would it then through every margin knife 
Forth like a star: for there is not the least 
Of parts but sees you. You must change your life. (103) 
 
Arndt quotes Käte Hamburger, in her Rilke: An Introduction as saying, “We speak of the utmost 
intensification because now, in the face of unexampled liveness of this statue, mere inspection 
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would no longer be the adequate and appropriate response. The need to be equal to this, to meet 
the claim this work of art makes on the viewer….breeds the desire to turn into a different person 
oneself.” (102-103) The greatness of the art, by its very perfection, cannot but call attention to 
the inadequacies of its spectator. So the auditor of Keats’ nightingale. And to the torso’s 
injunction, the mass man, the person of today, declares, as those hateful for Narcissus, “No! I 
will not change my life. I’m good enough…actually, I’m the best, and there cannot possibly exist 
any better than me! And you!” he continues, shrieking frantically, hysterically at the statue, 
“people only ever thought you looked good because of discourses of power. Your excellence was 
culturally determined! That’s all it was! I’m good enough just as I am!”43 
 We can conclude that the mass man is profoundly narcissistic. “The mass man regards 
himself as perfect.” (69) And since by his very nature there is no value on which to justifiably 
base his vanity, all value must be extinguished. It is the narcissists who believe Narcissus is 
narcissistic. Those who deny the experience of beauty are narcissists afraid of confronting their 
own negligible value. And where, ultimately, does that get us? It is as mediocre a vision of life as 
of personal achievement. Where beauty can bring joy and pleasure, the mass man asserts in its 
stead the mediocrity of self-satisfaction, of contentment. It is an awful vanity to deny the 






43 Or in his heart, perhaps, like Pushkin’s Salieri says, of Mozart, “What use is he? Appearing like an angel/He 
brings us a few of Heaven’s songs,/ And then, once he’s roused a wingless desire/ in us, children of dust, he flies 
away!/ Fly away then! And the sooner the better!” (Mozart and Salieri, l. 126-130). But this maybe is too humble.  
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V 
We listed two possibilities earlier: that either all standards of aesthetic judgment were illusory, or 
that we have been conditioned to accept the rejection of standards. We know the explanation, by 
its adherents, of the former possibility—that these standards were a systematic way of 
maintaining authority and privilege. In Ortega y Gasset we have the explanation for the latter 
hypothesis—that the self-esteem, the self-satisfaction of the newly confident masses are 
threatened by judgment, and so they have explained away judgment so that their adulatory image 
of themselves may remain intact. A question inevitably follows: which is more likely, that all 
spontaneous love of the myriad beauties of the world, that their elaboration in thousands of 
unlike objects and rituals, in the love of natural beauty and the love of art and the love of men 
and women’s bodies and faces, has all been illusory, or that actually, we currently living at the 
moment of aberration and self-delusion? If it is the latter, we must ask why this boon in life has 
been so needlessly squandered? Was the possibility of judgment so destructive to the mass man’s 
self that it had to be eliminated entirely? 
 There is, of course, an alternative. Again, Ortega’s language might strike contemporary 
ears as snobbish, and again, it is not a snobbery of class: “human society is always, whether it 
will or no, aristocratic by its very essence, to the extreme that it is a society in the measure that it 
is aristocratic, and ceases to be such when it ceases to be aristocratic.” (20) What is meant by 
aristocratic is not political or economic, but its literal meaning, a rule of the best. By this 
measure, all art is aristocratic. Ortega elaborates his definition:  
 
Let us recall that at the start we distinguished the excellent man from the common man 
by saying that the former is the one who makes great demands on himself, and the latter 
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the one…who contents himself with what he is, and is delighted with himself.  Contrary 
to what is usually thought, it is the man of excellence, and not the common man who 
lived in essential servitude.  Life has no savor for him unless he makes it consist in 
service to something transcendental….nobility is synonymous with a life of effort, ever 
set on excelling oneself, in passing beyond what one is to what one sets up as a duty and 
an obligation. (63-65) 
 
That final injunction in Rilke’s poem, “you must change your life,” must seem as an affront to so 
many people, were they ever to read it. Perhaps for some it is the choice of an ancient, or 
Western or European model, for others, a male, for others still in idolization of kind of body they 
feel has been excessively praised to their own detriment. For many, surely, the idea of an artwork 
having such an effect is preposterous. These are the cursory reasons they might claim, if asked, 
that they reject the last line. But, as we’ve seen, this is in many people a mask for their real 
feelings. Because if all those variables were changed, if everything that they claimed was 
wronged were righted, one suspects their reaction would be more or less identical. It isn’t any of 
those problems. It’s that when one is told, “you must change your life,” most people react, as an 
adolescent might: “don’t tell me what to do!” 
 Except…no one has told you “what to do.” Rationally, of course, it’s an inert, silent 
statue. It hasn’t even a head. The exhortation is perhaps in the viewers mind, or a summation of 
the nature of truly engaging with a beautiful work of art. More importantly, when one’s 
democratic leanings take all ideas of betterment as a form of insult (other than, of course, 
economic or status-based ones, which are wholly acceptable to our society), he becomes blind to 
the fact that there is nothing insulting in the sort of burdens the experience of beauty places upon 
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you, nothing humiliating in the least. This is perhaps, at least at the current moment, the most 
poisonous inheritance of a politicized attitude towards art. It has interpreted the difficulties and 
effort incumbent upon the individual who wishes to engage and, harder still, create art, as though 
they were a form of subjugation. They are not. They are an invitation—to effort yes, but contrary 
to the mass man’s belief, effort does not mean slavery. The Greeks believed the Muses resided 
on the mountain of Parnassus, looking down upon the oracle at Delphi, and thereafter 
instructional guides for music, whether with regard to piano technique like Clementi, or the rules 
of voice leading and counterpoint like Fux, titled their educational works “Gradus ad 
Parnassum”—-steps to parnassus. The exercises would invariably increase in complexity, 
indicating that at the summit, one had attained some mastery of an “art.” So it is with beauty. 
Yes, some is accessible spontaneously, like color or sound itself, and some is difficult and 
accessed only through effort, practice, the development of understanding, mastery of some 
technique of composition or comprehension. The fact the Greeks placed the muses upon a 
mountain indicates that while they did not believe art was hidden or utterly inaccessible, it could 
not possibly be encountered or accessed without such effort.  
 So far we have not yet defined beauty ontologically, we have only indicated how to 
differentiate it from other sorts of experience, and alluded to the pragmatic benefits of such 
experience. What we know so far is that it offers a unique joy that is not to be derived from 
things of different natures, and that those who declare realistically its irrelevance are both 
creating a more joyless, a more unhappy, a blander world for themselves and others, and that 
most likely they've done so in order to uphold a lazy, baseless sort of self-esteem. If this is so, we 
must determine the following: 
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 1. What are the benefits of beauty, pragmatically? 
 2. How and why can we perpetuate the experience of it? 
 3. Can we propose a feasible intersubjective universalism for the judgment of the 
experience of beauty? 
 4. Most difficult: can we propose a possible ontological argument for beauty’s existence?  
 
This seems to me more productive than the rejection of beauty outright. We can momentarily 
explore how and why this can be pursued. But first, having encountered a myth of beauty, it 
seems only fitting to construct one for our own time, The Myth of Narcissistissumus, the man 
who couldn’t fall in love with himself, because there wasn’t anything to fall in love with, but 
made sure to insist to himself there wasn’t anything anywhere else to fall in love with either. He 




In his 1925 essay “The Dehumanization of Art,” Ortega y Gasset notes the mass man’s peculiar 
hatred for art we would now call “Modernist:” 
 
‘From a sociological point of view’ the characteristic feature of the new art is, in my 
judgment, that it divides the public into the two classes of those who understand it, and 
those who do not. This implies that one group possesses an organ of comprehension 
denied to the other—that they are two varieties of the human species. The new art 
obviously addresses itself not to everybody, as did Romanticism, but to a specially gifted 
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minority. Hence the indignation it arouses in the masses. When a man dislikes a work of 
art, but understands it, he feels superior to it; and there is no reason for indignation. But 
when his dislike is due to his failure to understand, he feels vaguely humiliated and this 
rankling sense of inferiority must be counterbalanced by indignant self-assertion. 
Through its mere presence, the art of the young compels the average citizen to realize that 
he is just this—the average citizen, a creature incapable of receiving the sacrament of art, 
blind and deaf to pure beauty. But such a thing can not be done after a hundred years of 
adulation of the masses and apotheosis of the people. Accustomed to ruling supreme, the 
masses feel that the new art, which is the art of a privileged aristocracy of finer senses, 
endangers their rights as men. Whenever the new Muses present themselves, the masses 
bristle. (6-7) 
 
Ortega argues an inequality of perception in enjoying certain, more difficult or anti-realist forms 
of art, which are not intended for universal consumption or appreciation—and furthermore, 
describes a kind of spite that emerges from the sense that one does not understand what others 
have accomplished. This difficult art is, Ortega says, the art of Pirandello and Stravinsky, which 
elsewhere,44 in a discussion of Cezanne and Picasso, he says is based on “ideas.” The word does 
not mean to him what it means to beauty’s detractors—it is not a translatable notion, but rather a 
mental object whose reality exists only in consciousness and, subsequently, in the artistic 
representation, or perhaps the exploration, the elaboration of that consciousness. It is not, 
obviously, an art directly representative of empirical reality, and this is why he believes the 
masses hate it, for it: 
 
44 “On point of View in the Arts” (124-127) 
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[has] the sociological effect of having the people recognize itself for what it is: a 
component among others of the social structure, inert matter of the historical process, a 
secondary factor in the cosmos of spiritual life On the other hand, the new art also helps 
the elite to recognize themselves and one another in the drab mass of society and learn 
their mission which consists in being few and holding their own against many. (7) 
 
It can be of no doubt to any reader of this description that the primary character of Modernist art 
which inspires this sort of aesthetic ressentiment is precisely the fruition of Pater’s belief that all 
art aspires to the condition of music. I have previously stated that all art, whatever its advent, 
possessed this quality as its defining attribute, but in the art of the early twentieth century the 
essentially aesthetic nature of the arts began to foreground itself, thereby eclipsing those more 
translatable dimensions of life and ideas (not in Ortega’s sense) that seemed previously to those 
not in perceptive sympathy with beauty to be art’s true reason for existence. Obviously this had 
been so in instrumental music for some time (and indeed the breakdown of tonality in music is 
not by this measure quite comparable with the modernism of the other arts), but the introduction 
of abstraction in visual art (say, Kandinsky) as well as, in a rather different manner, the 
techniques of Joyce or Woolf or Faulkner seem self-evidently, whatever their individual merits, 
overtly to bear the fruits that Pater and later Wilde had seemed to nurture. All art had, in its 
capacity as art, been like music to the degree that it was beautiful; now that art seemed more 
music than anything else, people hated it.  
 What did they like? What do they like? As we’ve learned from our investigations into 
anti-aesthetics and narcissism, they like themselves: 
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What is it the majority of people call aesthetic pleasure….The answer is easy. A man 
likes a play when he has become interested in the human destinies presented to him, 
when the love and hatred, the joys of and sorrows of the personages so move his heart 
that he participates in it as though it were happening in real life. …Paintings attract him if 
he finds on them figures of men whom it would be interesting to meet. A landscape is 
pronounced pretty if the country it represents for its loveliness or its grandeur to be 
visited on a trip. (8-9) 
 
To which one might add, for the present day, the affirmation of one’s beliefs and the 
representation of figures that had been marginalized in the works stereotyped above.  
  
It thus appears that to a majority of people aesthetic pleasure means a state of mind which 
is essentially undistinguishable from their ordinary behavior. …the object towards which 
their attention and, consequently, all their other mental activities are directed is the same 
as in daily life: people and passions. By art they understand a means through which they 
are brought into contact with interesting human affairs. (9) 
 
One senses the slightly sentimental note in the works to which he refers, which was perhaps 
more ubiquitous then than now, but otherwise, allowing for some adjustments of the people and 
the passions, the description is exceedingly familiar. What Harold Bloom calls the “School of 
Resentment” and Helen Pluckrose calls “Grievance Studies” is in this sense not fundamentally 
dissimilar from the hordes of  ‘casual readers’ and members of bookclubs, who lament on 
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amazon.com that they don’t find a character “sympathetic.” The alternative, a visual counterpart 
to Pater’s dictum, is illustrated by Ortega y Gasset in a rather clever metaphor: 
  
We have here a very simple optical problem. To see a thing we must adjust our visual 
apparatus in a certain way. If the adjustment is inadequate the thing is seen indistinctly or 
not at all. Take a garden seen through a window. Looking at the garden we adjust our 
eyes in such a way that the ray of vision travels through the pain without delay and rests 
on the shrubs and flowers. Since we are focusing on the garden and our ray of vision is 
directed towards it, we do not see the window but look clear through it. The purer the 
glass, the less we see it. But we can also disregard the garden and, withdrawing the ray of 
vision, detain it at the window. We then lose sight of the garden; what we still behold of 
it is a confused mass of color which appears pasted to the pane. Hence to see the garden 
and to see the window pane are two incompatible operations which exclude one another 
because they require different adjustments.  
Similarly a work of art vanishes from sight for a beholder who sees in it nothing 
but the moving fate of John and Mary or Tristan and Isolde and adjusts his vision to 
this….In order to enjoy Titian’s portrait of Charles the Fifth on Horseback, we must 
forget that this is Charles the Fifth in person and see instead a portrait, a fiction. The 
portrayed person and his portrait are two entirely different things; we are invested in 
either one or the other. In the first case we ‘live” with Charles the Fifth, in the second we 
look at an object of art. (10-11) 
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By means of this subtle description of the way one’s eyes shift focus, Ortega y Gasset illustrates 
the different modes of artistic experience available to the observing subject. In this metaphor, we 
may take the pane as the vessel of art—to look through it at the garden below is to experience art 
as essentially mimetic, an opportunity to observe forms of reality. But just as contemporaneously 
various artists, from late Monet to the Cubists and Kandinsky, were trying to shift the attention 
from a world depicted to the picture plane itself, one who focuses his on the pane will experience 
a fairly abstract organization of colors and shapes that have been extracted form the world below, 
but which can no longer give an accurate sense of that world—they have become autonomous, 
independent. And it is works of this type, which emphasize their autonomy, that Ortega y Gasset 
claims provoke a bitterness in certain observers.   
Ortega y Gasset proceeds to argue that the nineteenth century “humanized” art to the 
detriment of aesthetics…that, for example, Beethoven and Wagner installed in music a human 
melodrama absent from Mozart and Bach and thankfully eliminated once more in the work of 
Debussy. It is not our purpose to debate the nature of these specific works any more than it is to 
comment on what was perhaps Ortega y Gasset’s reaction against a romanticism for which he 
felt a marked ambivalence—just as Titian’s Charles the Fifth may be quite as aesthetic by this 
measure as any work by Kandinsky, one might conceivably say the same of Wagner’s Tristan in 
relation to Bach. And it is true that in the nineteenth century there was a mania for naming pieces 
of music, sonatas, preludes, after imagery—raindrops, winter wind—that did not always suit it. 
Toscanini’s reaction to those who read biography into Beethoven’s Eroica seems akin to Ortega 
y Gasset’s, “To some this is Napoleon, some Hitler, some Mussolini. For me it is simply allegro 
con brio.” A similar anecdote occurs about the composer Gabriel Faure, “When a lady asked him 
in what sunny climes he had written his Sixth Nocturne, he replied, ‘The Simplon Tunnel.’” 
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(Nectoux, 48) Anyone familiar with the nocturne can see the stark difference between the work’s 
origin and its final character. 
 The question is, why allegro con brio, why the windowpane? Why the object of art and 
not Charles the Fifth? The question must be divided in two: 
 
1. Is aesthetic order, or beauty, extant? 
2. Whether extant or not, is the beauty as perceived, more worthwhile in an artwork 
than “human” considerations? 
 
Let us address the second question first. As we have said, a slap in the face makes us 
forget our ideas. Perhaps we may forget some encumbering ideas without recourse to that 
unpleasant method. Fix your attention upon one of those moments, as it has occurred. Edmund 
Husserl suggested a gesture of epoche, a phenomenological reduction or ‘bracketing,’ where the 
individual attempts to focus on the sense of experience itself without the distorting influence of 
ideas about experience45—the “intellect” as we saw Proust defined it in the opening of the 
introduction. Unlike the difficulty that is perhaps attendant upon a bracketing of perception, the 
appearance of beauty, especially in its first appearances to our consciousness—that is, prior to 
our cultivation or inheritance of ideas about beauty—does not require much mental exertion at 
all. Because beauty appears then, as it should, by surprise. It quite overtakes us, it effaces the 
existence of analytical thought for the entirety of its presence.46 It may be that for many who 
 
45 “If we want to focus on that essential structure [of experience], we must suspend or exclude all questions 
and claims concerning whatever might be causally responsible for conscious experience.” (Cerbonne, 22) 
46 Just so there is no confusion: this is not to say that the entire time one listens to, say, a concerto by Mozart, that 
no thought occurs in the brain. It only means that at the moments that we are touched by beauty, beauty crowds out 
thought. So it is with many sensations—hunger, pain, sexual desire, fear. And of course one could listen to the 
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have rationalized its existence too much, or whose analysis has reasoned the experience out of all 
existence, the only way to picture the bracketed experience is to remember. And there, it seems 
inevitable that there have been such moments, prior to reason, when, if not by art, than in human 
faces or bodies, various shades of skin, various colors of eyes, or, more likely perhaps, in some 
phenomenon of the natural world, some angle of sunlight, some shadow, some texture of a 
surface, or more grandly the sea at different times of day, the changing shapes and colors of the 
clouds or sky, the colors of leaves, the shadows resting blue upon the snow, wind setting grass or 
leaves aquiver as though they were breathing, has, without even registering in the intellect, 
supplanted intellect itself, startled experience with a pleasure beyond thought or understanding.47 
 Pater describes this process particularly well: 
 
Or if we begin with the inward world of thought and feeling, the whirlpool is still more 
rapid, the flame more eager and devouring. There it is no longer the gradual darkening of 
the eye, the gradual fading of colour from the wall — movements of the shore-side, 
where the water flows down indeed, though in apparent rest — but the race of the mid-
stream, a drift of momentary acts of sight and passion and thought. At first sight 
experience seems to bury us under a flood of external objects, pressing upon us with a 
sharp and importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action. 
But when reflexion begins to play upon these objects they are dissipated under its 
influence; the cohesive force seems suspended like some trick of magic; each object is 
 
concerto without being touched once by its beauty. Obviously perception fluctuates and flickers and shifts between 
all sorts of objects of attention.  
47 It seems to me effectively beyond argument that none but the smallest minority of people have not experienced 
such feelings in their entire lives, and so these feelings seem rather innate to human experience. Unless the minority 
is substantially larger than I tend to believe, those who have not are to be pitied, and the absence from their lives 
perhaps should be investigated in the hopes of freeing them from this numbness, rather than their handicap 
employed to alter our general understanding of aesthetic delight.  
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loosed into a group of impressions — colour, odour, texture — in the mind of the 
observer. And if we continue to dwell in thought on this world, not of objects in the 
solidity with which language invests them, but of impressions, unstable, flickering, 
inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them, it 
contracts still further: the whole scope of observation is dwarfed into the narrow chamber 
of the individual mind. Experience, already reduced to a group of impressions, is ringed 
round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has 
ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can only conjecture to be 
without. Every one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his 
isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world. Analysis 
goes a step farther still, and assures us that those impressions of the individual mind to 
which, for each one of us, experience dwindles down, are in perpetual flight; that each of 
them is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is infinitely 
divisible also; all that is actual in it being a single moment, gone while we try to 
apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it 
is. To such a tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on the stream, to a single sharp 
impression, with a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by, 
what is real in our life fines itself down. It is with this movement, with the passage and 
dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, that analysis leaves off — that continual 
vanishing away, that strange, perpetual, weaving and unweaving of ourselves. (151) 
 
When we attempt to recall the nature of our perception, prior to what Proust called intellect, prior 
to all the constructs we have accumulated to understand ourselves, and which seem from the 
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perspective of being as dogmatic and incomplete, as irrelevant as the convoluted debates which 
thrived at the height of religious authority, we see our life as a series of flashing impressions, just 
as the moderns saw, a constant flux between unlike moments united around a single personality, 
tied together by memory and intermittent analysis. Our constructions, the beliefs of the present, 
which seek to superimpose social or cultural explanations upon the this vision of life, resemble 
religion in the privileging of “intellect,” in seeking answers over mere being and, like religion, or 
like the esoteric intricacies of the law, what may at first have seemed noble or worthwhile has 
now become lost in so many convolutions of argumentation and reason that its presence obscures 
our sense of our own existence, as some dense undergrowth of vines or weeds obscures the 
sunlight. Yet under the epoche, when we block off our ideas and our beliefs, the sense that Pater 
describes seems inescapable. This, more or less, is what it’s like.  
 In a way, Pater’s description of the fleeting nature of experience mirrors the influence of 
the intellect in larger historical and personal processes. The moment an experience, particularly a 
pleasurable one, occurs, is itself without thought or analysis. It simply comes upon one. But of 
course such a moment isn’t permanent. The moment one becomes aware of it, thought has 
replaced feeling, the moment of pleasure has passed. So it sometimes seems with the ideas we 
construct for ourselves. We seek some explanation for our sensations, and though it appears as 
though our curiosity will yield some higher life, an obsessive emphasis upon that curiosity 
atrophies experience itself, turns us into a sort of homunculus, until life itself appears so barren 
we become like Faust, when he raises the poison to his lips. To understand the purpose of beauty, 
we have somehow to find a way before or behind that impenetrable wall of thought, if only to 
return to some awareness of our sensations themselves, and what they feel like.  
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 Well, Pater indicates, sometimes, they feel good. Beauty feels good. It seems so 
obvious…what have all our culture’s convolutions done for us, if they obscured something so 
obvious and essential? 
 
Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea 
is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is 
irresistibly real and attractive to us, — for that moment only.” (152) 
 
So we have the fact of beauty, and its pleasure, and we have the ideas that obscured it. But what, 
we need to ask, is the character of those ideas, not individually, but en masse? What have the 
ones obscuring beauty and its pleasures really yielded? Over a hundred years ago Pater had a 
sense of that too: 
 
“To regard all things and principles of things as inconstant modes or fashions has more 
and more become the tendency of modern thought.” (150) 
 
This is infinitely more true now than it was then. Though we have the beliefs of those mass men 
that make them feel secure, as historical process, our postmodern period is obviously little more 
than cacophony. We need only look at the where the multitude of approaches to literary 
criticism—semiotics and structuralism, deconstruction, Marxist criticism, psychoanalytic 
criticism, new historicism, reader response theory, cultural studied, ethnic studies, feminist 
theory, postcolonial theory, queer theory—indicate that no approach will ever be so dominant as 
to address the greater part of our understanding. And in the meantime, as we saw with Danto, 
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these ideas give people jobs. But seeing as how they ultimately serve more local explorations 
than the transformation of existence, and given the fact that they too are fleeting, and given the 
fact that, as we have seen, there is often a joylessness to such ideas, whereas beauty can give 
pleasure and joy, what are we to do with our moments as they pertain to beauty? Again Pater has 
an answer: 
 
Philosophiren, says Novalis, ist dephlegmatisiren, vivificiren. The service of philosophy, 
of speculative culture, towards the human spirit, is to rouse, to startle it to a life of 
constant and eager observation….Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or 
face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or 
insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive to us, — for that 
moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end. A counted 
number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in 
them all that is to seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass most swiftly from 
point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital 
forces unite in their purest energy? 
To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success 
in life. In a sense it might even be said that our failure is to form habits: for, after all, 
habit is relative to a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the roughness of the eye 
that makes any two persons, things, situations, seem alike. While all melts under our feet, 
we may well grasp at any exquisite passion, or any contribution to knowledge that seems 
by a lifted horizon to set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the senses, strange 
dyes, strange colours, and curious odours, or work of the artist's hands, or the face of 
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one's friend. Not to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about 
us, and in the very brilliancy of their gifts some tragic dividing of forces on their ways, is, 
on this short day of frost and sun, to sleep before evening. With this sense of the 
splendour of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one 
desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the 
things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be for ever curiously testing new 
opinions and courting new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy 
of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own. Philosophical theories or ideas, as points of view, 
instruments of criticism, may help us to gather up what might otherwise pass unregarded 
by us. "Philosophy is the microscope of thought." The theory or idea or system which 
requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some 
interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have not identified with 
ourselves, or of what is only conventional, has no real claim upon us. (152-3) 
 
We have seen how so many contemporary ideas against beauty deny us pleasure merely in order 
to privilege the commonplaceness of certain men and women. It is not a matter of simply 
following Pater—rather, his old suggestion refreshes our sense in the practical purposes of 
beauty, which are pleasure and joy. There are other joys to be sure, as he says later, “Great 
passions…ecstasy and sorrow of love, the various forms of enthusiastic activity,” (153), and 
whether beauty is the highest of all, as he claims, we can be sure it is one. So, in opposition to 
the deification of the commonplace which obscures this particular joy, we present the recapturing 
of that joy, experience itself, as an end, the pleasure of filling our moments with what feels most 
intense and various, and the sense of beauty as, at least, one of these. And as we have seen in the 
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last chapter, beauty must be different in character from ideas and other pursuits. To claim that it 
does not exist, or to subordinate it to other goals, is to cheat ourselves of pleasure for the sake of 
the mass man’s narcissism.  
In the next chapter we shall explore the ways that Pater pursues this epicurean ideal. In 
the last we shall attempt to demonstrate that beauty is not completely subjective, and may indeed 
have objective reality. For now, let us complete of the myth of Narcissus, and then offer a 
postulate about beauty.  
We have left out one figure from our description of the myth, the figure of Echo. It is 
useful to note that, while Echo offers a fascinating and ultimately mysterious formal variation on 
Narcissus story, she is not inherently essential to his story (she provides the reflection’s voice—
her character in this regard is a device that could have been served as well by almost anything). 
Yet she reproduces his behavior in more than her repetition of his voice—his obsession is 
doubled in her helplessness in the face of desire. And yet the doubling is in no way symmetrical, 
the way his interaction with his reflection is symmetrical. He stares at his own face, she stares 
from the wood, from afar; he hears his own words repeated to him, but she can only hear his 
words. Her reproduction is a shadow of his story—it is fitting in this story about beauty, where 
he is beautiful and she, we must conclude, is not.  
 It seems to me that what critics of beauty fear about beauty is becoming Echo, they fear 
replicating Narcissus’ obsession without his excellence. They fear that to love something more 
beautiful than themselves involves submission to it, and effacing their own character and 
individuality in the face of something that in some regard must be seen objectively superior to 
themselves. And it is true that the shock of beauty, like all intense experience, does displace 
one’s character for the period it is experienced, a sort of submission to the senses. But this is 
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equally true of fear or pain or love or even memory, and the fear, the deep insecurity required to 
refuse that blessing is nothing short of pathetic. The injunction of the archaic torso is not a 
sentence of slavery. Even as beauty overtakes us, it frees us also, as Keats saw: 
 Wherein lies happiness? In that which becks 
Our ready minds to fellowship divine,  
A fellowship with essence; till we shine 
Full alchemiz’d, and free of space.... 
Now, if this earthly love has power to make 
 Men’s being mortal, immortal. 
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The Icon: An Interlude 
 
 There once was an ancient land, hidden from foreign view until the recent discovery of its 
ruins, which worshipped beauty and nature and art above all things. All the populace played 
reeds and lyres, and composed short, elegant poems, and painted shadowy, suggestive figures in 
washes of red and black ink. The men were hairless and well-proportioned in their outward form, 
and the women radiated a beauty both forthright and reticent. They would lie beside riverbanks 
and caress one another, and sing sweet, melancholy songs, and pick silver petals to smell and 
place in one another’s hair.  
 The life of this nation was consumed by love, and graced with perpetual joy. And above 
all the gifts of creation, the people of this land treasured the work of a man whom they called 
Sesshu the Seer. He had lived centuries before, in the days of their citadel’s foundation, and had 
formed as out of nothing, from the sight of the beautiful world and the corridors of his profound 
and sensitive imagination, works in all fields, of such pristine and irrefutable accomplishment, 
that it was to him the citizens attributed all their joy.  
 Now all his works were at the crown of this city’s canon, his melodies, his poems, his 
tracts on love and on the songs of mating birds. But before all his gifts to the nation, and to the 
record of humankind, there remained one of a yet more insurmountable value. It was the only 
painting of his which still survived, and which was placed in reverence above even the throne 
where sat the city’s line of mighty kings.  And all the citizens were free at their leisure to go and 
gaze upon this majestic work, both for the sake of its own transcendent beauty, and as a spur to 
pursue pleasures of their own making. 
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 Some two centuries after the death of the Seer, a man perhaps as significant in the 
nation’s history rose to public prominence. He was called Toson the Thinker, and of all the 
devotees of the Sesshan manner, he was first in eloquence and passion. For he had stood long 
hours and sometimes days before the holy work, and understood it in such perfect detail that 
none could expound about its various glories as well as he. The king of that time gave the wise 
Thinker a seat beside his throne, and there Toson would sit and contemplate the masterpiece of 
his divine predecessor.  
 For most of Toson’s life, the kingdom lived in a state of fiery and unremitting joy, as it 
had since the time of the Seer. Yet in his old age, the citizens observed a shadow come upon the 
Thinker’s expression. He would stare at the painting still, but now his face bespoke frustration, 
and disappointment. And it happened that the king one day asked Toson what had come over 
him. And Toson said that now, after many years, he had come to see that there were in fact flaws 
in the Seer’s work. Small flaws, it was true, but the work was imperfect nonetheless. And he 
pointed them out to the king and the court and all agreed, sadly, that the Thinker was correct. 
The great masterpiece was indeed imperfect.  
 For a day the king and court conferred, and approached Toson with a request. Could he 
not correct the imperfections with his own brush? For Toson was considered second only to the 
Seer in the grace and elegance of his art, which matched the Seer’s balance, if sometimes not his 
grandeur. Could he not apply his brush to those small places which required touching up? It was 
he who had noticed the imperfection, and none was fitter to correct it. Toson agreed and 
carefully repainted over the flaws, smoothing out some crudeness. The king and court agreed that 
the painting was immeasurably improved, and that it was a greater masterpiece than before, 
painted jointly by the Seer and the Thinker, over a span of two hundred years.  
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 Shortly after Toson’s death, some students of his announced that in fact their master’s 
correction was itself imperfect. Indeed his criticism was accurate, and the places where he 
painted had surpassed the Seer’s original brushwork. But sadly, he had not foreseen that now, his 
additions struck an imbalance with the original artist’s strokes. For look, there, where the Seer 
had painted that crude curve—the Thinker’s line was better, but it had ceased to magnify that 
other arc, which the Seer’s stroke had mirrored as if by accident. But it would not do, they said, 
merely to reverse the process. Toson had been correct in his criticism. They must work as a 
group to restore a balance between these two masters. The court submitted, and the students 
began their labors.  
After the painting’s apparent completion, everyone agreed it was much better than before. 
But this sensation lasted only a very short time. Now not only scholars, but even private citizens 
could point out that there were all sorts of errors which the students had not foreseen. In fact 
their work had been disastrous. Their criticism was, of course, correct, but what had they 
wrought upon the work in their misguided attempts to improve? So a team of twenty specialists 
in different fields were brought to smooth out their corrections. 
 And on and on, and on. So over the centuries the painting was constantly remade and 
painted over. Sometimes there were as many as twenty-five people working on it at once. And 
the public would stand behind, and criticize their decisions, and each would propose a new idea, 
and each would be given a turn to implement his correction.  And meanwhile wild debates 
consumed the kingdom. Some denied that the painting had ever been beautiful and some said 
that beauty was itself a lie, and some said that they should just begin anew, with a new painting 
but most said no, they couldn’t tear it down so much work had gone into it they must, they must 
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see this work through, yes, there was good in it it just had met with some problems but with 
foresight and hard work they would see the painting through.  
*  *  * 
 The painting’s final form was never realized. But it achieved its current shape upon that 
ancient land’s obliteration by barbarian invaders, at which point the labors were forever 
interrupted. Some years ago our archaeologists unearthed the painting and it is now displayed in 
the halls of the National Museum. I went there with my friend to look at it after having read its 
fascinating history. Sadly, I could not find any trace of what might have been the Seer’s work. I 
wondered to myself what it had looked like, in the days it was so admired. My friend, an artist 
and theorist of broad and discriminating taste, said to me, after gazing upon the canvas, 
“It is immeasurably ugly.”  
With that, I could agree—it seemed almost as noxious as a public latrine. But then he 
added an observation I found quite disturbing; he suggested that actually, the whole thing rather 
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A Postulate about Beauty 
 
There are two unlike visions of the world. A purely scientific, empirical perspective sees the 
various materials of the world as qualitatively alike, even as different materials have different 
properties.  
 Let us compare this, for example, with a moral vision of the world. This sees two 
fundamentally unlike dimensions to reality. A moral vision of the world acknowledges the 
scientific vision, but adds to it an imperative—should, ought—that is fundamentally unlike the 
purely descriptive nature of material in the scientific perspective. 
A postulate: that particular organizations of materials, and even perhaps thoughts or 
ideas, imbues materials with a quality that material description is completely unequipped to 
address. The way that atoms can form molecules with properties utterly unlike the atoms that 
comprise them, beautiful organizations transport as if by alchemy mere material into something 
that is no longer simply material. It takes it beyond the is, not to the ought, but to….is beautiful. 
What is the beautiful like? Matter has an emptiness and beauty a fullness, matter has sort 
of randomness (even though governed by physical laws), whereas beauty has a rightness. It is as 
though in a godless world, when something is beautiful, it feels like a god. It is then necessary to 
attempt to describe what that thing has become.  
If there is no intrinsic meaning to the phenomenal world, when something is beautiful, it 
transcends the meaninglessness of reality…not to become meaningful, but to attain a plane 
where it is beyond such questions or incompleteness. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Walter Pater’s Reflective Epicureanism 
   
 Over a decade after the publication of his influential conclusion to The Renaissance, 
Walter Pater published Marius the Epicurean in 1885, largely as an elaboration and possibly as a 
defense of the earlier, briefer text. To pious readers, the novel, which concludes with the 
protagonist’s integration into a community of Christians and deathbed communion, might have 
seemed a recantation of Pater’s earlier, seemingly more pagan position. Russel Perkin says, “One 
of the most enduring questions about Marius is whether it is in fact a conversion narrative, 
whether Marius can be said to be a Christian at the end,” (213) while Richmond Crinkley claims 
that, “Pater completed the book in 1883 or 1884, and it was taken by his admirers as an 
affirmation of his acceptance of Christianity. Some critics see Marius as a movement by Pater 
towards Christianity; others see the book as an indication of Pater’s movement away from the 
philosophy of the “Conclusion.” (136-7) In his introduction to the Penguin edition of Marius, 
Michael Levey argues that Pater’s, “religion convictions had changed, before Marius was 
published, ‘from strong skepticism to some form of acquiescence in the Christian religion,’” and 
furthermore, describes how, “Mrs. Humphry Ward recorded…how well before the publication of 
Marius his views had altered and he had grown conscious of the mystery of Christianity.” (16) 
Others have read the novel’s relation to Christianity more ambiguously. Eli Adams 
asserts that, “the novel enacts a familiar pattern of the Victorian bildungsroman: a traditional 
childhood religious faith collapses under the force of contemporary skepticism, but the emotional 
rewards of that faith are subsequently recuperated in a secular devotion to the forces of 
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intellectual light,” (149) while Adam Lee claims that Marius’ Christianity is not so much a 
matter of adherence to a religion but its more humanistic premises: “We know that Marius is a 
Christian because the kind of Christianity the narrator describes [i.e. one of sympathy] as the 
fairest in history is…ascribed to Marius….he seems destined to become a Christian….Such a 
unification between the mind of Marius and the reader seems to exemplify the ideal Christianity 
he extols as sympathy…if that explanation is too abstract, Marius is a Christian by his actions.”  
(156) On the other side, Sarah Lyons claims that, “the end of the novel really vindicates the 
premises of the “Conclusion” and has only a superficial investment in Christianity,” (230) and 
that furthermore that, “Marius is open to the possibility of Christian transcendence because such 
openness represents an enhancement of the here and now and thus is an end in itself.”  (240)  
As read here, the novel is in no way an endorsement of Christianity. Rather, through his 
exploration of various ideas and sensations, Marius remains consistently true to his epithet, 
wherein Epicureanism consists of the engagement with all philosophies and experiences, and the 
commitment to none, thus achieving the dual pleasures of reception and reflection, and the 
discovery of meaning solely within the incessant striving after sensation which marks the limits 
of human experience.    
 Pater’s dismissal of the ideological dimensions of aesthetic experience can be traced in 
his rejection of his critical forebears, particularly Ruskin’s moralistic concept of aesthetics. 
Working backwards from Pater’s anti-ideological imperative, I would like to explore the 
philosophical underpinnings of Pater’s rejection of ideas in favor of sensations. Central to my 
argument is the notion that, while he did not articulate it, the nature of those sensations he 
defined as “perfect” or “beautiful” have a unique ontological status. Here it might be useful to 
situate my argument in comparison with some recent scholarship. In her 2016 Transfigured 
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World: Walter Pater's Aesthetic Historicism, Carolyn Williams argues for a historicist 
understanding of Pater, which I believe is innately oppositional to aestheticism, to a Kantian 
purposiveness which is at the center of the “perfect” moment. Though Williams claims that 
“Pater's notion of aesthetic autonomy is strictly limited, for though he does argue that the work 
of art should be free from utilitarian appropriation, he does not propose to appreciate it apart 
from its historical context,” (2) I would suggest this is less a reaction to Pater than an application 
of contemporary ideology (as articulated in the previous chapter), which must also be viewed 
with a degree of suspicion. While providing an incisive analysis of the development of Pater’s 
metaphors of aesthetic appreciation, Williams seems ultimately incapable of allowing the 
aesthetic not to be re-integrated into an empirical search for knowledge (albeit of an ideological 
rather than factual sort). She seems in her own terms, to want to secularize Pater’s paganism, 
demanding that experience yield some ideological fruit, an understandable critical position, but 
ultimately an unaesthetic one, perhaps utilitarian against itself. The nature of Epicureanism as 
articulated in the novel is a philosophy that moves fluently between ideologies, attaching itself to 
none, more for the sake of varied “sensations and ideas” not limited by the fetters of habit, and I 
would argue that any attempt at ideological conclusiveness, of knowledge itself is inimical to 
that pursuit of pleasure except as a transitory experience in its own right. More germane to this 
study, in Walter Pater: Individualism and Aesthetic Philosophy, Kate Hext positions Pater’s 
impressionistic criticism as a natural conclusion of a materialist conception of the universe 
formed in a scientific age, situating his aesthetic as a philosophical engagement with his shifting 
definition of the individual, one which vacillates uneasily somewhere between Hume’s 
skepticism and Kant’s idealism. What I propose is that implicit in Pater’s imperative against 
ideology, and despite Hext’s formulation of the shifting perception of the individual, is a 
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necessarily objective formulation of the aesthetic; buried within his maxim “not the fruit of 
experience, but experience itself, is the end,” is a perceived object or “end,” which does not 
quiver with the same uncertainty as the subject’s impressions. As we shall see, when the 
eponymous protagonist moves through the schools of Cyrenaicism, Stoicism, and Christianity, 
Lucian argues that all philosophers are like fisherman who, “again and again…let down the 
net…and with vast labour draw up, not a load of fish, but only a pot full of sand.” Religion or 
philosophy might yield but a pot of sand—for Pater, the beautiful is the …“fish.” It is of great 
interest to trace the ideological origins and causes for a particular ideological formulation, as 
Hext does, but epistemologically, this is not identical to the formulation of experience itself Pater 
offers us. Just as Baudelaire says all art is modern, I posit that even if an idea emerges from a set 
of philosophical circumstances, Pater’s formulation is simply an explication of the nature of 
pleasure which is not contingent upon anything but the experiencing human.  
Except perhaps for the almost complete absence of dialogue, the interpolation of ancient 
texts translated and altered by Pater is probably the most significant stylistic feature of the novel, 
and so it might be useful to begin analysis with these, which Pater seems to have chosen 
specifically for their function as commentary outside novelistic action, limited as that may be. Of 
course the most famous interpolation, and clearly relevant to Pater’ earlier aesthetic concerns, is 
the tale of Cupid and Psyche from Apuleius’ Golden Ass. Introducing the tale, Pater suggests, as 
though joking with the reader, “you might take it, if you chose, as an allegory.” (70) In fact it 
seems that an allegorical reading is almost inescapable in this context; as with many of the 
interpolations, the transcribed story from Apuleius is completely out of character with the rest of 
Pater’s novel even if, in his translation, it maintains some continuity of style, and this most 
significantly in the fact that, not only does it have a plot, but it may be said to consist entirely of 
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plot (and a supernatural one at that). This in itself can hardly be appropriate to a novel which 
everywhere else fulfills its sub-heading as concentrating on Marius’ “sensations and ideas,” and 
it would be a stretch to suggest that one may derive said sensations from inferring his reaction to 
the story as he reads it. And though the mode of allegory might seem as distant from Pater’s 
aesthetic as could be imagined, one might also suggest that the story itself is intrinsically 
allegorical to neither Pater nor Apuleius, only that it functions in such a manner in the context in 
which Pater has placed it. But neither—and this statement is based largely on my own 
intuition—would it do to dissect each of its many and minute components in the manner of some 
tiresome medieval exegesis, where the ants symbolize X and the birds Y, the first sister Envy and 
the second Cruelty, and so on, because of course that robs literature of the pleasure, or Voluptas, 
with which the story concludes, and which ever must be its most potent value (the reasons for the 
avoidance of an overly reductive ‘solution’ will be elaborated in the analysis of Lucian’s 
Hermotimus to follow). I would suggest, based only on taste (and taste does have as strong a 
claim as reason to the evaluation of aesthetic objects, and the creations of aesthetically-minded 
individuals) that any allegory to be extracted must be done so only from the story’s broadest 
strokes, the key shifts of plot or the moments that seem to demand symbolic reading, until we 
conclude with a figure almost purely allegorical in the daughter of Cupid and Psyche. 
 Seen here, Psyche is man, or mankind. It is really her story and not Cupid’s, and her story 
is that of pleasure and defeat in the course of experiencing the divine or transcendent. The 
opening with Venus, and her jealousy of Psyche, are too much in the fairy tale convention—a 
feature to be discussed below—to fit into whatever scheme Pater is extracting from the story, and 
its allegorical reading would be nonsensical anyway: the beauty of eternity jealous at human 
beauty? Such a suggestion would be utterly meaningless in aesthetic terms. The key to the 
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allegorical moment is Psyche’s interactions with Cupid on the marriage couch. Here we have 
outlined in symbolic form Pater’s description of the nature of human pleasure as detailed in The 
Renaissance. As with the most poignant myths, even one “latest born” as here, its value is not 
etiological but expressive of some permanently human experience, and so transcends devotional 
meaning. Psyche’s enjoyment and loss of Cupid is man’s joyous and difficult engagement with 
fleeting beauty or pleasure. The moment we shine a light upon it, the moment we think “I am 
enjoying myself,” the moment we substitute our pleasure with knowledge of that pleasure, 
thereby replacing the experience of an object with our contemplation of that object, it flies away. 
That the pleasure, Cupid, is offended is a mysterious touch; it may be owing only to the 
exigencies of the fairy-tale plot, but it also seems, at least in the context of Pater’s thought, to 
personify an impersonal experience, for indeed we have rejected that pleasure when we seek to 
know its identity—at that moment we have traded pleasure for knowledge, which in this novel is 
the ultimate and most defeating temptation of inquiring man.  
The conclusion of the tale is more difficult to decipher allegorically, or at least its 
allegorical meaning is more removed from human concerns. That the engagement of humanity 
and divinity or beauty leads to pleasure is a given, but that the pleasure is eternal, a goddess 
herself, that must prove a bittersweet idea to human beings, for whom pleasure is not eternal in 
experience. But Psyche is no longer a human, but a goddess, and so the difficulty and sadness 
implicit in human joy and its inevitable loss is evaded, and she becomes less a woman and more 
a symbol (as to an extent all divinities must be), and as a symbol both she and Voluptas are, like 
Cupid and Venus, eternal. Pleasure, love, beauty, and the human pursuit of those objects is 
eternal, for mankind as a whole—they are eternal but they are not perpetual, in the experience of 
individual men and women.   
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 The details are, of course, the source of the reader’s Voluptas (origo voluptae), and it is 
worth noting here the character of these details, which serve to accentuate the symbolic 
landscape in which the book takes place. These are the details of fairy tale (the whole tale of 
Psyche seems to combine, or engender, Cinderella—evil sisters, nature assisting in impossible 
tasks—in its frame and Beauty and the Beast at its core). One thinks of fairy tales as a genre 
which reflects the medieval world, and both The Golden Ass and, intentionally, Marius, have the 
quality of depicting the waning of the classical world, its transition into the medieval, something 
the color of the large version of Runge’s ‘Morning’ which seems as much twilight as dawn. The 
scheme of the novel renders this mood explicit, in its broad arch from the religion of Numa to 
that of Paul, but the historical context does not need to be read only for its ideological 
connotations. The sense of shifting between two fixed peaks, of paganism and Christianity, of 
classical and folk literature, of the sunlit superstitions of the ancients and the more menacing 
ones of the middle ages, is an ideal context for the novel’s thesis and ideal symbol for much of 
what must comprise the Epicurean’s life. Pater suggests for us to burn with a hard gem-like 
flame, but he knows, and certainly puts forward in Marius, that such an intensity cannot 
encompass the whole of existence, or even the majority. Rather, one who searches for those 
privileged moments is mostly in a state of flux—Marius, for example, only has one true quasi-
epiphany in the entire novel, in the chapter “The Will as Vision”—coming upon some sensation 
only to abandon it—having shed the lamplight upon the sleeping god—or have it abandon him in 
its brevity. 
 Only in such a mutable landscape can the Pervigilium Veneris be written, with its final 
stanza’s declaration: 
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Illa cantat, nos tacemus. Quando ver venit meum, 
Quando fiam uti chelidon, ut tacere desinam?48 
 
Such a moment may only come in a time of transition, which yields specifically this lack of 
confidence, this frustrated engagement with the objective perfection of a goddess like Venus by 
the imperfect, human speaker. But it bespeaks the more generalized transitions, which may just 
easily come at the end of another period, the sudden insufficiency of a set of fixed beliefs, the 
moment when consciousness of an experience forces that experience to depart. So too the other 
large interpolation of the novel, Lucian’s wonderful dialogue Hermotimus, which seems to 
require a decadent time period for its composition, such as the one that would soon succeed Pater 
and which his ideas in some sense inaugurated—the conclusions of Lucian’s dialogue require the 
sort of decadent developments of a society, bordering on that society’s collapse, that permit the 
questioning of its foundations; it is the time period most developed, if not in artistic production, 
than in the self-consciousness of a society’s inhabitants, both characteristics of which are 
obviously immensely evident in a figures like Pater and his immediate followers. 
 Like the borrowing from Apuleius, Hermotimus is not in keeping with the content of the 
rest of the work. Unlike it, and appropriately placed in a more or less symmetrical position from 
the story of Psyche, it represents the other extreme distance from this “bland” novel, that of 
philosophical abstraction.49 It is important to note, before discussing the dialogue itself, two 
 
48 “She sings, we are silent. When will my spring come? 
     Shall I find my voice when I shall be as the swallow?”   (translated by Allen Tate) 
49 Here I am referring to what Marius, in observing the rituals of the white nights, calls, “a delicate blandness,” a 
description which effectively characterizes the novel itself, which blandness—not intended here pejoratively—may 
be said to exist less in the words or images and more in the tone, which never raises its voice nor descends to a 
whisper, but maintains always the calm and consistency of a lecturer more sensitive to understanding experience 
than experienced in life, that is, the voice of Pater himself. 
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useful points: first, its argument against philosophical schools occurs in the midst of Marius’ 
encounter with Christianity, and so subverts an overly normative reading of his indoctrination in 
that respect. In another dimension, it is wonderful that it comes late in the text, after much 
experience; he has seen much, and thereby he can come to an abstract doctrine, namely that, 
given our ‘brief interval,’ it is always premature to conclude anything.  
Probably the key to understanding Pater’s theory of knowledge is this translation. Lucian 
is referred to by the narrator as a skeptic, and certainly that philosophy does not play a large role 
in the novel. But the dialogue is held up without question, and it is the only time we receive an 
intimation of what may be considered “truth,” here the negation of truth, or to paraphrase, the 
truth of an unpleasant countenance.50 That it comes later does not of course make it more true 
than the conclusions of ‘Cupid and Psyche’ (that would be privileging one moment over another 
solely for its placement in time), but by its very nature it seems to be more broad in its potential 
for application, or at least more applicable to the sort of philosophical questions—what Pater 
refers to as the reflective rather than the receptive—which occupy Marius for the latter half of 
the novel. The dialogue, which I do not think requires close reading because its conclusions are 
so self-evident, asserts that it is foolish to commit to a single school of knowledge, because the 
promise of any source of knowledge requires such a disproportionate investment of one’s life, 
and requires furthermore the belief in those who claim to have acquired said knowledge after 
having committed equivalent portions of their own lives, that it is impossible for any individual 
to weigh the various philosophies against one another, and so a rational individual must devote 
 
50 The term unpleasant here is a little problematic, not in and of itself, but with regards to Pater’s aestheticism. Yet it 
does not seem to be a means of rendering Lucian’s conclusion ironic, for two reasons: first, beauty has been 
relegated purely to receptive experience by this point in the novel (to be discussed later) and so is no longer the only 
standard of judgment, and secondly, the word is really to be read metaphorically, as a modifier of countenance, i.e. it 
is a truth that is unpleasant to hear.  
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himself to none of them.51 Hermotimus claims that at the end of his (twenty year) novitiate, he 
will be awarded a happiness-in-knowledge surpassing the investment of twenty years, but how, 
Lucian asks, is he to know? The application towards the final philosophy of Christianity is self-
evident: is one to devote a life to the promise of a blessed afterlife for which he has no evidence, 
and which may all come to waste? The fact of the inductee’s ignorance of his own dogma is all 
the more glaring, for no Christian knows with certainty the veracity of his conclusions. 
Christianity, if it has value in this novel, must not have value in terms of its tenets in and of 
themselves; nothing, suggests Pater, is valuable with regard to the sort of truth various 
philosophies make the pretention of possessing.  
 Though this dialogue comes rather late in the book, it still proves a useful limit in 
evaluating Marius’ engagement with different philosophies. In the novel, there are primarily 
three philosophies under examination, Cyrenaicism, Stoicism, and Christianity, though Pater is 
not so crude as to let the novel be structured by them as three phases of Marius life—he is never 
a Stoic and only cursorily a Christian. Neither Christianity nor Cyrenaicism is subjected to the 
systematic rebuttal of Stoicism in the person of Marcus Aurelius, who, from a sort of perverse 
Epicurean perspective, must be seen as some possible embodiment of an ideal; certainly as 
emperor it can be contended that he has at least the greatest opportunity for experience (though I 
suppose exactly the opposite can be contended as well, that his station and situation bar him from 
true freedom). In any case, Aurelius’ example gives us the novel’s most detailed example of the 
inadequacy of an ideal. The moral criticism or amorality (for, as Marius concludes, correctly, the 
amoral is ultimately the immoral) is obvious and requires minimal interpretation—it occurs at 
the climax to Book II, as Aurelius sits idly examining his scrolls while gladiators and slaves and 
 
51 In a sense, this can serve as an ironic riposte to Socrates’ claim in Ion, that poets know nothing, as discussed in 
the Introduction.  
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animals are brutally murdered in the amphitheatre. As a personal intimation the moment has 
much merit, though it offers us little in understanding the book per se, nothing that we, 
presumably more civilized, do not already know, except with regard to its effect on Marius’ 
personal philosophy, which will be discussed later in the section that deals with the possible 
place for morality within an Epicurean context. Actually, the immoral indifference of Aurelius, 
though his personal fault, is not the structural or ideological key to the section centered on 
Stoicism, and Pater leaves behind less dramatic clues prior to this climax to foreshadow a point 
that is made with greater and more far-reaching vigor in Hermotimus.  
 Aurelius’ philosophy is based on a studied indifference to the faults of lived experience. 
In a sense, it has as its origin a noble realization which is also quite evident in an Epicurean work 
like Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, one which, furthermore, has neither in our own time, and 
certainly not in the millennium and a half that would succeed this historical moment, been very 
well learned, namely, that an individual life emerges for a time and then subsides, and that the 
interval of this life is framed in nothingness. One might say, cynically, that both philosophies 
appreciate this fact, but that it bothers the Stoics more, which is why they try so very hard to 
suppress it. Of course rationally, there is good reason behind Aurelius’ thought—all human 
hardship ultimately is meaningless and without any end, so one would do well not to worry about 
it. What Aurelius fails to account for, is that he is requiring of human beings, himself included, 
to follow that essentially metaphysical rationale—that to humans, the cognizance of their own 
meaninglessness and the meaninglessness of their endeavors does not subtract from the reality of 
their sensations. Aurelius presents an ideal that surpasses humanity, and fails precisely because 
he demands that this ideal be exercised by human beings.  
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 Pater’s refutation of this ideal can be criticized as a kind of fictional ad hominem attack, 
but it is hardly so cheap—the personal facts he summons about Aurelius are true for all, Stoic or 
no. The first one is casual, seemingly insignificant: Aurelius suffers from terrible headaches. He 
himself admits that, “since boyhood [these headaches] had been the ‘thorn in his side,’ 
challenging the pretensions of his philosophy.” (156). I think every thinking person must have at 
some point identified with this sentiment. Why can I not, one asks, by force of will, transcend 
this bodily pain that has no part in me, my consciousness and will? But as Dostoevsky’s 
Underground Man says so well, a person with a toothache is a toothache. Our sensations must 
precede our ideas, and our ideas can never override the reality of sensations. Stoicism as a 
philosophy misapplies, dogmatically, the premises of Epicureanism, and its fallacy is more in 
evidence when Marius observes Aurelius’ ‘weakness,’ philosophical weakness, with regard to 
his body and his children. From the first there is a bemused treatment of Stoic ideology: 
 
There was here the almost inhuman impassibility of one who had thought too closely on 
the paradoxical aspect of the love of posthumous fame, (147) 
 
Even Aurelius’ speech (formed brilliantly by Pater from his Meditations) is ultimately as 
effective as the headaches as a line of argument, negating itself with its insights, everywhere 
trying to extract some fruit from experience and so, by our earlier logic, eclipsing experience 
itself. But the culmination of Pater’s ad hominem argument52, the death of Aurelius’ daughter, 
transcends argument entirely. We too pity Aurelius, as Marius does, and through our pity we too 
 
52 I have repeated this phrase, and it comes to seem not a logical fallacy in this case, because the question is not an 
abstraction but is more specifically: what makes a good human life? Are the ideologies one follows satisfying to 
life? We might say that it is unfair for Pater to prove his point with a fictionalized figure, but the faults and 
contradictions he ascribes to Aurelius are neither excessive nor unique.  
Amir Dagan 162 
transcend the antithetical philosophical position to Aurelius’ Stoicism. Not just his philosophy, 
but the argument itself melts away in the face of human experience, in a gesture which alone 
should beg the lie that Pater’s aestheticism, or any hedonism, is at its heart necessarily immoral.  
 Marius’ most trenchant criticism, however, is separate from all of these. It comes at the 
end of chapter XII after Marius has left an evening in the company of Aurelius and his family, 
and is worth repeating at least in part: 
 
How temperate, how tranquilizing…yet, as he left the eminent company…and sought, 
after his manner, to determine the main trait in all this, he had to confess that it was a 
sentiment of mediocrity. (163)  
 
I can think of no criticism so scathing as this, from an aesthete. For all his intelligence and 
kindness, for all his excellent administration of an empire, intellectually, Aurelius is a child, 
because he has compelled himself, it seems, to accept a doctrine, a dogma, and no one who is 
perpetually alert to the world can ever bring himself to do that. It is that which makes Marius feel 
for a moment that he is above the emperor, and what makes, in some capacity, the Paters of the 
world, private and soft-spoken, transcend the most powerful and confident of men. Really, they 
do know something that those men do not: Schlegel’s “but—”. For the powerful and confident 
cling like children to an idea about which they can wrap all their sensations, and which lends an 
illusory order to reality when really it is they who have ordered reality about that idea. And I 
think it must be treated metaphorically that Aurelius’ house’s mediocrity is located in its 
tranquility—it is a placid attitude regarding life, to feel confident in an idea, and what Marius 
calls mediocrity, he might just as well have called cowardice.  
Amir Dagan 163 
 Of course one could not imagine Stoicism as a real lure for Pater after his earlier works, 
though it certainly does allow for an amusing indictment of what seems a typical British 
sensibility, of precisely the sort that might be horrified by Pater’s earlier conclusion(s). A more 
pervasive and seductive possibility for interpretation is Marius’ engagement with the early 
Christians in the final section of the novel. Yet to interpret Christianity as somehow the fruition 
of Marius’ life is almost willfully to misinterpret the novel, though it is not inconceivable that 
Pater made that possibility available to those who live their whole lives in a state of such 
willfulness, thereby placating their criticism preemptively. The narrator stresses at the opening of 
chapter XXII that the very impulse to explore the church is Epicurean, and each form of 
enlightenment or joy which follows is expressed in terms of sensation rather than theology, the 
experience of encountering a new belief rather than the belief itself. This latter Pater views as a 
rebirth of all that is most peaceful in the pagan world, the Good Shepherd like a shepherd out of 
Theocritus, the ritual a new and more peaceful beauty than those which begin the novel. The 
point to stress is that Pater frames belief not with regard to its truth, but in its effect upon human 
sense:  
 
It was Christianity in its humanity…in its generous hopes for man…its appreciation of 
beauty and daylight. (238) 
 
The word “hopes” is essential—Pater does not suggest that the hopes will come to fruition. The 
belief in an afterlife does not dictate that afterlife’s existence; what is essential is the belief, and 
the joy that such belief produces in a worldly sense. And Pater emphasizes that this is only true 
of the early church, and of that church’s decadence in the Renaissance—only these are said to 
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capture its true spirit, epochs framing a central millennium of dogmatism. In these periods, 
wither adjacent to paganism or imbued with its rediscovery and integration into Christianity, 
“there was no forced opposition between the soul and body, the world and spirit.” (241) And to 
return to musical imagery of the ‘School of Giorgione,’ and a wonderful idea of philosophy 
which functions as a pre-emptive antidote to Hermotimus, “our creeds are but an abstract of 
prayer and song.” (242) 
 The novel seems to end with Marius martyring himself in Christian fashion, but is he? 
Certainly there is no skinning alive or burning or lions. Even at the point of his martyrdom for 
Cornelius, Marius acts more out of friendship than religious conviction. He explicitly feels 
repugnance for the kind of Christian suffering he might have to undergo, and his sense of reward 
is located more in the discovery of his “nerve,” which is, if not a discovery of sensation, certainly 
one of self. And at the very point of his death, intermingled with images of Christianity (that to 
my mind are more aesthetic than theological), Pater unleashes the subtlest and most scorching of 
ironies—or at least so it may be viewed so by detractors, while those who love his work love just 
as much the source of his allusion—he explicitly alludes, in Marius’ deathbed epiphany, to a line 
from the Conclusion to The Renaissance—perhaps it need not be considered an allusion, only a 
sentence issuing from the same wellspring of thought.  
  
For still…his deeper wisdom had ever been…to use life, not as a means to some 
problematic end, but, as far as might be, from dying hour to dying hour, an end in itself, 
(294) 
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which, aside from recalling the “brief interval” line (nor is this the only reference in the final 
chapter to Hugo’s Derniere Jour d’un Condamne), is an almost verbatim quotation of one of his 
great aphorisms: 
 
Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end. 
 
Pater has hardly rejected his earlier Hedonism; he simply shows that his beliefs are not 
necessarily contradictory with those more pleasing aspects of normative belief. The novel’s end, 
peaceful for its protagonist, cannot be read without a bit of irony, for the Christians who give 
Marius communion and have buried him as a martyr have misunderstood him, reduced him to 
their own dogma, which whatever their kindness is itself dogmatic, while he has understood 
them, subsumed the best of them into a more worthwhile philosophy of life. It is an interpretation 
of the uses of Christianity evident from the first only upon rereading, for the very first sentence 
bespeaks not a belief in Christianity per se, but the sort of moment it can yield, found elsewhere 
in general affect, but unique in its particulars to this historical period: 
 
As, in the triumph of Christianity, the old religion lingered latest in the country, and died 
out as but paganism…so, in an earlier century, it was in places remote from town-life that 
the older forms of paganism itself had survived the longest. (37) 
 
Pater proffers an anti-teleological reading of religious history, that shows the change occurring 
then to be but one of numerous changes, and the quantity of a historical moment to be relevant to 
his work only in the form of simile. Even to begin the work with the word ‘as’ is telling of the 
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work’s very nature: it is a work that is mutable, metaphorical, ultimately divorced from its 
immensely detailed historical setting. The place where the novel ends may in turn be as a simile 
for some other time of comparable dynamics, accessible to another life equally temporary and 
equally precious.  
The crux of interpretation in this novel, then, is not the introduction of Christianity, but is 
located in chapter XVI, aptly entitled “Second Thoughts,” wherein Marius begins to doubt the 
doctrines of Cyrenaicism. Two questions must be addressed in order to place the local 
philosophical conclusion of this moment within the argument of the book. First, what does 
Marius see as the flaw in Cyrenaic philosophy and, more importantly, does his abandonment of 
that philosophy amount to an abandonment of Epicureanism? 
It is doubtful that the ideas of Cyrenaicism and Epicureanism are used interchangeably in 
this novel. While the terms themselves no doubt refer to related ideas and idealized modes of 
life, it becomes apparent that in their distribution over the course of the novel, the former is 
intended to denote a local idea of aesthetic hedonism, and the latter an all-encompassing 
philosophy of experience. It may come as a surprise to a reader with preconceptions of Pater’s 
ideas that a novel including the word Epicurean in the title seems to mention the word almost not 
at all in the novel itself, and instead explores what seems that same ideology by another name. 
What becomes apparent, however, is that for Pater, Marius’ temporary Cyrenaicism is a kind of 
diluted or simplified Epicureanism, such as people misread into Pater’s own work, or which his 
younger followers like Wilde took in rather a more limited and dandified fashion than was 
intended. Cyrenaicism is the ideological reduction of Epicureanism, Epicureanism as aesthetic 
dogma, and as we have seen, the novel everywhere maintains that experience is impoverished by 
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dogma. Marius remains an Epicurean for the entire novel, even as he explores Christianity, 
because Epicureanism is the embracing of lived experience.  
 Pater expressly frames the limit of the Cyrenaic philosophy with phrases recalling a type 
I have already quoted often: “It is one of those …partial ideals, based on…limited[,] 
apprehension of the truth of one aspect of experience(…the beauty of the world and the brevity 
of man’s life there).” (181) He decries the fanaticism of its youthful practitioners, which are 
precisely the sort of people who would take the ‘Conclusion’ of The Renaissance as gospel?53 
But already, if one does treat any idea in such a manner, he has blocked out his receptivity, has 
become dogmatic because he has chosen to experience a given philosophy rather than all of life.   
Pater proceeds to assert that the Cyrenaic idea is youthful because, “the ideal of a rich 
experience comes to them in the receptive, if not the reflective, powers.” (184) Anyone who 
supposes that Pater is prudishly negating his own conclusions need only look to this phrase to see 
that even as he dismisses his youthful followers, he retains the central point which had enamored 
them. Still the philosophy of old age engages experience, only that the experience is expanded to 
include reflection. Reflection is experience, as much as is reception; it is simply the experience 
of inwardness. This distinction is elaborated by Pater’s fascinating linkage between the opposed 
Greek ideals of Cynicism and Cyrenaicism and their Roman counterparts in Stoicism and 
Epicureanism. The relation of Greek to Roman is, I suppose, something akin to the relation of 
Homer to Virgil: the first, more passionate and natural, perhaps more beautiful, the latter more 
composed, wiser and more restrained. “The old Greek morality…with all its imperfections, was a 
comely thing,” (185) for it was philosophy in its youth, and engendered that philosophy that 
appeals to the young. Yet all these ideals, Pater points out, are not necessarily opposed, though 
 
53 I admit to having myself been guilty of this.  
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their tenets might be, but rather “exaggeration[s] of one special motive.” The exaggeration takes 
on a particular form, becomes fixed and immutable, and after it gives us pleasure, it dissipates as 
suddenly as does a moment of pleasure at the faculty of reflection. The transference of the search 
from simply the “aspects of things,” to that impossible ideal is certainly a broadening; the fault 
of the earlier aestheticism was that it was too precise. Yet all systems, Pater suggests, are of 
value, as one passes through them, for they give intimations of something larger, even though 
those very systems are ultimately “an unfulfilled ideal.” (187) The ideal must be imagined, and it 
initiates its pursuit and so engenders experience, and all experience is the provenance of the 
Epicurean.  
 It remains to articulate the value of Marius’ shift to Christianity at the novel’s end, and 
whether that value can be explained under the rubric of Pater’s ever-shifting Epicureanism. This 
conclusion’s origins, one must surmise, are subtly established in the chapters which precede the 
chapter “Second Thoughts,” discussed above, and which focus on Marius’ attendance at Marcus 
Aurelius’ court. As mentioned earlier, the section on Aurelius culminates in Marius’ dual 
verdicts of the Emperor’s doctrine: mediocrity and, more dramatically, lack of human sympathy 
or immorality. What elevates these sections and their subsequent meanings from a merely dated 
condemnation of Stoic philosophy is the wonderfully elaborate mutations that said realizations 
have upon Marius’ own philosophy. Marius himself is not a Stoic, and so one would imagine his 
disapproval of Aurelius to have a minimal influence on his development. Yet in his sensitivity to 
thought and sensation, Marius takes that criticism, both more broadly as a criticism of 
intellectual dogmatism, and as a possible critique of his own lack of sympathy. Which is to say, 
in a somewhat dialectical fashion, by seeing Aurelius’ immorality as an inadequacy, he 
establishes morality as an act and sensation necessary to his own existence, and realizes that if 
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his form of Cyrenaicism has not included it, then it too has been as dogmatic in its way as 
Aurelius’ Stoicism. It is in Christianity that he finds a philosophy inclusive of the quality of 
sympathy.  
I should point out that the association of ethical behavior with the tenets of Epicureanism 
is not as forced an argument as it might appear. Again and again, Pater repeats the word 
“sympathy” with regard to Aurelius’ moral inadequacies. As there is no purely rational source 
for moral sentiment, sympathy must be construed as its only source, which is to say, ethics are 
not a priori, nor can they not be learned empirically (as the “fruit of experience”) but must begin 
from experience itself. Pater locates that source in sympathy, the ability to imagine oneself from 
the perspective of another. One may argue that this is an insufficient beginning to a moral 
philosophy, and that such a beginning can be turned in any direction dependent upon people’s 
individual sympathies (or absence thereof), but Pater is not constructing a moral philosophy, and 
in any case, any philosophy is an “unfulfilled ideal.” Just as Marius or his friends strive in 
different capacities to discover something permanent, so too does all moral intuition imply a 
perhaps discoverable permanent moral ideal; so it seems, but in our unfulfilled search for it, what 
matters ultimately is how we have responded to that search, and whether we have embarked on it 
at all.  
It would be easy and not irrelevant furthermore to offer that Christianity is merely the last 
of many experiences in his brief interval, for, if we assume with Pater that experience rather than 
its conclusions are the end (and Christianity, while not the fruit of experience—for it would be 
utterly ridiculous to suggest that religious dogma comes from empiricism—does pretend to be a 
fruit, or truth), we ought not to suppose that simply because an experience is the last of the 
interval, that it in any way constitutes that interval’s goal. This point, and a preemptive warning 
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against any reductively teleological or religious readings of the novel, is neatly articulated twice 
in the first chapter of Book IV, describing Marius’ induction into the rites of early Christianity. 
The first caveat to the religious content that follows, and the articulation of its non-dogmatic 
value—may be found in Socrates’ analysis of the Halycone myth, spuriously attributed to Lucian 
and a neat and loving inversion of Hermotimus, still to follow several chapters later, wherein 
Socrates de-emphasizing philosophical wisdom for the sake of poetic pleasure. ‘Pseudo-
Lucian’s’ Socrates is asked by Chaerephon what may the value of the Halycone myth, which any 
reader of Lucian would know that writer must regard as contemptuously in its value as truth as 
any other piece of mythology. To Chaererphon, “nothing seems more incredible” than the 
fantastic content of the story. Socrates, who in emphasizing experience above truth posits a very 
un-Socratic argument—but no matter, for Pater skillfully employs the fake Socrates of a fake 
Lucian to espouse numerous anti-truths belying the relevance to Pater’s argument—evades the 
very question, first by pointing to the ignorance of men with regard to the more profound 
meanings of the world, and then by concluding the following: 
 
We mortals, being altogether of little account…may hardly speak with security of what 
may be the powers of the immortal gods concerning Kingfisher, or Nightingale. Yet the 
glory of thy mythus, as my fathers bequeathed it to me, O tearful songstress! That will I 
too hand on to my children…the story of the pious love to Ceyx, and of thy melodious 
hymns… (221-222) 
 
Can Pater mean this any less for the mythology of Christianity than for paganism? What matters 
is the song, not its content. As in Hermotimus, the only truth is that man is helpless to evaluate 
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the reality with regard to its truth, and so we are left to enjoy its beauties. Although the spurious 
truths of Pagan and Christian mythologies are obvious enough, Pater’s engagement with each is 
primarily aesthetic, whether his protagonists engage with a Classical style in Marius or the 
Gothic style in his “Denys L’Auxerrois,” from Imaginary Portraits, or Pater himself the 
alternately pagan and religious imagery in Giorgione and Michelangelo. The content of what 
follows will not be measured in truth, but in its experiential value, and even if, as will be shown 
shortly, that experiential value is unique, or superior, in its moral content, it does not make a 
pretense of the truth of those beliefs, whose nullity is in any case irrelevant.  
 There follows a more curious and enigmatic exchange with Apuleius, whose predilection 
for Platonism is not entirely surprising given the mystical conclusion of The Golden Ass (again it 
should be noted that what stays with us in that work is not the Isis cult, but the Rose of Isis, 
appreciated aesthetically, and the conclusion whose whiteness and purity is less a cloying piety 
than the sort of shimmering plagal cadence that concludes a work like Wagner’s Tristan). Here, 
however, Apuleius’ words ring hollow in Marius’ ears—perhaps, a Chirstian might say, because 
they are the incorrect philosophy—but I would contend because they are too abstractly 
philosophical in the first place. The true Socrates would reject the Halycone (Plato certainly 
would) for its own factual spuriousness, as presently a certain dimension of Christianity would 
do,54 and that is a position one can never imagine Pater accepting.  
 The value of Christianity, then, is not the “faulty theology of Calvin,” which wrongly 
steers the “excellent soul” of Jonathan Edwards, and which, unless Marius is encountering a sect 
 
54 This is hardly the place to debate the relevance of mythological imagery within the context of Christian religion. 
My point is merely that, as dogmatically as would Plato, if in my opinion with even less accuracy, Orthodox 
Christianity retains only what it believes will accord with its own perpetuation, or, less cynically, with its own 
central truths, whereas the aesthete treats mythology as though it exists for its own sake, or the privileged moments 
it elicits from the aesthetic observer.  
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of Gnostics, and there is no indication for this assumption, must be rather closer to these 
followers of Paul than to the more contemporary artists of the Renaissance whom Pater 
admired—it is specifically not their ideology, so much as what that ideology yields 
experientially. The fact is probably alluded to by the first house of Marius’ engagement being 
that of a Cecilia, recalling of course the patron saint of music…the condition to which art aspires, 
to paraphrase the opening of “The School of Giorgione.” And the particular harmony that colors 
that music is the experience of sympathy, which is valuable and, at this historical moment, 
seemingly unique to the Christian cult.  
Given Pater’s Epicureanism in this novel, we may arrive at what might be fittingly called 
the conclusion, not in time, but with regard to the height of the hard flame, the moving and 
beautiful “Will as Vision.” It has neither exactly the beauty of art, though it is beautiful, nor the 
complexity of philosophy, though it is wise, but rather encompasses the almost inexpressible 
synthesis of the dialectic formed between art and philosophy. Pater does not give us a 
conclusion, but rather the intimation of what may come from his own inward hedonism. It is less 
an expression outwards, less a system, than the sudden awareness of the source of the search, the 
root of all thought and experience, where all that is encountered may suddenly appear but the 
projection of one’s own consciousness, because that is where our awareness of those separate 
objects begins: 
 
Were the cheerful, sociable, restorative beliefs, of which he had there read so much…just 
hidden behind the veil of a mechanical and material order, but only just behind it, ready 
perhaps even now to break through…might the will itself be an organ of knowledge, of 
vision? (208-209) 
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We do not get an ‘answer’ because there is none, only the intimation of an extent to which our 
sensations might aspire. For all its intensity, it is a limited moment, and as frequently in Pater’s 
voice, instantly there comes the melancholy—as explained in The Renaissance, this melancholy 
must come—the sense of a falling off: 
 
Himself—his sensations and ideas—never fell again precisely into focus as on that day, 
yet he was the richer by its experience….It gave him a definitely ascertained measure of 
his moral or intellectual need…Must not all that remained of life be but a search for the 
equivalent of that Ideal, among so-called actual things—a gathering together of every 
trace or token of it, which his actual experience might present? (212-213)  
 
It is difficult not to quote such lines at length. That there is a dwindling of intensity, an 
impossibility of return to the privileged moment, is the curse of intense experience itself. Its 
character, its matter, if one may use that word for the ethereal sensation, is extinguished almost 
at the point of its existence, and yet something has happened beyond the scope of Aurelius’ 
mediocrity, beyond precise philosophical comprehension. It is the impulse that is the conclusion, 
and it is a fitting climax that at this moment not only do we have the novel’s subtitle included, 
but the relationship between title and subtitle is explained: Marius is his sensations and ideas, the 
receptive and reflective faculties. That the sensation dissipates the moment it is conceived, that it 
seems impossible to hold onto, is perhaps the source of melancholy in a book that has few 
dramatic moments. And yet it is also an enrichment, because though we know Marius carries 
nothing back from it, he is edified in the knowledge that such experience exists. And it is 
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beautiful, and pleasing, and though it might aggravate the remainder of our interval with longing, 
so too does it enrich it with memory, and though we may lament that we cannot possess it 
perpetually, we may rejoice, also, that we are given something that approaches in grandeur our 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Wilde’s Amoral Aesthetics: 
Morality and Pleasure in Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray and Salome 
and Henry James’ “The Author of Beltraffio” 
 
Despite the fact that Oscar Wilde prefaced his novel The Picture of Dorian Gray with a 
series of maxims that sketch his theory of an amoral literature and espouse a philosophy of art-
for-art’s-sake, the critical literature on this work often opts for a primarily moral reading of the 
novel, which not only exists at the expense of the Preface but concludes that the novel itself 
undermines the Preface’s aestheticism. For example, in his 1947 study Oscar Wilde, Eduoard 
Roditi claims that “the ethical message” of Dorian Gray is that “Dorian Gray distorts…[Lord 
Henry’s] paradoxical philosophy of Dandyism,” ultimately meeting “the punishment of 
excessive self-love.” (Lawler, 372)55 In Beyond the Tragic Vision (1962), Morse Peckham refers 
to the “progressive effects upon Dorian’s personality of his exploration of vice.” (Lawler, 380) 
Barbara Shuttleworth mentions Dorian Gray’s “evil acts,” (Lawler, 384) in her 1965 study Dark 
Passages: The Decadent Consciousness in Victorian Literature, while Philippe Jullian (Oscar 
Wilde, 1969) summarizes the moral of the novel as being “a life dedicated to beauty, so much 
luxury and so many works of art, only hide[s] deception and decomposition.” (Lawler, 410) 
Richard Ellmann (1969) finds “a criticism of Pater” in “the disastrous effects of Lord Henry’s 
influence upon Dorian.”(412) Joyce Carol Oates sees Wilde (‘The Picture of Dorian Gray, 
 
55 All quotations indicated ‘Lawler’ are taken from:  
Wilde, Oscar. The Picture of Dorian Gray: Norton Critical Edition. New York: Norton, 1988.  
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Wilde’s Parable of the Fall,’ 1981), though he does believe in aesthetics, as offering a critical 
commentary on his beliefs, wherein “the artist who succumbs to the spell of beauty will be 
destroyed.” (Lawler, 430) In his 1988 edition of the novel, Donald Lawler suggests that though 
“Wilde was making his story moral…while doing his best to conceal the moral archetype,….the 
ethical force of the argument still burns through.” (Lawler, 446) More recently, in 2000 Jean 
Paul Riquelme has argued that, “Wilde responds to Pater by projecting the dark implications of 
Pater’s attitudes and formulations in a mythic Gothic narrative of destruction and self-
destruction.” (610) 
More recent criticism of Wilde has perhaps taken different routes but not entirely ignored 
these issues. As Helena Gurfinkel points out, in the 1990’s, Wilde criticism began focusing on 
gender and sexuality, and “Queer theorists deployed Wilde’s penchant for redefining lying as 
creativity and ‘immoral’ behavior as a way to multiply and redefine selves.” (1-2) More germane 
to this essay, in “Oscar Wilde’s Poetic Injustice in The Picture of Dorian Gray,’56 Neil Hultgren 
sees the critique of ineffectual action as embodied in the character of James Vane to be a riposte 
to Wilde’s moralizing critics. In Henry James, Oscar Wilde and Aesthetic Culture, Michèlle 
Mendelssohn frames the aesthetic movement as a transatlantic dialectic embodied by the two 
writers of her monograph’s title. In his 1990 study of aestheticism, Leon Chai makes a 
fascinating distinction between Pater and Wilde, for whereas Wilde views Pater’s aestheticism in 
Marius as that of a spectator, Wilde’s more engaged and tumultuous life convinced him that form 
is made of the material of life itself, a view which may still accord with Wilde’s pronouncements 
in his preface. Yet it cannot be denied that as the discourse has shifted from pre-postmodern 
 
56 See Bristow, Wilde Discoveries.  
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grand narratives to more local concerns with politics, gender and cultural history, that the ideas 
which animate this book recede somewhat from view.  
Probably the standard moral interpretation is to be found in Ellmann, developed at greater 
length in his 1988 biography of the writer, though it is interesting to note the consistency of tone 
in the readings above. Ellmann treats Dorian Gray as an explicit attack on Paterian aestheticism 
that rejects that movement by outlining its perverse moral implications, though he does claim 
that the Preface and novel itself exist in dialectical relation to one another. He summarizes the 
novel’s moral as he sees it: “The life of mere sensation is uncovered as anarchic and self 
destructive….The text: drift beautifully on the surface, and you will die unbeautifully in the 
depths.” (Ellmann, 315) Here, as is found in varying degrees in the aforementioned studies, 
Ellmann sees Dorian’s descent into sin and suicide as the natural outcome of an adherence to 
aesthetic principles as embodied in Pater and Lord Henry, and the novel becomes a polemic by 
Wilde against the immorality implicit in those principles.   
 These evaluations conspicuously ignore Wilde’s position as a student of Pater’s and 
adherent—and often vocal proponent—of his mentor’s aesthetic philosophy as expressed in the 
Preface. In fact, the Preface can be viewed as being intentionally a somewhat inflammatory 
expression of the positions Pater had advocated throughout his The Renaissance: Studies in Art 
and Poetry, most notably in that work’s Conclusion. A brief comparison of various phrases 
shows the genealogy to be self-evident. The maxim for example, that “all art is at once surface 
and symbol,” can viewed as a reincarnation of Pater’s poetic phrase in his essay The School of 
Giorgione, “All art constantly aspires to the condition of music.” (86) What both Pater and 
Wilde are claiming is that art’s quality as art is located not in its subject matter—its references to 
the ‘real world’—but rather in some abstract configuration which is purely artistic or beautiful; 
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music, being non-referential, is thus the ideal point of comparison because it is nothing other 
itself, nothing other than art.  
Pater’s lines are also echoed in maxims that have decidedly moral, or rather amoral, 
implications. When Wilde claims, “There is no such thing as a moral or immoral book. Books 
are well written or badly written. That is all,” he has extended the non-referentiality of Pater’s 
artistic ideal in order to negate the possible presence of any moral content in literature, replacing 
it with an emphasis on form or beauty, which is to say, replacing ethics with aesthetics. The 
amoral component is then reiterated: “No artist has ethical sympathies.” Art’s ambition is beauty, 
and it has nothing to do with morality—Wilde could not be more clear on this matter. Barbara 
Shuttleworth quotes Wilde’s explanation for eventually preferring Pater to Ruskin as being that, 
for the latter, “the keystone of his aesthetic system is ethical always.” (386) Clearly, according to 
Wilde, ethical considerations were detrimental to the appreciation of the aesthetic.  
It may be worth exploring the way in which Wilde’s provocatively amoral aestheticism is 
rooted in developments of aesthetic thought, first on the continent, and then among Pater and his 
contemporaries, to which Prettejohn serves as an admirable guide. Perhaps his most notorious 
maxim in the Preface, ‘All art is quite useless” can be traced to a fetish for uselessness which we 
observed in the introduction as evinced by the writings of Gautier and Baudelaire, but which in 
fact begins with Germaine de Stael’s attempt to reframe certain Kantian principles. In her de 
l’Allemagne, Mme de Stael found a means of expressing Kant’s idea of disinterest/interest in 
clearer terms, namely, uselessness/usefulness (Prettejohn, 69): “in separating the beautiful from 
the useful, Kant clearly proves that it is not in the nature of the fine arts to give lessons…they 
ought to elevate the mind, and not school it.” (de Stael, part 3 chapter 9) Later, Gautier 
elaborated these ideas in a way that gave greater weight to the sensual element. In discussing 
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Hippolyte Flandrin’s Young Male Nude, Seated Beside the Sea, the subject of which appears 
mysterious, claimed, “it has no precise meaning, he wrote, nor does it proceed from any 
intention, but exists as a free manifestation of beauty, and communicates ‘the dreams of the 
painted beyond the trammels of subject matter.’….‘art expresses itself, without other 
preoccuptation.’” (Prettejohn, 67) Similarly, he explained that the principle of l’art pour l’art, 
“means not form for form’s sake, but rather form for the sake of the beautiful, apart from any 
extraneous idea, from any detour to the profit of some doctrine or another, from any direct 
utility.” (98)  
 Prettejohn, in terms that echo Eagleton’s description in chapter 1, explains that: 
 
For its proponents in the 1830’s, when the motto became current in criticism, the 
dissociation of art form morality meant art’s independence both from academic doctrines 
that requited art to demonstrate a lofty moral, and form the prudish and petty moralism of 
bourgeois criticism….indeed, l’art pour l’art was often seen as a repudiation of the 
increasing commercialism of the markets for literature and art….a refusal of complicity 
with the profit making ethos of bourgeois society. But from the start it could also be seen 
as an irresponsible evasion of social or humanitarian aims for art (98-9) 
 
The innate conflict between morality and aesthetics seems inescapable, if only from the 
perspective of an essentially moralistic society (as we shall see in our analysis of James’ ‘The 
Author of Beltraffio’), and will be discussed abstractly in the final chapter. It may suffice to say 
here that, though the idea of aesthetics may be perceived as a reaction to bourgeois morals, and 
only subsequently becomes a repudiation of morality itself, the position is not necessarily so 
much immoral, as amoral, though Wilde perhaps intentionally courts the prior reading for the 
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sake of shock value. But of course it is also possible to despise morality only as it is manifested 
in the hypocrisy of bourgeois morals, of sanctimony, and one may pursue both the amorality of 
aesthetics and concurrent if not congruent social irrelevance, as is clear in the example of 
Baudelaire, who, “heaped scorn on what he saw as the ‘heresies’ of confusing art with morality 
or scientific truth. Beauty…may be strange, grotesque, sinister, or macabre. But it can be 
reduced to subservience, whether to noble philanthropism or to petty bourgeois morality, to 
radical or repressive politics, without losing all its integrity and powerful.” (101) Here, the 
pursuit of the grotesque may both be a social end and a broadening of aesthetic definitions that 
serves the purpose of clarification.  
 These French notions were eventually transmitted to English figures such as the pre-
Raphaelites, and in the hands of Pater, Swinburne, and Whistler (an American), may be seen also 
as a reaction as the theological and ethical aesthetics of Ruskin. Ruskin felt that the detached 
nature of Kantian definitions of beauty ideas of beauty were inherently insufficient, because, “the 
perception of the beautiful was inherently moral, because it responds joyfully to God’s creation 
and because it is itself a faculty given to humans by a loving god.” (115) In works such as “The 
Nature of the Gothic,” Ruskin explored the way certain periods of art defied the dehumanizing 
nature of modern industrial life, not merely because art may be said to transcend bourgeois 
concerns, as the Aesthetics would have it, but because the Gothic art, for example, is itself a 
reflection of a life of holiness and fulfillment, as opposed to the alienation and sense of 
detachment inherent both in modern and classical perfectionism. For Ruskin, a sentiment he 
attributed to Schiller such as, “the sense of beauty never fathered the performance of a single 
duty,” (115) was an insult to the edifying power of art and the dignity of man.  
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Yet the following generation took their cues far more from the aforementioned French 
authors. Swinburne, associated with the pre-Raphaelite painter s and poets, for example, asserted 
in his monograph on Blake that, “Art for Art’s sake first of all, and afterwards we may suppose 
all the rest shall be added to her (or if not she need hardly be overmuch concerned); but from the 
man who falls to artistic work with a moral purpose, shall be taken away even that which he 
has—whatever of capacity for doing well in either way he may have at starting.” (124) The 
sentiment implies that since art is a self-contained activity, emphasis on extra-aesthetic concerns 
such as morality will defeat both the moral purpose and the nature of artistic achievement itself.  
“Moreover, the writings of Swinburne and Pater take up an insight of Baudelaire’s essay that was 
perhaps less influential in France: ‘modernity is an aspect of all art, not just the art of the most 
recent period,’” (Prettejohn, 130) a notion that effectively dehistoricizes and decontextualizes art, 
thus separating it from moral or political considerations. 
These varied sentiments ultimately found a more sober and methodical articulation in the 
criticism of Pater. Wilde is no mere imitator of Pater, and it is probably their divergences that 
have engendered the argument that Wilde opposes Pater. Actually, their relationship as seen here 
is not oppositional; rather, they diverge with regard to the application of aesthetic ideology in 
their work, both in medium and content. Consistent ideologically as the entirety of Pater’s 
Renaissance is, it was primarily the Conclusion that furnished the succeeding generation with 
their idea of Aestheticism. This section is distinguished from the rest of the book because it is not 
an analysis of any particular piece of artwork; it is not an analysis at all, but a sort of rallying cry 
to enjoy a life of the senses (tempered, at the end, by the belief that it is art which shall grant the 
senses the greatest pleasure). The sorts of assumptions which inform this section are by no means 
absent from the preceding ones, but here they are brought out for the express purpose of being 
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applied in life as opposed solely to art criticism. This is the idea from which Wilde’s writing is 
generated. Of course for both Pater and Wilde, observing art is, or ought to be, an integral 
component of a pleasurable life.  
 The difference between Pater and Wilde can be seen in both their biographies and their 
mode of production, which are, in a way, emblematic of the difference between aestheticism and 
decadence, or between’s Pater and Wilde’s more decadent aestheticism. As opposed to Wilde, 
Pater’s life presents an almost startling portrait of inactivity given his sentiments in his writing. 
Even Marius the Epicurean, however excellent, strikes one as being as removed from experience 
outside of art as are the essays of The Renaissance. In contrast, Wilde’s life and writings engage 
the possibility of aesthetic and hedonistic experience rather than simply contemplation. 
Similarly, Wilde’s early mature writings seem much more engaged than do Pater’s with the 
application of aesthetic ideas. The fact of their being more purely literary, rather than a strange 
mixture of criticism and fiction, fortifies this distinction, as does, interestingly, their greater 
emphasis on plot. 
This application of Paterian ideas to life may be regarded as the origin of Wilde’s 
treatment of aesthetics in Dorian Gray, and is in a sense in Pater the fount for what is often 
perceived as Decadence. Hedonism in art appreciation is certainly a different thing, or will 
inevitably be perceived as being fundamentally different, from hedonism in life. Naturally, the 
unfettered application of hedonistic philosophy can lead to some developments revolting to 
conventional (and sane) observers, developments which not a few writers of the period were 
eager to attempt depicting, though Wilde could hardly be numbered among the more offensive of 
these (nor is he really offensive at all in that sense). When applied to actual human life, this 
sentiment is undoubtedly true. But it is false to suppose that Wilde was in anyway concerned 
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with this distinction as an artist, or that he used his novel as means of expressing it. Furthermore, 
a study in the application of Pater’s Conclusion to human life does not necessarily imply a turn 
toward moral criticism. In fact, as has been seen, the Preface explicitly cautions against this type 
of reading. Rather, Wilde does use his novel as an examination of the implementation of 
aesthetics, but in a typically decadent, i.e. amoral, mode: an examination governed by an 
aesthetic rather than a moralistic understanding of experience.  
Wilde wrote his Preface in 1895, five years after the publication of the novel, as a rebuttal 
to his critics. As Ellmann says, “to prevent the book’s being treated as immoral, Wilde excluded 
morality from its province.” (322) Naturally, Ellmann contends that this contradicts the novel’s 
underlying character, an assumption that presupposes Wilde would undermine his own writing in 
order to get at his critics. Yet it is interesting how easily he was willing, as Ellmann points out, to 
completely deny any trace of moral intention in the novel. In fact, the Preface’s tone is totally 
inimical to the very idea of a moral reading of any literary or artistic work. It seems equally 
possible that Wilde was not just avoiding the charge of immorality, but avoiding a moral 
interpretation of his work altogether, a statement that to his mind coincided exactly with his 
artistic goals in the novel precisely because he had never considered morality in the process of 
composition.   
Let us for the time being at least humor the artist and take his Preface seriously.  That 
Wilde published these aphorisms as a Preface to his novel could be taken simply as an artistic 
credo, which of course it is, and as such a ‘moral’ interpretation of the novel need not be as 
contradictory as would appear; literature’s quality, according to Wilde, is divorced from its 
subject matter, and so well-written or badly-written books can be based on both moral and 
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immoral subject matter. Accordingly, the two components may be reconciled thus: Dorian Gray, 
a novel expressing moral sentiments, ought only to be judged by the quality of its writing.  
 All this would be well and good and the accusation of contradiction superfluous (though 
probably still an irresistible temptation for many critics) were the sentiments of the Preface—or 
at least sentiments similar to those of the Preface—not repeatedly and ardently repeated within 
the novel by the character of Lord Henry Wotton, whose pernicious influence on Dorian has 
been taken as the ideological origin of the latter’s misdeeds. Here it would appear that the 
inescapable critique of Dorian’s morality implies transitively that the ideology upon which those 
deeds were founded be subjected to the same criticism. In essence, one can say that the content 
of Wilde’s novel refutes the aesthetic maxims that precede it, a conclusion either expressed 
overtly or logically deducible from the critical responses referred to above.  
 To do so is to suppose that Wilde’s aestheticism as expressed in the Preface is insincere; 
more importantly, it is to misread the application—or intentional misapplication—of Pater’s 
aesthetics within the body of the novel proper. As shall be seen, the content of Wilde’s novel is 
wholly consistent with the Preface. Dorian’s mistake is to misunderstand Pater, and his turn 
toward immorality can be seen as a turn away from the proper appreciation of beauty. This 
formula, again consistent with Pater, is then varied to the same effect in Salome,57 where, in a 
production whose style seems consummately closer to Wilde’s artistic aspirations, Salome’s 
‘depravity’ can once again be seen as a move away from Paterian aesthetics.  
  
The crucial scene in Dorian Gray from the standpoint of aesthetics is the title character’s 
first encounter with Lord Henry and his implied Faustian pact which commences the novel’s first 
 
57 Also accused by Ellmann as a motion away from Pater’s aesthetics: “Salome’s perverse sexuality is related to 
Paterism.” (Lawler, 413-414) 
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and most effective arc; after this the novel to some extent degenerates into disconnected 
repetitions of different vices and the same ideology, from which it does not return until the final 
scene recaptures something of the opening’s almost mythic grandeur. The pact is made possible 
through Lord Henry’s influence, specifically his commendation of Dorian’s beauty and his 
lament over the youth’s eventual aging: 
 
When your youth goes, your beauty goes with it, and then you will realize there are no 
triumphs left for you…. Live the wonderful life that is in you….there was so much in you 
that charmed me. (24-25) 58 
 
Lord Henry has conflated two ideas of Pater’s, each from the Conclusion to The Renaissance. 
The first refers to the human acquisition of pleasure: 
“To burn always with this hard gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in 
life,” (152) 
the second to the fleeting appearance of beauty: 
“Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone of the hills is 
choicer than the rest…for that moment only.” (152) 
Yet the way in which they are combined, and the misplaced emphasis Henry gives to Dorian’s 
own person, can be viewed as a profound misreading of Pater’s hedonism, a misreading to which 
Pater’s work was often subjected.  Surely Pater’s ideas emphasize pleasure, but it is pleasure of a 
particular kind. Pater advocates a receptiveness to the beauties of the world wherever they may 
happen to make themselves manifest, beauties which have the potential to be present, it seems, in 
 
58 Quotations from Dorian Gray and Salome are taken from:  
Wilde, Oscar. The Picture of Dorian Gray and Other Writings. New York: Bantam, 2005.  
Amir Dagan 186 
all things and which people may hope to have the opportunity of experiencing. What is 
significant for our purposes is that the beauties reside in the things observed, and that the 
pleasure humans experience must be derived from the observation of the thing.  
This philosophy in no way encompasses the entirety of pleasurable experience. 
Conspicuously absent is sexual pleasure, and not, it would seem, from any prudery on the part of 
Pater, who was possibly celibate in life. Sexual pleasure, or more broadly physical pleasure as 
derived from the sense of touch, is essentially un-aesthetic—it is pleasure whose center can be 
said to reside wholly within the individual experiencing it—whereas aesthetic pleasure, though 
also experienced by the observing subject, is produced by the engagement of the subject with an 
object of beauty outside of himself. Aesthetic sensation is distinguished by Shuttleworth from 
Henry’s idea of pleasure as the difference between impression and sensation. If this is overly 
vague, one need only begin enumerating the unending list of beautiful objects that can give no 
sensual pleasure, or alternately the objects that can provide sexual pleasure but are not beautiful.  
 When Henry comments on Dorian’s beauty one can ascribe to his words a desire for each 
of these pleasures. To Henry, Dorian is both aesthetic object and sexual object, two components 
which need not be mutually exclusive, and which, if combined, can from the perspective of man 
only reside in another human being. Disregarding the motive of attraction, however, one can, 
taking Lord Henry at his word, presume that he considers Dorian an object of aesthetic 
admiration, an opinion which we as readers know to be accurate within the world of the novel. 
 But what can this mean for Dorian? It cannot, at least, mean the same thing as it does for 
Lord Henry, because nobody can be the object of their own uncritical veneration. And here I do 
not refer to the possibility for vanity or narcissism, an idea coupled frequently with that of 
immorality in criticisms of the novel and shortly to be discussed at some length—I mean to say 
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that one cannot enjoy oneself aesthetically because one’s appearance as is can never spatially be 
the object of one’s own aesthetic scrutiny. Henry tells Dorian that the latter’s youth “charmed me 
[Henry],” a fact of Henry’s own experience impossible to translate to the person to whom he is 
relating it. Dorian’s youth can never be the same aesthetic object for himself as it is for Lord 
Henry or indeed for everyone but Dorian, because he is the only person in the world that is 
incapable of observing it.  
 But Dorian has to some extent already been corrupted—corrupted by an ideology phrased 
in a way that does not exactly apply to him because it treats him as the object he can never 
observe, and which is faulty more for its phrasing than for its tenets—as can be seen from his 
aesthetically degraded relation to his portrait: 
 
When he saw it he drew back, and his cheeks flushed for a moment with pleasure. A look 
of joy came into his eyes, as if he had recognized himself for the first time [italics added]. 
(27) 
 
Of course Dorian is not recognizing himself—he is recognizing a painting of himself. A painting 
and a person are not the same. And here let us establish that though the painting is a portrait of 
Dorian, it must contain a peculiar beauty that is different from his own, if only by merit of the 
fact that the two of them—Dorian and the painting—belong to different genres or media. This 
separation of beauties is only fortified by an application of the Preface’s philosophy, for if the 
painting is beautiful, this must be the result of the art rather than the subject matter, of form 
rather than content. It is paint on canvas which is beautiful, not the identity of the sitter.  
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Dorian’s delight at his own painted image may be seen as narcissistic, an epithet that has 
been leveled, somewhat appropriately, at Dorian in a number of the aforementioned articles; 
Riquelme, for example, makes much of this, suggesting that Paterism is inherently narcissistic, 
with Wilde ‘Echo-ing’ a criticism of Pater over the course of the novel. Yet a comparison 
between the novel and the myth itself will illustrate how different the scenarios are. Narcissus 
falls in love with his reflection without knowing its identity, which is to say, Narcissus is not 
narcissistic: he does not love his reflection out of vanity, but out of objective aesthetic 
appreciation. In Wilde’s scenario, the portrait can best be likened to the reflection in the water, 
and Dorian’s repudiation of if it something like Narcissus splashing the reflection away, 
something that mythological aesthete—really king of aesthetes, an aesthete at the cost of his own 
life—would never dream of doing. Dorian is the inversion of the myth; he wishes to destroy the 
object he can observe for the sake of preserving the unseen object: himself.   
Though the origin of Dorian’s pleasure is ambiguous—has he derived pleasure from the 
painting and proceeded to mistake its beauty for his own? or is his pleasure at the painting solely 
because he is its subject?—the fatal aesthetic mistake has already been made: Dorian has 
somehow conflated his own beauty with that of the painting. 59 But for Dorian, who hasn’t the 
capacity to look upon himself perpetually the way Narcissus does by the water, only the painting 
can function as a true aesthetic object. As such his demand that “the picture…change, and I…be 
always what I am now,” (28) is a self-denial in the acquisition of personal aesthetic pleasure. 
Henry has already called the portrait, “one of the greatest things in modern art,” and Dorian is 
denying himself the pleasure of this art for the sake of an object—himself—that he is incapable 
of enjoying aesthetically.  
 
59 Potentially a further variation on the Narcissus subject: here, Narcissus-Dorian likes the image because it is 
himself, but unlike with Narcissus, it is not an image of himself because it is a work of art rather than a reflection.  
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 This means that for Dorian to adopt Lord Henry’s ideology with regard to his own person 
is automatically to pervert it—it is to turn his beauty into unaesthetic pleasure by applying it 
toward some other end. That he uses it for the sake of soliciting sexual pleasure from others—
uses it—is patently contradictory to the most significant of the aphorisms in Wilde’s preface: 
“All art is quite useless,” useless in its capacity as art—a painting may make good firewood, a 
peacock or swan a good meal, a beautiful woman a good sexual partner, but none of these uses is 
a function of their beauty. The point of origin for all of Dorian’s crimes can be located in this 
moment where, by conflating one’s own beauty with one’s own pleasure, aesthetic pleasure is 
eliminated and wholly replaced by the sensual.  
In this light some of the later episodes come to have radically altered, amoral meanings. 
Ellmann sees Sybil Vane as an antithesis to Dorian, who gives up art for the joys of life, (317) a 
moralizing interpretation that once again contradicts the Preface. Actually, the episode is wholly 
consistent with the Preface provided one is not tempted to read it in an overly rational manner, as 
a step on the path of Dorian’s corruption. Instead, in keeping with the spirit of Wilde’s maxims, 
art, especially a novel such as Dorian Gray whose content is so unrealistic, ought to be read by 
its own unique aesthetic logic. “All art is both surface and symbol,” so let us read this ‘romantic’ 
episode—whose surface is a sentimental love affair—symbolically. Its purpose is not to be 
derived from a causal relationship to the plot that precedes it. Rather, it is an extremely close 
variation on the theme already outlined in the ‘pact’ scene, now presented to Dorian from the 
outside so that he might observe rather than just participating in it.  
Sybil’s transformation mirrors Dorian’s choice almost exactly, albeit now embodied in a 
character he can observe. Beginning as a Shakespearean actress who seems somehow to recreate 
the fantastical heroines she portrays, she is an aesthetic object for Dorian, and so can be likened 
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to the painting. Her paralyzing love for Dorian at the point that he rejects is her is not unlike 
Henry’s admiration in content (though not in character), because she has made Dorian the object 
of scrutiny rather than herself. This shift mirrors the transference of ‘soul’ from man to picture 
by not only depriving him of the aesthetic object, but illustrating the aesthetic hollowness of 
being oneself the object of another’s devotion (even one’s own—a separate self, the subject to 
one’s own object). She is Dorian’s decision objectified for him, now marked by the displeasure 
or at least indifference that it will inevitably bring. Even her name, if one is so inclined to make 
this sort of observation, is prophetic of the perils of Dorian’s anti-aesthetic narcissism.   
 Later, the conscious rejection of a moral interpretation can be derived somewhat 
allegorically from the fate of the painter Basil. This is not to say that each character, or even 
Basil himself, represents a given idea in the manner of more old-fashioned allegories. But 
certainly it is obvious enough that Basil embodies the moral voice of the book. Dorian’s murder 
of him is only the dramatic culmination of a process that has been in evidence practically since 
the novel’s beginning. It is difficult to imagine that anyone would find Basil’s idealism more 
interesting than Henry’s sarcasm, but if in the first scene one feels inclined to ‘root’ for the 
former, in each of Basil’s later appearances he grows progressively more tiresome, both to the 
reader and to Dorian. By the time when, before his death, he cries, “This is blasphemy!” (145) 
the reader’s quiet laughter ought to indicate well enough Wilde’s intention in depicting the 
novel’s conscience.60 Metaphorically, then, his death eliminates the possibility for that sort of 
commentary in the world Wilde has created. This does not imply, however, an actual rejection of 
 
60 The fact that Wilde suggested that, “Basil is what I think I am: Lord Henry what the world thinks me: Dorian is 
what I would like to be—in other ages perhaps.” (Ellmann, 319) need not contradict this assertion about his place in 
the novel. Often our conceptions of ourselves are unbecoming of cloying to others. Wilde was prescient enough not 
use it as the focus of his novel; with regard to the comment attributed to Wilde that, “in every first novel the hero is 
the author as Christ or Faust,” he avoided the mistake made by many other first-time novelists by choosing the latter. 
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morality, any less than a place where a portrait and a man can exchange features can be itself 
likened to reality. It rejects morality as a standard for judging the aesthetic. 
 Interestingly, Basil’s own evolving feeling toward the painting parallels Dorian’s in its 
‘narcissism,’ that is, in its inability to judge the aesthetic object as separated from human content. 
When Basil says, “I felt, Dorian, that I had told too much, that I had put too much of myself into 
it,” (109) one is reminded of Gogol’s religious interpretation of the completed first volume of the 
irreligious Dead Souls or Wordsworth as inadequate critic of Lyrical Ballads; the artwork has 
been made, and it stands apart from its creator’s attempts to incorporate it into his life as it is at 
some later point in time, with new emotions or new philosophies. What precisely does Basil fear 
with regard to his painting? That it might reveal his affection for Dorian and be considered 
publicly inappropriate? Perhaps, though this would of course have, by Wilde’s standards, no 
bearing on the work’s aesthetic value. In any case this is not the tone of the passage. He loves 
Dorian, and for him the painting is evocative of some unhappiness with regard to that. All of 
which, of course, has nothing really to do with the artwork in and of itself—it is merely a portrait 
now, and contains no human emotions though it may be perfectly capable of evoking them. In a 
way Basil is the greater narcissist than Dorian, for he looks at the beautiful painting of someone 
else and all he can see is himself.  
Yet to distinguish between media in the two artworks—Dorian and the painting—does 
not explain their interchange at the novel’s conclusion. More than in the ‘pact,’ a moral reading 
might seem inescapable in the final scene, and yet this moment just as easily demands an 
aesthetic understanding. Chiasmos for the sake of symmetry? Symmetry as hallmark of the 
aesthetic? Certainly, and before analyzing the symbol itself, it is essential to note that this 
chiastic gesture must, of necessity, be more essential to the ending than any moralizing or 
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aestheticizing analysis can be. By concluding the novel in this manner, Wilde outlined a broad 
structure the episodes of which (excerpting the first and last) are of relatively little importance as 
structure, a neat, almost ternary effect of pact-fall-reversal which is intuitively appropriate 
regardless of meaning. This is the foundation of the aesthetic as expressed in Pater, it precedes 
the analytical, and the moment one begins even to be cognizant of the effect, he has already lost 
it.  
 In the chapters leading up to the novel’s denouement, Dorian has become frustrated and 
to an extent benumbed. Such a development is a cliché under a moral reading, trials of the sort of 
frustrated demonic figure encountered in Wilde’s great uncle Charles Maturin’s novel Melmoth 
the Wanderer, whose title character seeks only to escape a life of power and immortality 
rendered undesirable by evil. Yet this interpretation is rather prudish, and as such inapplicable to 
Wilde’s novel. Are we really to suppose that Oscar Wilde is suggesting one would tire of sexual 
or aesthetic stimulation provided one were offered enough of it? Nor is there any reason why 
moral corruption would deter someone from an infinite of pleasure. Actually, the numbness has 
been foreshadowed in the romance with Sybil Vane, and is logically deducible from the anti-
aesthetic nature of the pact. Admittedly, Wilde’s version of Faust is rather limited in his options, 
remaining his whole life so to speak in an equivalent of Auerbach’s Tavern (abandoning his own 
Gretchen in the process), but the sort of endless pursuits that mark Goethe’s work were not 
present in Wilde’s novel to begin with. One must not suppose Dorian would necessarily tire of 
them under different circumstances. 
Instead, this development in Dorian’s character must be understood aesthetically in order 
to necessitate the novel’s conclusion. It has been suggested that Wilde would scoff at the 
possibility of growing tired of sex or art; what has made Dorian tired is that in a sense, he has 
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been barred from enjoying either of these. Symbolically, Dorian has denied himself aesthetic 
pleasure for the sake of more hedonistic pleasure, but as has been shown, he has really denied 
himself the acquisition of any pleasure at all not originating from his own self. The suicide 
symbolically reverses this process. Abandoning narcissism, he becomes a true Narcissus, 
harming himself even as the picture’s beauty is preserved. The myth is intensified both through 
the supernatural and by merit of its action: Narcissus remains (to die) and so the image remains; 
Dorian kills himself and so the image is called into being. There is a moral, but it is an aesthetic 
one taken almost right out of Pater’s ‘Conclusion.’ Dorian’s hideous face is a surprise because 
we have grown accustomed to the beautiful one, but realistically it is a fitting symbol for human 
life, Keats’ generation wasted by old age in the face of the eternal urn, a symbol of Pater’s 
“awful brevity,” the idea that “we have an interval, and then our place knows us no more.” (152-
153) Metaphorically it takes Dorian the entire novel to acknowledge this fact, and only in death 
does he assume the face appropriate to the aesthetic subject—a face to whose beauty the subject 
must of necessity remain indifferent. In its stead we have the painting, restored to its original 
beauty, whose presence provides a sort of aesthetic redemption for Dorian. For both Pater and 
Wilde this moment constitutes, at least in understanding, “success in life,” because “the gem-like 
flame” can only be experienced through engaging with an object outside of oneself.  
 
II 
 In Salome, both play and character, one finds embodied many of the theories espoused in 
the Preface and body of Dorian Gray, without recourse to articulated philosophical argument and 
in a form much more suited to the earlier work’s content, that is, in much more beautiful form. 
Happily, the ideas remain the same. Like Dorian, Salome is beautiful; also like Dorian, she 
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desires pleasure. We can deduce the former from the obsessive attentions of Herod and 
Narraboth, the latter from her own obsessions with Iokanaan, which in turn yield some lovely 
speechmaking of her own (her speeches on the beauty of the Baptist’s features are probably more 
beautiful than anyone acting in that role, but this is beside the point). This attachment to 
Iokanaan is telling of the divergence between the two title characters, for Salome, though similar 
to Dorian as an object in the sight of others—if possibly not so irresistible, though then again 
Dorian was never asked to contend with a larger than life figure of fanatical purity like St. Ursula 
or Margaret the Virgin—does not make the same ‘narcissistic’ mistake he does, instead directing 
her gaze outward toward an object of beauty other than herself.  
 It would probably take a devout Christian to see any impropriety thus far on the part of 
Salome, and from the standpoint of either the aesthete or sensualist, the only deviant among the 
many characters in their elaborate hierarchy of lusts is Iokanaan, whom one might facetiously 
say is duly punished with death for his celibacy (read: prudery).  Rather, her immorality is 
located in the demand for the execution of Iokanaan, her deviancy in making love to his severed 
head. And both of these can just as easily be read as a turn away from a proper, Paterian 
appreciation of the aesthetic object.  
As I suggested earlier, the aesthetic quality of an object must not be enjoyed in a 
utilitarian manner; in this and the earlier case utilitarian means a sexual manner. As James Joyce, 
also disciple, in his way, of Pater’s, put it in his 1918 play Exiles: 
  
RICHARD: Do you kiss everything that is beautiful for you? 
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ROBERT: Everything—if it can be kissed…..and so I kiss it because it is beautiful. And 
what is a woman? A work of nature too, like a stone or a flower or a bird. A kiss is an act 
of homage. 
RICHARD: It is an act of union between man and woman. Even if we are often led to 
desire through the sense of beauty can you say that the beautiful is what we desire? 
[Italics added] (21-22) 
 
The incongruence of these two impulses—desire versus the appreciation of beauty—is first 
encapsulated in the earlier-mentioned scene in which Salome appreciates Iokanaan and is 
subsequently rejected by him. Each time he insults her and each time she replies with a negation 
of her earlier aesthetic evaluation she has allowed desire, in this case thwarted desire, to 
supersede objective aesthetic judgment. This is by ordinary standards perfectly natural or human, 
but it does work to suppress the aesthete in her. “Your body is hideous,” she says, “it is the body 
of a leper….your hair is horrible,” (305), and we know that none of these criticisms are accurate 
because Salome has told us exactly the opposite one moment before. The insults of the insulted 
girl here have replaced the objective judgments that “nothing in the world is so white as your 
body….nothing in the world is so black as your hair.” (304-305) 
 Although her phrasing appears to change positive evaluations into negative ones, really, it 
is more accurately summarized by paraphrasing Joyce as an evolution from “a sense of beauty” 
to “desir[ing]” the beautiful, a process probably unique to the appreciation of human beauty, and 
probably necessary in some degree to the act of reproduction. Salome reenacts this process in the 
last of her speeches on Iokanaan’s appearance, this time without requiring his insults, when she 
says: “There is nothing in the world so red as your mouth…I will kiss your mouth.” (306) From 
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an aesthetic perspective, this is where depravity begins, because it is by kissing the mouth that 
she can no longer see the mouth. As in Dorian Gray, aesthetic degradation begins the moment 
appreciation is exchanged for utilitarian pleasure. “All beauty is,” or at the very least ought to be, 
“quite useless.” 
 It is only fitting that those acts by which Salome will be judged abnormal in the most 
normative sense—murder and necrophilia—will also be extensions of her aesthetic errors. 
Logically the eventual decomposition of Iokanaan’s body would have made it a rather less 
attractive specimen, but Wilde chooses not to wait, emphasizing that, much like Dorian Gray and 
the portrait, Salome has destroyed the object of beauty in the pursuit of her own desire. As she 
cradles the head of John the Baptist, it is important to note the change in tense from her earlier 
speech: 
 
Nothing in the world was so white as your body. Nothing in the world was so black as 
your hair. Nothing in the world so red as your mouth….But what does it matter? What 
does it matter? I have kissed your mouth, Iokanaan, I have kissed your mouth. (330-331)  
 
Salome’s desire has spoiled the object of her aesthetic delight, but she no longer cares, desire 
having completely replaced appreciation. It is at her most immoral that she is also at her most 
unaesthetic—her enjoyment is no longer disinterested in a Kantian sense. 
  By its conclusion, Salome has restaged the dilemma of Dorian Gray in more stark and 
abstract terms. Yet this dimension of the play, which dominates its second half, is also an 
intensified inversion of the structure of the first half, which focuses primarily on sexual desire. In 
the many moments in the play which do not concentrate exclusively on the characters of Salome 
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or Iokanaan, Wilde introduces an elaborate series of desiring subjects and indifferent objects, 
almost soap-operatic in its complexity, and largely eschewing questions of aesthetics in favor of 
more purely sexual desire, a process which will both intensified and inverted in the play’s second 
half in Salome’s infatuation with Iokanaan. As in the second part, these desires are consistently 
frustrated, though here for the opposite reason. 
 And before we examine the nature of these relationships, one must point out again: none 
of these desires are implicitly all that strange and as such are in themselves especially decadent. 
That Herod desires his teenage stepdaughter might be deemed inappropriate, but it is certainly 
not unnatural, any less than his preference for her over her mother. Nor is Salome’s desire for the 
religious figure of John the Baptist. In fact the series is entirely comprised of normal desires right 
up until its asexual conclusion: Herodias for Herod, Herod and the Syrian for Salome, Salome 
for Iokanaan, concluding in Iokanaan’s obsession with Jesus in a gesture paralleled by the 
arguing Jews’ chaste obsession with their own messiah (or with religious dogma in general). Of 
all these, only Iokanaan and the Jews are unnatural with regard to desire, unless, as Ellmann has 
suggested, Iokanaan harbors a homosexual desire for Jesus.61 
 Having outlined the various characters’ roles with relation to subject and object, we 
begin, unlike in Dorian Gray, with only the quotidian: sexual desire. Herod’s perversity is 
manifested in the strangely fetishistic demands he makes of Salome, presumably based on the 
knowledge that he will be unable to have intercourse with her. He asks her: 
 
 
61 This interpretation seems to me to detract from the visceral insanity of most of Iokanaan’s speeches. If his 
religion can be said to be somewhat eroticized, it isn’t as an extension of natural—(homo)sexual—desire; Wilde 
depicts him as depraved precisely because he is a monomaniacal ascetic who rejects Salome in favor of piety, i.e. his 
love for Jesus isn’t depraved for its sexuality but for its asexuality.  
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“Salome…wet your red lips in [the wine] while I drain the cup….I love to see the mark 
of your little teeth in a fruit. Bite just a little bit of this fruit, and I will eat the rest. ” (310-
311) 
 
Herod desires Salome, but settles for tooth marks or some of her spittle on his fruit. Naturally the 
fruit can offer nothing of what he really desires. Though hardly aesthetic, it functions in the same 
way to sex with Salome that kissing does to looking at the end of the play. The exchange is 
paralleled in Salome’s coquettish seduction of the Young Syrian Captain, an offer that mirrors 
Herod’s unhealthy requests:  
 
“You will do this for me, Narraboth, and tomorrow…I will let fall for you a flower, a 
little green flower.” (301) 
 
Salome’s gesture makes it seem, accurately, that there is a great deal more perversity in courtly 
love than there is in promiscuity. It would be degrading enough that he should obey her for 
sexual favors; that she is certain he will do so for so little is the mark of depravity in this scene. 
The flower will do nothing for Narraboth by way of what he desires, and merely possesses some 
peripheral association to the desired object without the potential to give any pleasure. This sort of 
self-inflicted frustration culminates in the Dance of the Seven Veils, where Salome wholly 
embodies an object that can be observed but not enjoyed. Just as Salome cannot enjoy the 
aesthetic attributes of Iokanaan through sex, neither can Herod or the Syrian Captain derive 
sexual satisfaction from an ‘aesthetic’ object associated with Salome. Art can no more be useful 
than objects of pure utility can be enjoyed as art. 
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 As in Dorian Gray, a broad chiastic structure is revealed as aesthetic objects are flanked 
on either side by utilitarian lust: lust-aesthetic; aesthetic-lust. Each pair’s inappropriate 
compliment frustrates the expectations that precede it. All of which reinforces the sort of truth 
expounded Preface, that aesthetic satisfaction is to be derived by different standards in a different 
medium. To mistake the flower for the girl is ultimately just as foolish as mistaking a man for his 
portrait. As Wilde says both overtly and allegorically, beauty, as all pleasure, can only be 
enjoyed within the bounds that it itself defines.  
 
That these two works engage with aesthetic concerns as opposed to moral matters is then 
as evident in the text as it is in Wilde’s Preface. One supposes that those who see a moral agenda 
in his work do so because, were the events depicted real, they would require precisely that sort of 
admonitory criticism. Dorian and Salome are not people, but characters, and their world is not 
life, but a book, a principle whose simplicity belies how often it is ignored, and in turn insisted 
upon, not least by Wilde himself: “vice and virtue are to the artist materials for an art.” One may 
find each in each in Dorian Gray and Salome, but it does not follow that one can find any sort of 
commentary upon them.  
 In both of these works deeply concerned with human appreciation of the beautiful, Wilde 
as a follower of Pater and as an aesthete in his own right constructs dramatic situations whose 
substance is totally in keeping with his own theories of art. The association of immorality with 
aestheticism, the accusations of narcissism, indeed the use of the Myth of Narcissus as a standard 
of vanity rather than of objective aesthetic appreciation, perhaps bespeak less an insufficient 
standard of conduct in Pater’s or Wilde’s Hedonism than our own society’s inability to accept 
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aestheticism as a legitimate avenue for amoral pleasure, and beauty as something objective and 
separable from purely human considerations.  
 
III 
A telling analysis of the distinction between morality and aestheticism from a writer self-
consciously opposed to certain aestheticist aims is evidenced in Henry James’ short story “The 
Author of Beltraffio,” and can thus be used s a more temperate measurement of a serious artist’s 
attitude toward the tension between morals and art. James is recorded as having grave suspicions 
of Wilde and his coterie,62 and while his own writing is hardly devoid either of reflections on the 
nature of art or the concern with individual style, he was perhaps too judicious a man to condone 
what may have appeared to him rather a fanatical devotion to the purely abstract nature of beauty 
as divorced from its human concerns.  
Yet neither, it seems, could he support what must have appeared an equally fanatical 
obsession with morals—however much such an emphasis must appear to many as simply the 
norm, the expected conduct of civilized man—and it is for this reason that an anecdote pertaining 
to a member of Pater and Wilde’s circle offered such promise in its ideological tensions that he 
thought it was fit about which to frame the story in question. The anecdote was based on an 
episode in the life of John Addington Symonds, a writer in the aesthetic or decadent mode 
remembered now for his fluent and often evocative histories, particularly of writers in the 
Renaissance. His son having died, it was rumored that his wife refused to read her husband’s 
work, which may have been interpreted as a revulsion to his aestheticism or, more likely, his 
homosexuality, the latter perhaps being identified with the former.  
 
62 As described, for example, in Richard Ellman’s essay, “Henry James Among the Aesthetes,” found in A Long the 
Riverrun: Selected Essays. 
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James’ short story concerns the narration of a grotesque incident by a young American 
devotee of the English writer Mark Ambient, whose work is described by the narrator in terms 
obviously intended to evoke the movement to which Symons subscribed,  
 
[…] you will not have forgotten the commotion, I may even say the scandal, produced by 
Mark ambient’s masterpiece. It was the most complete presentation that had yet been 
made of the gospel of art; it was a kind of aesthetic war-cry. People had endeavored to 
sail nearer to “truth” in the cut of their sleeves and the shape of their sideboards; but there 
had not as yet been, among English novels, such an example of beauty of execution and 
“intimate” importance of theme. Nothing had been done in that line from the point of 
view of art for art. (29-30)63 
 
We have here, quite explicitly, all the trappings of the aesthete. Art for art is, frankly, a more 
reasonable variation of the phrase “art for art’s sake,” and anyway a literal return to that phrase’s 
origin in Gautier, “l’art pour l’art,” while “the gospel of art,” and “an aesthetic war cry,” reflect, 
respectively, the quasi-religious adherence to beauty of the aesthetes and what was then perhaps 
the avant-garde. So too is the apparent “scandal” caused by his work, presumably for its 
‘immoral’ emphasis on aestheticist qualities—though some writers were decidedly transgressive 
in their tastes, this does not seem to be true of Ambient, and in any case, scandal was to become 
something of necessity for artists in the succeeding decades.  
 
63 All James quotes taken from: 
 James, Henry. Eight Tales from the Major Phase. New York: W.W. Norton and co, 1958.  
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 More telling, perhaps, are the narrator’s descriptions of the movement to which Ambient 
is opposed. Beauty is opposed to truth, but truth of a certain sort. Now the concern with truth has 
already been seen to be problematic in light of aestheticist ideology in particular and modernity 
in general—as Pater says in the opening to his Conclusion: “To regard all things and principles 
of things as inconstant modes or fashions has more and more become the tendency of modern 
thought,” a fact which, if itself true, makes the pursuit of truth a highly questionable enterprise. 
But it is still more telling how the narrator views the pursuit of truth. Coming down from his 
rather romantic image of “sailing” towards truth, he mocks that the pursuit of truth is attained by 
a writer achieving accuracy, “in the cut of their sleeves and the shape of their sideboards.” Truth 
here is quite a quotidian thing, because it is none other than conventional realism, obsessed, so 
the narrator implies, with the accumulation of uninteresting facts.64 Indeed, this pejorative 
description of realism and, by extension, reality itself, only serves to explain the reasoning 
behind the aestheticist creed: if reality is all sleeves and sideboards, who has use for anything but 
art?  
 It is ironic that Ambient is a cause for such scandal given his relatively domesticated life 
and manner. True, his writings have some conventional trappings of  “exquisite taste,” that to a 
degree resemble some of James’ own, as in Roderick Hudson, “the old hill-cities of Tuscany, the 
look of certain lonely grass-grown places which, in the past, had echoed with life; he understood 
the great artists, he understood the spirit of the Renaissance; he understood; everything.” (31) 
Clearly, James is not without a sense of irony in treating his young narrator, and the naiveté in 
believing that the love of art constitutes “everything,” seems perhaps as foolish (or, perhaps 
almost as foolish) as the belief in pure realism. But if these concerns do not constitute the 
 
64 cf James Woods’ criticism of Julian Barnes: “who reads fiction for a “wealth of information?” (The Broken 
Estate, 235) 
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entirety with which writing might be concerned, neither does love of Rome or Florence bespeak 
some heinous transgression of morality to any but the most Puritanically-minded despot. Nor 
does Ambient himself seem in any way a libertine; rather, he seems a perfectly amiable, courtly 
sort of country gentleman, open-handed and generous to his overeager acolyte while restricting 
the majority of his personal attentions to his family, his sister, his wife, and above all his son. 
One is left to wonder what could possibly exist in his books to elicit the sandal to which the 
narrator has alluded. If it is not anything objectively immoral or corruptive, it seems that an 
emphasis on beauty itself is perceived by certain righteous partisans as scandalous, a belief quite 
in keeping with the survey we have observed in the introduction, in Plato, in the hatred of 
literature, and, more recently, in a politicization of art that is markedly anti-aesthetic.  
 The somewhat absurd drama that ensues, based upon Symons relations with his wife, 
originates in the fact that Mrs. Ambient is precisely one of those shocked and scandalized by her 
husband’s writings. Herself both beautiful and, amusingly, named Beatrice, we learn quite soon 
that whatever heaven ambient believed she might lead him is not the heaven in which she herself 
believes. For the narrator describes her as less a Rossetti (no Dante for this Beatrice!) than, “a 
Reynolds or a Lawrence, with no more far-fetched note in her composition than a cold, ladylike 
candor and a well-starched muslin dress.” (45) If perhaps all beauty is in its way chaste, then 
hers is more chaste than most, or marked by a peculiar form of chastity, not the disinterestedness 
of Kant but rather the prudery of the school marm. One wonders that Ambient didn’t see it…but 
then, perhaps even the aesthete makes no such subtle distinctions when he is enraptured by 
another person, and in any case, the comparisons the narrator makes, which James obviously 
enjoys having him make, are ridiculous to life and presumably to the imagined world of the 
work. But it is import to note that her aesthetics, that of 18th century propriety (though one might 
Amir Dagan 204 
find in the paintings of Thomas Lawrence an almost cloying premonition of later luxuriance), no 
“no far fetched note,” as though her own physical composition entails her own code of propriety. 
It is a sad irony for her husband that this image is one of “candor.”  
 After several brief scenes intimating Beatrice’s strange protectiveness of their son 
Dolcino, whom she claims is too fragile and ill to remain in the company of his father, 
Ambient’s sister, after the narrator claims Ambient’s wife perceived him as “a fanatic,” explains 
Beatrice’s motives.  
 
She assured me her brother and his wife had no other difference but this--one that she 
thought his writings immoral and his influence pernicious. It was a fixed idea; she was 
afraid of these things for the child….from her point of view, you know, she has a dread of 
my brother's influence on the child on the formation of his character, his 'ideals,' poor 
little brat, his principles. It's as if it were a subtle poison or a contagion--something that 
would rub off on his tender sensibility when his father kisses him or holds him on his 
knee. If she could she'd prevent Mark from even so much as touching him. … It comes 
from Beatrice's being so religious and so tremendously moral…And then of course we 
mustn't forget," my companion added, a little unexpectedly, to this polyglot proposition, 
"that some of Mark's ideas are--well, really--rather impossible, don't you know?" (53) 
 
The irony of her aesthetic depiction is apparent. For while we do learn she is of religious 
temperament and “so tremendously” moral, we must conclude it is morality not of the 
transcendental but the Puritanical type. The opposition between aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
concerns is framed in a way defined by the non-aesthete, which is to say, while the aesthete 
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might not vie his production as directly antithetical to non-aesthetic concerns, the non-aesthete 
views aestheticism as “immoral,” as something directly contrary to good—precisely the origin, 
one concludes, of the aforementioned scandal. It remains to be seen (or at least guessed) whether 
Ambient’s writings are immoral or merely amoral—what are the precise nature of the ideas his 
sister calls “impossible?” But it’s fairly obvious that their self-evident immorality would render 
this question about aesthetics moot, and this does not seem to be James’ intention, if only 
because answering a self-evident question is of no intellectual interest whatsoever. Assuming the 
best of Ambient, that is the amorality of his writings, Beatrice seems to believe that to entertain 
this interest is implicitly to corrupt “principles” and “ideals.” 
 The question one must ask is whether, as Beatrice seems to conclude, aesthetic amorality 
is in the end immorality as well. Now there are several ways to perceive this question. It may be 
that amorality in one sphere of existence  (say, the arts) means amorality in all, and it would not 
take much to view a purely aesthetic, amoral existence in life as morally repellent (imagine for 
example someone who views the formal organization of bodies he has murdered as material of 
aesthetic delight, which isn’t strictly illogical). In this case the narrators “fanaticism” might 
imply, to Beatrice’s ears at least, that what one loves in books is also all one loves in life 
(naturally he may be a fanatic with regard to books alone, but the ironic treatment of the narrator 
implies this is not the whole truth). Alternately, one may suppose that morality may be excluded 
from dogmatically aesthetic art and that the purveyors of said art will not apply their dogmatism 
to their conduct in life outside of art. Presumably we see this reality in Ambient’s treatment of 
Dolcino (although his precious beauty, somewhat comically rendered, may beg the question of 
whether Ambient would be equally attached to his child were he ugly). In any case, Beatrice’s 
dogmatism points to the question of whether aestheticism is in its very nature an affront to 
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morality, or whether it is only an affront to bourgeois morals, again, the world of sleeves and 
sideboards.  
The nature of such work as James depicts it is treated at some length in a monologue by 
Ambient, replete with all of James’ typical ellipticism and ambiguity. After lamenting his 
previous efforts imperfections, Ambient attempts to express his mission as a writer in his newest 
work: 
 
This new affair must be a golden vessel, filled with the purest distillation of the actual; 
and oh how it worries me, the shaping of the vase, the hammering of the metal! I have to 
hammer it so fine, so smooth; I don't do more than an inch or two a day. And all the 
while I have to be so careful not to let a drop of the liquor escape! When I see the kind of 
things Life herself, the brazen hussy, does, I despair of ever catching her peculiar trick. 
She has an impudence, Life! If one risked a fiftieth part of the effects she risks!  (56) 
 
If Beatrice is a Puritan, then her husband must be a monk, and not merely one of the ordinary 
type, but rather of the ancient, ascetic ideal, like St Symeon the Stylite, albeit with rather more to 
show for his obsession. Naturally they are both fanatics. But Ambient’s obsession is for a 
perfectionism that is perhaps not familiar to most people. Not exclusive to artists, ambient sees 
his vocation as one in which his creation is perfect on its own terms, and while the production of 
a scientist or philosopher is substantively different than an artist’s, the obsession with “getting it 
right” must be roughly the same. As pertains to art, this surely is an expression, though not 
necessarily an echo, of Kant’s notion of purposiveness, though it must be added the impulse 
Ambient described must have preceded Kant’s term by the length of most of human history. The 
Amir Dagan 207 
artist, depicted here, perceives art not as a contingent object, but one having an implicitly perfect 
form, a sort of objective teleology. Just as Kant claims beauty appears to have the nature of 
objective truth, ambient, as surely countless other artists, writers, composers, etc, is satisfied only 
when it has achieved the form that (without articulating it in these terms) at the very least 
conform to Kant’s definition, and quite possibly exceeds it.  
 The question remains whether this form of fanaticism is directly in conflict with moral 
considerations, as Beatrice believes, and to the degree that we can determine this for ambient, 
one needs to tease something fairly precise from James’ intentionally ambiguous metaphor. 
Ambient refers to his project as “a vessel, filled with the purest distillation of the actual,” a 
definition that perhaps shies away from the more extreme definitions with which Wilde has 
provided us. A straightforward reading would suppose that “vessel” and “actual” correspond 
roughly to form and content. And it is true that when he says, “the shaping of the vase, the 
hammering of the metal! I have to hammer it so fine, so smooth,” he seems to be referring to 
formal considerations, or maybe the more local concern with style—many writers thus obsessed 
have claimed to, “do more than an inch or two a day.” 
What is the “actual,” the “liquor?” When he refers to the “risks,” life takes, he seems to 
be saying that life is full of marvelous aesthetic effects without, it seems, the fine considerations 
artists put into their work, without any presiding genius, a sentiment which could certainly be 
construed as irreligious (who, Beatrice might reply, is the genius but God?), without by secular 
standards appearing immoral. But it appears to me that the liquor is less content than the 
sensation of reality, and in this respect Ambient is less a modernist or pure aesthete than a sort of 
impressionist, consistent with Conrad’s exhortation in The Nigger of the Narcissus to, “make you 
see.” What is in any case clear is that while he does appear to view life from the same angle as he 
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does writing, this view is just bespeaks a certain obsessive yet fastidious concern with aesthetics, 
and does not necessarily imply a disinterest in other spheres of attention. Ambient’s language, 
furthermore, is singularly chaste, as to an extent is all disinterested contemplation of beauty (life 
is a ‘hussy” presumably because she pours out her favors lavishly and indiscriminately). We see 
that the fault in Beatrice’s eyes is not dissimilar to many of the criticisms so far leveled against 
beauty, from Plato to the medieval church to the critics of the Balthus painting—it is a “with us 
or against us” mentality—if Ambient’s primary obsession is not congruous with Beatrice’s, then 
he must be her implacable enemy. It is not that aesthetic concerns are objectively immoral, but 
rather that for the Puritan mind, any concern deviating from theirs is utterly insupportable.  
 To the degree that the story’s denouement is appropriate rather than, for James, garish—
Beatrice forbids their sick child from seeing a doctor until it is too late, one may view the plot as 
a formal expression of the dogmatism of her position. And here it is important to note that 
whatever his own fanaticism, it does not interfere with Ambient’s other duties. It is the anti 
aesthete who is rendered grotesque by his or her hatred of Beauty, while the aesthete has never 
made claims for beauty’s supremacy in all aspects of life. The hatred of beauty seems to dilate 
the reality of beauty until said hatred obscures the nature of life itself. When ambient finally 
opens up a bit about his wife, we see a description of a well-intentioned philistine not dissimilar 
from Ortega’s of the mass man: 
 
‘She’s a very nice woman, extraordinarily well-behaved, upright and clever and with a 
tremendous lot of good sense about a good many matters.  Yet her conception of a 
novel…is a thing so false that it makes me blush.  It’s a thing so hollow, so dishonest, so 
lying, in which life is so blinked and blinded, so dodged and disfigured, that it makes my 
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ears burn.[‘]  ….[‘]There’s a hatred of art, there’s a hatred of literature—I mean of the 
genuine kinds.  Oh the shams—those they’ll swallow by the bucket!’ (60) 
 
What, one wonders, is in the “sham?” Ambient does not make it clear. We may have to judge 
this from our own experience, or the literature that in his own time is set in opposition to the 
aesthete’s. Now it is hard to suppose that Beatrice is fond of, for example, Henry James. The 
sham must be different or style from what he calls literature, or otherwise different in content. If 
the content is moralizing and domesticated in tone, that answers the question easily enough. But 
ambient specifically says that the sham is her “conception of a novel,” rather than its subject.  
middlebrow conception is inescapable.  Yet it might be too simple to say merely that the hatred 
of art as evinced by Beatrice is ressentiment or some sort of inferiority complex. Perhaps it is 
merely that, confronted with an aesthetic too difficult or complex for her to access, she comes to 
believe that it is unnatural—which, as artifice, it no doubt is—and that this remove from the 
normal run of things is analogous in some way to a remove from ethical standards as well.  
 Yet who, at the last, is unethical? It is clear that the fact Beatrice turns into monster who 
kills her own son doesn’t really provide any evidence of said characteristic in reality—owners of 
factories may be awful men, but making a character with said profession evil proves nothing but 
that the author has chosen to depict one in this way. This is not the sort of insight literature really 
can give. It is rather in the postscript to the story that we see what may be understood of the 
whole affair, and the relation between beauty and extra-aesthetic concerns. Dolcino is dead, his 
parents are broken by the experience and soon to follow him. And yet we learn of a curious 
change of heart during Beatrice’s last days: 
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I ought to mention that the death of her child in some degree converted her. When the 
new book came out (it was long delayed) she read it over as a whole, and her husband 
told me that during the few supreme weeks before her death--she failed rapidly after 
losing her son, sank into a consumption and faded away at Mentone--she even dipped 
into the black "Beltraffio." (77-8) 
 
The whole issue is laid out in this quiet, almost amusing coda. It didn’t really matter. It was 
never about what she thought it was about. What really does a novel matter, when your son is 
dead? The same might be said of all the art-hatred we’ve shown. Is Balthus itself the molestation 
of a child? The question is not whether art has any obligation to morality, but whether it has 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Isak Dinesen and the Aristocracy of Art 
 
“ARISTOCRACY: Despise and empty it.” 
    -Flaubert, Dictionary of Accepted Ideas  
 
“But Père Hardouin observed that he had not got up at four o’clock every morning for forty years 
to think as all the world thought.”  
-Renan, Recollections of Youth 
 
 
All art is aristocratic. As art by its nature possesses a peculiar characteristic distinguishing it 
from all other human endeavor, and as that characteristic is susceptible to the faculty of 
judgment, which evaluates not information or base factuality but quality, the sum total of artistic 
creation is by merit of its very existence organized into an immense and intricate hierarchy. It is 
not for any individual to attempt to trace the intricacies of this hierarchy as he would the 
territories of nations or the lineage of kings, any more than one may say with any confidence that 
there, the sun setting over a glittering sea on this day is more pleasing than mist over the same 
purple waters the following morning, it is neither possible nor desirable, these taxonomies thick 
with webs and dust far from the open spaces they purport to measure. All that matters given the 
limited compass of human intellect and the still briefer span of human existence is that the 
hierarchy is known to exist, that in our cultivation and, more rarely, more importantly, in our 
creation of art, that we might strive to experience and make the very best. And the best of art is 
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the most beautiful, that possesses in the highest measure the quality that distinguishes art in the 
first place.  
 To say that aristocracy, as a word and a concept, has unpleasant associations, particularly 
in this hemisphere, would do little justice to the crazed, vitriolic hatred its very mention must 
undoubtedly inspire. The reasons for this are twofold, though related (as all things, it seems, are 
related—the discovery of these relations, delightful, their explication all too often tedious). Let 
us begin with the more obvious. Our nation, and all nations that purport to call themselves by 
those familiar self-appointed compliments—modern, enlightened, and, sigh, democratic—began 
their existence by, as is perhaps too often repeated, throwing off “the shackles” of monarchy. 
This was no doubt a good thing.  One dreams of such clear, physical shackles to throw off….but 
that is for another time. How in fact does it pertain? Surely Beethoven’s Sonata op. 109 has no 
more political control over the populace than does a basketball—rather less one supposes. So the 
degree to which art is aristocratic can have no obvious relation to an aristocracy of birth and the 
political and economic power thereby entailed. And as it would be ludicrous to connect the 
concept of aristocracy to mere wealth—to suppose that a billionaire selling screen time any more 
than one selling janitorial supplies would in any way be conceived of as an aristocrat—any 
species of political or economic power must be by its nature incongruous to the innate 
aristocracy of the beautiful. To associate beauty with political or economic power is to indulge a 
metaphor beyond the limits of reason—it is to impose frail intellectual connections upon a lived 
experience which in no way supports them, to an extent that is self-evidently absurd.  
 But political and economic resentments are deeply installed in the hearts of the 
oppressed, and even as new, more insidious forms of economic oppression are born or evolve the 
memory of old inequities remain in all the demos, even in the hearts of those purveyors of the 
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new inequities. How, one asks, when those that rule now are the sort of merchants whom 
Odysseus would beat as he did Thersites, whom the Baron de Charles would not deign to spit 
upon, how when neither Odysseus nor Charlus can be said physically even to exist, does the very 
concept of aristocracy offend? To understand that we must understand what aristocracy has come 
to mean. Only having done so may we afterwards install the pure and happy concept of beauty’s 
aristocracy.  
 Napoleon once called England ‘a nation of shopkeepers.’ What he meant to say was that 
England was a country full of materialist bourgeois; what he effectively implied is that such 
people are interested only in what you finds in stores, which of course means either goods or the 
money paid for them. His formulation is apt for the Anglophone world at large. It holds well for 
our American bourgeois, naturally, for our consumers, for our materialists in philosophy as well 
as in daily life: our empiricists, our positivists and the promoters of ‘scientism.’ The American 
manner of life is one perpetually obsessed with little things, little materials. Pascal observed that 
the “advantage of being well-born is that it sets a man on his way by the age of eighteen or 
twenty,” and de Tocqueville carried the observation to our time and nation by addressing the 
psychology of a man not well-born. He remarked of self-made, democratic men that “most of the 
rich men were formerly poor: most of those who now enjoy leisure were absorbed in business 
during their youth; the consequence of which is, that when they might have had a taste for study 
they had no time for it, and when the time is at their disposal, they no longer have the inclination. 
….A middling standard is fixed in America for human knowledge.” (47) We might broaden this 
into the idea of a taste for the extraordinary, and the capacity to excel at the extraordinary, which 
is all that that defines the aristocrat in art.  
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 As so much of human history has been governed by an aristocratic social structure, 
naturally much of human art has been formed under aristocratic political regimes. And perhaps it 
is true that those rulers, thankfully gone, associated the beauties of art with the waxing and 
waning of their own political fortunes. But as the sculptures of a dead religion may be viewed by 
us not merely for what they truly are, but for what they always were, in that regard which is most 
significant in them, and most unique, for their beauty, so too can we see in the dead structure of a 
political class something finer, which excludes their violence, their barbarism, until the values 
they treasured in brutal forms are ripened into something wholly beneficent and lovely. As 
Nietzsche wrote in the Genealogy of Morals, of the evolution the violent nobility which opposed 
the prudish resentment of judeo-christian morality: 
 
The root of the word coined for this, esthlos, signifies one who is, who possesses reality, 
who is actual, who is true; then, with a subjective turn, the true becomes the truthful: in 
this phase of conceptual transformation it becomes a slogan and catchword of the nobility 
and passes over into the sense of “noble” as distinct from the lying common man…until 
finally, after the decline of the nobility, the word is left to designate nobility of soul and 
becomes as it were ripe and sweet.  (I:5) 
 
So too with aristocracy, which now may signify the rule of the best. In art, the best is the most 
beautiful, and in the connoisseur, the man most capable of extracting the most intense and 
transcendent sensations from objects of beauty. 
 A noble title, now that nobility’s significance feels like an echo of a distant or forgotten 
world may—provided it is not associated either with a vulgar scion trading upon his name in the 
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hope of mercantile advancement or, more rarely, some des Esseintes whose unrigorous excess 
departs to the same degree, if inversely, from grace as his anemic body does the virile ones who 
founded the name to which he clings—a title, though it confers nothing really upon its owner, 
may possess a pleasant sort of echo upon the imagination, as those upon which Proust mused, 
evoking places and names and historical romances. It is like a pallid analogue to those artworks 
viewed now, divorced from either their ritual or theological purposes.  
 And that, one supposes, is the nobility which worked its way into Karen Blixen’s 
imagination, until it grew into the central metaphor for creativity watered by the evocations of art 
and history and the gorgeous ruins of Europe’s capitals and the cultivated civility of its 
countryside. And this despite the somewhat unseemly pride she took in her own title.  Born into 
a family of Jutland landowners and wealthy bourgeois, she was engaged at the age of 27 to 
Baron Bror Fredrik von Blixen-Finecke, whom she followed to Kenya—her experiences there 
were recounted in her well-known memoir Out of Africa.  In Africa she felt herself freed of 
convention, and to a degree, we may see this attitude recapitulating the idea of aristocracy as 
formed not in the minds of contemporary Europeans, but in Nietzsche, for whom nobility is itself 
a form of freedom.  
The degree to which Blixen identified with this culture informed both the subject matter 
and more importantly the manner of her stories. It is true that she has been most often identified 
with Scheherazade, a comparison she was apt herself to make and which the embedded structure 
of her tales immediately call to mind. More striking perhaps is her evocation and modernization 
of the heritage of European Romanticism. Neither of these allusions fit specifically into our 
discussion except to denote an expectation she places upon the reader unlike both the cultivated 
difficulty of high modernism and the proletarian simplicity of much American fiction, whose 
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politics rather than style find common cause with the anti-aestheticism prevalent in our 
institutions. This is the expectation of worldliness, and it is through her idea of worldliness that 
we may begin to define Dinesen’s reformulation of the concept of aristocracy and consequently 
our own universal definition of the aristocracy of art.65 
  
 Dinesen’s story “Babette’s Feast” concerns two aged daughters of a priest who years 
before had founded a “pious, ecclesiastical party or sect,” whose “members renounced the 
pleasures of this world, for the earth and all it held to them was but a kind of illusion, and the 
true reality was the New Jerusalem.” (21) The sisters, unfortunately named Martine and Phillippa 
after Martin Luther and Phillipe Melanchthon, eke out an ascetic existence along with the last 
remaining members, also aged, of their father’s sect, in a town, Berlevaag at the foothills of fjord 
in Norway. Yet years before they each had a fleeting brush with pleasure in the form of two 
suitors, an army officer, Lorens Loewenhielm and, “more distinguished,” the opera singer 
Achille Papin, whose chaste courtship of Phillipa ironically involves practicing Mozart’s la ci 
darem la mano. The suitors are promptly rebuffed with a prudery repressing, as Dinesen’s 
narrator suggests, “something in [their] own nature.” Fifteen years later, Papin begs Phillipa to 
 
65 Just as her eighteenth and nineteenth century settings create a charming and evocative mood—one which is 
distinctly different from that of historical fiction however accurate in its details, because its quality lies more in its 
aesthetic evocation than fact (compare the yellow sunset of her Italy with the red demi-monde of her Paris or the 
deep blues of her Denmark, all primarily aesthetic in effect)—her protagonists function less in relation to the unjust 
economic realities that permitted their existence and more as the evocation of our, more modern fairy tales: the 
glamorous romances of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Her eighteenth century France is not that of the 
Revolution (even if a story takes place in that time) but the powdered wigs and laughter and rich color of Fragonard, 
her Germany the Jena of Hegel and Holderlin, Bavaria of Ludwig II and the swan-drawn boat of Lohengrin. It is 
precisely the Europe that never existed and had ceased to even be imagined at the time she was writing, about a 
decade and a half after World War One, the Europe that continues to exist for every lover of its art.  
 But her use of the aristocracy is not only for the purpose of evoking romance. Their worldliness permits a 
modernized exploration of fictional matter of the kind one imagines in Renaissance Italian or Elizabethan courts 
listening to readings of Il Pastor Fido or Sidney’s Arcadia, so many d’Este sisters following the abstruse logic of 
Mirandola or Bembo’s intricate language games. Nothing requires explanation to these characters—their experience 
begins from a knowledge of fictional tropes. Their vague and often abstract conversations emerge from this 
familiarity with literature. 
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take the French refugee Babette as a serving woman. After years of labor, she wins a lottery, and 
uses the entirety of her winnings to give the sisters and their sect a fine French dinner, ultimately 
revealing that she had been the finest chef in Paris and, as she says, an artist.   
 The story has been obviously and rightfully read as an allegory for the relationship 
between hedonism and asceticism, pleasure and piety. Pope Francis has interestingly claimed it 
his favorite movie, “because it challenges us to look outside of ourselves and to see the beauty of 
God’s joy and mercy.”66 Susan Brantly, a scholar of Scandinavian literature, quotes Francis’ 
musings on the film in his Amoris Laetitia: 
 
The most intense joys in life arise when we are able to elicit joy in others, as a foretaste 
of heaven. We can think of the lovely scene in the film Babette’s Feast, when the 
generous cook receives a grateful hug and praise: ‘Ah, how you will delight the angels!’ 
It is a joy and a great consolation to bring delight to others, to see them enjoying 
themselves. This joy, the fruit of fraternal love, is not that of the vain and self-centred, 
but of lovers who delight in the good of those whom they love, who give freely to them 
and thus bear good fruit. 
 
She claims, “one can surmise that Blixen would have been delighted by such an illustrious 
member of her audience, especially given her fascination with the aesthetic aspects of the 
Catholic church,” an attitude which strikes one as consistent with her aesthetic reimagining of 
social definitions such as aristocracy. Unsurprisingly, there have been numerous religious 
readings of the story. Thomas J. Curr claims that, “Babette’s relationship to the puritanical 
 
66 Kosloski. Philip. “Why Does Pope Francis want us to watch the movie “Babette’s Feast”?” Aleteia. 21 Nov.
 2016. 
https://aleteia.org/2016/11/21/why-does-pope-francis-want-us-to-watch-the-movie-babettes-feast/ 
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community as allegorical to Christ’s actions on behalf of the church and her feast a kind of 
Eucharist,” while Brantly claims that, “[Ervin] Beck goes even further to suggest that Babette 
can be associated with St. Barbara, whose attributes are the sacramental cup and wafer, because 
of her connection to the sacrament.”  
These interpretations might strike the common reader as too esoterically theological, and 
it is true that the story makes a greater appeal by merit of its juxtaposition between religious and 
sensual values. Rather in the manner of Mann, the (fairly) Southern Romance culture of France 
melts the inhibitions of the Northern ascetic, though unlike Death in Venice the effects of 
liberation are mild and pleasant. So Grethe Røstboll characterizes it as a contrast between “cold, 
pietistic Norway and sensuous, temperamental Paris, between an ascetic Protestant world view 
and Catholic extravagance and worship of beauty, ” Ann Gossman speaks of “two irreconcilable 
points of view toward food and drink are played off: the strict Puritanical rejection of any 
enjoyment of them as luxuries, and the Epicurean enjoyment of them for their intrinsic delight.” 
In related but perhaps more extreme terms, some critics have explored Babette’s witch-like, or 
diabolical character. Frantz Leander Hansen, who has also called Blixen’s art “aristocratic,” 
describes the concept as follows: “[T]he diabolical is in a positive sense the unexpected, 
surprising and unpredictable which ensures that life does not stagnate in well-regulated and 
routine rationalization. In Karen Blixen’s universe the diabolical is principally a creative, 
constructive factor, and therefore it makes sense that the artist Babette should be in collusion 
with the devil and with his help creates her divine meal.” But as Brantly points out, “most of 
these “demonic” readings conclude that the meal is not necessarily a generous gift to the 
unwitting puritans of Berlevaag, but the last opportunity for a great artist to practice her art.” In 
conflict with this, and particularly relevant to our discussion of the conflict between politics and 
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aesthetics, is Brantly’s claim that, “Others have seen in the pages of “Babette’s Feast” a class 
war….[Ron] Hansen in particular, sees Babette as “blatantly exploited” by Martine and 
Philippa…. Instead of reconciliation, Hansen sees the feast as an act of rebellion.” We shall 
explore the unexpected manner in which this idea of class and political strife is played against 
aesthetic concerns, and their relation will give us a definition of the aristocratic attitude towards 
art.  
Artistically, Dinesen here presents a subdued vision of sacredness and profanity—the 
disciples of Berlevaag are prudish in the extreme but hardly menacing in their dogmatism nor 
even particularly intolerant, and Babette’s Bacchus is fairly literal rather than metaphorically 
transcendent, which is to say, within the bounds of Dinesen’s slightly symbolic realism, the 
capacity of even the most exquisite meal to corrupt a good Lutheran’s nature must be of 
necessity rather limited. But naturally Dinesen’s sympathies are all on the side of pleasure. 
 
There are, in Dinesen’s story, three aristocrats, as we have defined the term, Babette, 
Lowenhielm, and Papin. Let us look first at the two less significant characters, the sisters’ 
suitors, as a way of gauging the meaning of Dinesen’s depiction of the term: “In the 
Loewenhielm family there existed a legend…[that] a gentleman of the name had married a 
Huldre, a female mountain spirit of Norway, who is so fair that the air round her shines and 
quivers. Since then, from time to time, members of the family had been second sighted.” (23) 
Loewenheilm briefly believes his second sight has been aroused by Martine, who with her sister 
is previously described as “extraordinarily pretty, with the almost supernatural fairness of 
flowering fruit trees or perpetual snow. (21) Dinesen’s storytelling methods, like the oral 
practitioners, and like, in their somewhat dissimilar ways, Mozart and Bach, who despite their 
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originality were through the conventions of their time permitted to make use of some ready-made 
blocks of musical material, like Homer’s readymade epithets…her description of the girls may 
appear perfunctory in its familiar loveliness. Yet the obvious contradiction of the metaphorical 
figures, flowering fruit trees and perpetual snow, and that pairing’s incommensurability with the 
adjective “supernatural” must either be ascribed to utter incompetence or a deliberate cultivation 
of incommensurates. What is the girls’ appearance like? Like prettiness, which to those it strikes 
lovingly down is of almost supernatural importance. Not quite beauty, banal to those 
disinterested, its effect upon those it seduces makes little sense but that of the charms of 
prettiness itself. That’s what most physical attraction is like…a bit banal to anyone but the person 
experiencing it, to whom it seems absolute magic.  
 But is it indeed the magic of the “Huldre?” Defined as a “supernatural maiden” belong to 
the “hidden people” or “invisibles,” and resembling most Northern European cultures myriad 
variations of elves or fairies, the Huldre’s name “derives from hylja, ‘to cover’ or ‘conceal.’”  
(Christiansen) And here I am going to make rather an unacademic, utterly intuitive assertion—
though the etymology of the word may account something for its progeny’s second sight, I 
suspect Dinesen was disinclined to select such a reference intending the sort intricate exegesis 
prevalent among commentators. Certain truths lie only in ambiguity, and it is precisely the 
mystery created by the briefest of references that is germane to Dinesen’s goal. There is ordinary 
life, Dinesen seems to say, but we are given on occasion to glimpse something more. It is rather 
like Novalis’ use of the blue flower, had Novalis resisted the urge to subject it to a series of 
indecipherable allegories. Whatever this being is, it is mysterious, it is immortal, it exceeds 
humanity in the hierarchy of existence—it lives in the mountains, it makes the air quiver—. We 
must suspect that possibly there is something in Loewenhielm’s nature that sets him above and 
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apart from the ordinary run of humanity. More specifically, his is, perhaps, a power to perceive, 
bequeathed upon him by something that is covered or concealed, and it is that power of 
perception which will define his role in the story, as the connoisseur of art.  
This reference to the huldre naturally harkens to the story’s opening paragraph two pages 
earlier, “In Norway there is a fjord—a long narrow arm of the sea between tall mountains—
named Berlevaag Fjord. At the foot of the mountains the small town of Berlevaag looks like a 
child’s toy-town of little wooden pieces painted gray, yellow, pink, and many other colors.” (21) 
Topography too has its qualitative hierarchies, rather as does the party’s New Jerusalem. 
Apposite to each other is the sublime triumph of natural majesty, and the quotidian if charming 
world of the most ordinary human endeavor. Whatever sight descent from the Huldre brings, 
surely it resembles the vision of the mountain and the fjord, which so exceeds ordinary life that 
when its gaze is lowered the town must needs be viewed if not with pity than at least a kindly 
sort of condescension.  
The mountain is perhaps a stock Romantic metaphor—its sublimity is all too familiar 
from countless Romantic poets, and it is precisely that trope which draws Papin to Berlevaag.  
“One evening a lady of the Court, who had been dreaming of romance with the artist, had 
described to him the wild, grandiose scenery of Norway. His own Romantic nature was 
stirred…but he felt small in the sublime surroundings.” (26) He hears her sing: “…in one single 
moment he knew and understood all. For here were the snowy summits, the wild flowers and the 
white Nordic night, translated into his own language of music….Like Lorens Loewenhielm he 
had had a vision.” (26) 
 Yet to these male variations on Romantic desire, the sisters offer a wall of piety and 
domestication. “[Martine] did not imagine that her sister might have been surprised and 
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frightened by something in her own nature.” It is an eloquent expression of a familiar theme, 
particularly to moderns, the repression of something inward and important beyond the bound of 
social law. On a cursory glance, it appears no doubt to be lust, perhaps more broadly the desire 
for adventure. Yet we must consider in larger terms both the force of repression and the glimmer 
of life repressed. The former, literally Phillipa’s pietism, is precisely the Judeo-Christian 
morality that stifles the pagan good in Nietzsche. And more broadly still, it is the shadow of 
ideas, or unnecessary thinking, stifling the human telos. The latter may indeed me comprised of 
many ends, or fluctuate incoherently, at least to the human intellect, between them, but surely 
Dinesen is saying, whether a desire for lust or love, or beauty or adventure, it is Phillipa’s nature 
in some degree to pursue pleasure, and it is moralism which has turned her away from her own 
nature. Indeed, when Papin bids her farewell, despite his love, he seems to acknowledge that if 
here excellence is ever to exist, it will not be on this earth…and if the hedonistic vision of the 
story is to be respected, then, unfortunately, there is nothing that is not of this earth: 
 
[…]and yet, my lost Zerlina, soprano of the snow. As I write I feel that the grave is not 
the end. In Paradise I shall hear your voice again. There you will sing, without fears or 
scruples, as God meant you to sing. There you will be the great artist that God meant you 
to be.. Ah! how you will enchant the angels. (30) 
 
In contrast to their piety, we have Babette, whom they seem at once to pity and, mildly, to 
distrust. “They would find her in the kitchen, her elbows on the table and her temples on her 
hands, lost in the study of a heavy black book which that secretly suspected to be a popish 
prayer-book. Or she would sit immovable on the three-legged kitchen chair, her strong hands in 
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her lap and her dark eyes wide upon, as enigmatic and fatal as Pythia upon her tripod.” (33) 
Babette is frequently perceived in a variety of Pagan and sometimes menacing guises, “the 
bottled demon of a fairy tale,” (39) or even a witch, who along with her assistant seems a “dark 
woman with her red haired familiar,” attending to fires and “cauldrons bubbling…before 
daybreak.” (42)  A minor observation worth adding: “Their consent in the end completely 
changed Babette. They saw that as a young woman she had been beautiful.” (38) 
Babette is received by the sisters in 1871, when, as Papin says “civil war raged in our 
streets. The noble communards, standing up for the rights of man, have been crushed and 
annihilated.” He adds that her husband and son “both ladies’ hairdressers,” have been shot. (29) 
It would be useful here to refamiliarize ourselves with the political and historical circumstances 
to which Dinesen refers.67 Babette was a member of the Paris Commune, a proto-communistic 
uprising that took over Paris after France’s loss of the Franco-Prussian War. A highly leftist and 
progressive episode in French history, it ended when the army of the third French republic 
defeated the communards and brutally executed hundreds of its members. Babette’s political 
sympathies are obvious: she was a radical leftist who supported violent uprising against 
entrenched and moneyed power.  
Dinesen’s political allegiances are most likely irrelevant, though it is hardly difficult to 
find artists whose leftist political sympathies seem, simplistically, at odds with their refined 
tastes in food, culture, life. (Nowadays few I imagine would side with monarchy, though there 
surely are many so called liberals who would be decidedly unsympathetic to the communards). 
 
67 It is unfortunately necessary here to make a clarification of method. To what degree must circumstances of 
historical, or indeed any allusive material be investigated in order to apprehend the best an artwork may give to us? 
It is, perhaps, an intuitive thing, but as with poor Martine and Phillipa’s loss of earthly joy, intuition is all too often 
only complex to those who make it so. Papin mentions General Gallifet—we need not. An excess of scrutiny into 
the wrong matters blinds one…forests, trees, etc.  
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But of course, contre Sainte-Beuve, the artist’s politics are largely irrelevant, and Dinesen knows 
as well as anyone that her own politics are less relevant than the supposed conflict between art 
and ethics that takes place within Babette. She hates the monarchy but, asked whether the bottles 
Babette has brought from France contain wine, Babette replies “‘No, Madame. It is a Clos 
Vougeot 1846!…From Philippe, in Rue Montorgueil!’” (39-40) Babette’s sympathies are as 
divided as any soul belonging to a being not overcome with fanaticism, with dogma. Ultimately 
for Babette, there isn’t any conflict at all. Contradictions are natural, and they naturally remain.  
Dinesen distinguishes intentionally between the two iterations of aristocracy, between its 
old, social, and ultimately vulgar meaning and that of hedonistic experience as manifest in art. 
Lowenhielm, we are told, in intervening years has become a General. We are given a catalogue 
of his honors, all of which have to do with royalty and respectability. His evident disquiet in the 
face of his worldly achievements indicates that these hardly fulfill the aristocracy of his soul—
the image of his youthful self gives the aged General “a short glance and a smile, the haughty, 
arrogant smile that youth gives to age.” (45) The General, we are told, has no inclination to give 
age’s condescending smile back to youth, he is in low spirits. Clearly noble station is 
incongruous with whatever attributes his magical lineage had implied. The young man, we learn, 
“had attracted dreams and fantasies as a flower attracts bees and butterflies,” (46) but had fled 
from them, had been “scared of the Huldre of family legend and declined her invitation to come 
into the mountains; he had firmly refused the gift of second sight.” (46) 
 Dinesen’s narrator indicates two precise and seemingly opposite sources of disquiet. 
Lowenhielm’s wife pays little attention to his meals, and he is thereby troubled by indigestion. 
Second, he finds he is worrying about his immortal soul. Yet he believes he is a moral person. 
“But there were moments when it seemed to him that the world was not a moral, but a mystic, 
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concern.” (45) Dinesen is clearly making a distinction between a vision of the immortal soul as 
one guided by moral concerns—whether the morals dictated by the General’s personal code, 
which we may assume are fairly conventional (though none the worse for that), or the piety of 
the town’s sect, or as we shall see, the morals of Babette’s revolutionary activities—and one with 
“mystic concerns” which we may conclude have to do with the teleology of an individual soul’s 
peculiar nature. Lowenhielm’s nature is intrinsically “romantic,” it longs for dreams, fantasies, it 
is called to the mountain, it is called to second sight.   
The members of Berlevaag’s sect contrast with this in more than their abstinence from 
pleasure. Of course they do that as well, as one of the brothers says, “‘On the day of our master 
we will cleanse our tongues of all taste and purify them of all delight or disgust of the senses, 
keeping and preserving them of the higher things of praise and thanksgiving’” (41) But it is 
simplifies Dinesen’s intention to merely contrast hedonism and asceticism. Note the lines of the 
brothers’ and sisters’ hymn: 
 
 May food my body maintain, 
 may my body my soul sustain,  
 may my soul in deed and word 
 give thanks for all things to the lord. 
 
It is hardly historically unprecedented that Lutherans retain some kind of monarchic or feudal 
imagery when describing their vision of the cosmos. But the hierarchy is not literal—rather it is 
an illustration of dogmatism. For people who seem to privilege abstractions over materiality, the 
body and soul seem little distinguished here except in their position in a chain of causes leading 
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ultimately to the brothers’ complete submission before ideology. The individual soul exists no 
more than the body—each is simply viewed as it pertains to the goal their collective minds have 
set before themselves. And Dinesen is hardly going to avoid exploring, even briefly the ironies 
of obsessive ideology. For previously we learn that since the Master’s death, there have been 
festering grudges that have developed in the aging community, all of them petty and banal. Of 
course, and so it is implied that their attempt at piety has not kept out such pettiness.  
But is there an implication also that piety is itself banal? What, if anything, has the 
ideology wrought but a lowering of the “soul” to the “body”, but the body in its most quotidian 
and hence one of its more hideous incarnations, the classic petty grudges of a small town, the 
pettinesses that seem to triumph wherever people have ideas more than happiness on their 
minds—in periods of religious fanaticism, in periods of revolution, in the Soviet state, even—
dare I say—in the academy. 
 How distant Babette’s vocation is from this kind of petty human comedy is revealed only 
at the story’s end, which puts into the truly shocking juxtaposition the conflicting requirements 
of art and ideas. At the story’s conclusion, Babette reveals to her hosts that she has spent the 
entirety of her winnings on her meal and will stay with them indefinitely. She says, she has no 
one to return to in Paris, claiming “they are all gone,” they being the names  not of her husband 
and son, but a list of aristocrats. The passage is worth quoting almost in full: 
 
Martine remembered a tale told by a friend of her father’s who had been a missionary in 
Africa. He had saved the life of an old chief’s favorite wife, and to show his gratitude the 
chief had treated him to a rich meal. Only long afterwards the missionary learned from 
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his own black servant that what he had partaken of was a small fat grandchild of the 
chief’s…. 
But Phillipa’s heart was melting in her bosom. It seemed that an unforgettable 
evening was to be finished off with an unforgettable proof of human loyalty and self-
sacrifice.  
“Dear Babette,’ she said softly, ‘you ought not to have given away all you had for 
our sake.’ 
Babette gave her mistress a deep glance, a strange glance. Was there not pity, 
even scorn, at the bottom of it? 
  “For your sake? she replied. ‘No. For my own.’ [….] 
  ‘I am a great artist!’ she said…. 
  ‘So you will be poor all your life, Babette?’ 
 ‘Poor? Babette said. She smiled as if to herself. ‘No I shall never be poor. I told 
you that I am a great artist. A great artist, Mesdames, is never poor. We have something, 
Mesdames, of which other people know nothing. ‘[….] 
‘But all those people whom you have mentioned,’ she said, ‘those princes and 
great people of Paris whom you named, Babette? You yourself fought against them. You 
were a Communard! The general you named had your husband and son shot! How can 
you grieve over them?’ [….] 
‘Yes,’ she said. ‘ I was a communard. Thanks be to God, I was a Communard! 
And those people whom I named, Mesdames, were evil and cruel. They let the people of 
Paris starve; they oppressed and wronged the poor. Thanks be to God, I stood upon a 
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barricade; I loaded the gun for my menfolk! But all the same, Mesdames, I shall not go 
back to Paris now that those people of whom I have spoken are no longer there…. 
those people belonged to me, they were mine.68 They had been brought up and trained, 
with greater expense than you, my little ladies, could ever imagine or believe, to 
understand what a great artist I am. I could make them happy. When I did my very best I 
could make them perfectly happy.” 
[…. Monsieur Papin said] ‘It is terrible and unbearable to an artist…to be 
applauded for…his second best…through all the world there goes one long cry from the 
heart of an artist: Give me leave to do my utmost!”’ (57-59) 
 
It is perhaps worth noting that Phillipa does not register the apparent contradiction until Babette 
proclaims herself an artist. The contradiction resides in the fact that those whom Babette has felt 
closest to, whose absence defeats any purpose of her return to Paris, are those whom she has 
knowingly attempted to kill, “cruel, evil” men, who let the people of Paris starve. They, like 
Lowenhielm, are connoisseurs, and we wonder whether in fact the General has led as moral a life 
as he believes. Yet for art, it does not matter.  
 It would seem anathema to contemporary attitudes that the greatest understanding of art 
would be housed in the senses of the cruelest men, but that it precisely the reality Dinesen 
presents. Nor is it their cruelty, their evil that makes them an aristocracy of the senses—it is 
essential only to note that their evil does not prevent them becoming so. In the case of this story, 
 
68 This recalls a point made by Proust in the second volume of In Search of Lost Time. Speaking of Beethoven’s late 
string quartets, he asserts that they, “devoted half a century to forming, fashioning and enlarging the audience for 
Beethoven’s quartets, thus marking, like every great work of art, an advance if not in the quality of artists, then at 
least in the community of minds, largely composed today of what was not to be found when the works first 
appeared, that is to say of persons capable of experiencing it. What is called posterity is the posterity of a work of 
art. It is essential that the work…should create its own posterity.” (142-143) 
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aristocracy serves both as a metaphor and a literally reality, for the type of food she creates is 
only to be understood not merely by wealth, but by the utmost cultivation. More broadly, it is 
some confluence of opportunity and one’s natural capacities that privilege either the creator or 
the connoisseur (it would be mad to suppose, for example, that anyone given the same 
opportunities would achieve Babette’s imagined genius).  
 In Dinesen’s view, there is absolutely no correspondence between moral or political 
considerations and aesthetic ones. Babette furthermore, is content to live a life of 
incommensurates, at once hating a group politically and acknowledging that they alone are 
capable of understanding her art. This is perhaps a harder lesson to swallow than it should be. 
With a kind of grace that may be difficult to achieve today, Dinesen informs us that it is 
impossible to bring all the elements of life, whether collectively or individually, into harmony. 
Art must be judged by criteria distinct from those of morals, and indeed their respective criteria 
may as often as not be in direct opposition to one another. Through Babette Dinesen seems to 
explain that any attempt to consolidate them will only corrupt one or the other. I would venture 
to add that as the arts are by nature the most delicate and fragile, any attempt to subsume them 
into a moral or religious or ideological system will only crush them. As she echoes Papin, she 
explains that at the last, artists will not take stock of any claims upon them but their own 
excellence. It is, ironically, a sort of monastic life, however sensual its production may be. It is 
one innately aristocratic in that, as Babette says, only the “very best” matters. Truly, the 
aristocracy of art is not even feudal, a reality that is evident when one looks at the canon of 
works that matter in history. It is a reality against which people have often fought in recent 
years—but little seems to matter as one becomes further removed from a historical period, other 
than “the very best.” 
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 But if Babette is perhaps the model artist, one who exists simultaneously in a moral and 
aesthetic universe without letting either dimension do harm to the other, the narrative perspective 
of the passage warns the reader how difficult, perhaps even impossible, such a perspective will 
be for the non-aristocrat to apprehend. We realize why the sisters have viewed Babette so often 
as a kind of witch. Dependent upon the period, such imagery has very different implications—to 
the Greeks, the Pythia, or even figures like Circe or the witches of Thessaly, is a source of 
divinity if sometimes of menace, whereas after the onset of Christianity, a witch’s transformative 
powers seem primarily to signify evil. Of course Babette is a witch, an alchemist as all artists are, 
as Simon Magus who took accepted Satan’s temptation to turn stones into bread where Christ 
refused. And so ambiguously, in this final scene, despite knowing Babette’s gratitude to the 
sisters, the narrator registers not only a hint of selfishness, but even of menace.  
 The narrative’s ambiguity is insightful. “Babette gave her mistress a deep glance, a 
strange glance. Was there not pity, even scorn, at the bottom of it?” In the romantic writing to 
which Dinesen often harkens, “strange” often denotes something like “wild”—otherworldly. 
Here it is not precisely clear whether the narrative is omniscient, or, as the last question seems to 
imply, from the perspective of Phillipa. Because naturally, a person’s better may look upon them 
with either pity or scorn. And even to be looked at with pity may make on feel as though they are 
scorned. The sisters are likely too pious to feel any kind of Nietzschean ressentiment at either 
possibility, but it’s without doubt that even so the reality is unnerving, or strange. And latent here 
is the innate resistance of the moralizer to aesthetic aristocracy. Why does Martine picture the 
revolting African meal, like Tantalus presenting Pelops, at the prospect of Babette’s aristocratic 
strangeness? Is it not the ordinary, unbeautiful Narcissist, who must somehow accuse the 
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beautiful Narcissus of some flaw in order to assuage the pain emerging at the recognition of her 
own sense of inadequacy? 
The story’s humane comedy is derived jointly from the brethren’s loosening inhibitions 
and the General’s astounded recognition of the dishes— a neat narrative device of revealing 
Babette’s menu while preserving her Pythian aloofness. Only the General, we note, is to have his 
glass refilled, (50) for material as well as spiritual reasons—only he, we presume, can drink—
really drink. But we also surmise that the brethren’s capacities for pleasure cannot be 
transgressed. For them to have too much pleasure is impossible; it would be, perhaps, like those 
ancient stories of hubris, of Phaeton or Icarus, wherein humans attempt to surpass their mortal 
capabilities in imitations of beings who by their very nature exceed humanity.  
In light of the themes elaborated, the General’s speech must be treated with care. 
Beginning with the claims that “mercy and truth…have met” and that “righteousness and bliss 
shall kiss one another,” (52) which quotes the dean’s sermons that he heard in his youth. The 
speech may appear an overly simplistic reconciliation of the opposing forces through which the 
story has often been interpreted. The General outlines a vision not wholly inconsistent with 
Lutheran ideology—that man is foolish, unknowing, that he is gifted with grace when he has no 
knowledge or capacity to remedy his own weakness. Only inconsistent, perhaps, is the general’s 
implication that bliss is earthly rather than divine, an aspect of material life rather than the life 
beyond. In his brief discussion of Axel’s film adaptation of the story, A.O. Scott comments that 
the movie shows that Babette’s hedonism and the brethren’s piety are both sides of a single 
human impulse. Yet this seems overly simplistic and pat in light of Dinesen’s fairly intricate 
weaving of her thematic material. At no point do the brethren not only understand, but even truly 
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experience the General’s sense of the meal, let alone Babette’s artistry. It cannot therefore be 
concluded that the general’s concept of grace is commensurate with theirs.  
  
Man is frail and foolish….in our human foolishness we imagine divine grace to be 
finite….we tremble before making a choice in life, and we fear of having chosen wrong. 
But the moment comes when  our eyes are opened, and we see and realize that Grace is 
infinite. Grace…demands nothing from us but that we shall await it with confidence and 
acknowledge it in gratitude. Grace, brothers, makes no conditions and singles out none of 
us in particular; grace takes us all to his bosom and proclaims general amnesty. See! That 
which we have chosen is given us and that which we have refused is, also and the same 
time, granted us. Ay, that which we have rejected is poured upon us abundantly.  (52) 
 
It is perhaps superfluous to note that the General might not be his own best critic. His 
interpretation of his experience is, I contend, mistaken in the belief that what he has experienced 
is at all comparable in any but the most tenuous, analogic way—-though perhaps an aristocrat 
may be forgiven for using the royal we. It may be conceded that to some degree, all present at 
this speech have been granted what they refused, the Brethren pleasure, the General, fantasy and 
dreams. But so much of the speech is illogical when applied to its audience that we must 
conclude that the General is indulging in a bit of solipsism, or perhaps generosity, if we are to be 
more generous ourselves in our judgment. The Brethren have never imagined grace to be finite. 
Grace, as conceived by the brethren, does single out people in particular (what would it mean 
otherwise) and the General’s experience has been nothing if not singular. Only he has lacked 
confidence, and only he, we must conclude, has ample gratitude. Ultimately, only the grace 
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conferred upon him is one that he has both chosen and rejected, because it was only in his nature 
to be inclined to choose it. And literally and metaphorically, only upon him has it been 
“poured…abundantly.” 
 But Dinesen does say he chooses his words carefully, so let us see what this means for 
the connoisseur, the lover of art. It is significant to note that only once in his discussion of grace 
does the General mention say the adjective divine, and never God. Based on his earlier 
misgivings, his “mystic concern,” and the fact that the concerns seem to be relieved, one must 
conclude that Babette’s meal has eased precisely those yearnings that had heretofore oppressed 
the general. Babette herself claims she is an artist, and the general the only one at the table who 
can understand her art. The General enjoins us to see, to wait until our eyes are opened. Yet we 
know already that the General’s eyes, opened, have the gift of second sight. And from this 
counterpoint between his own romantic quest and Babette’s elucidation of her own genius, we 
can see what the General, known or unknown to him, means by grace—it is the capacity to see 
art, or beauty, to enjoy the world in a transcendent manner. Babette’s feast is the fruition of his 
own aristocratic nature. And what could be a better description than that sudden, startling 
moment of experiencing an aesthetic joy, and the only proper to response to it, gratitude, than the 
General’s description of grace?: 
 
Grace…demands nothing from us but that we shall await it with confidence and 
acknowledge it in gratitude. 
 
It is probably a coincidence that this mirrors the last sentence of Pater’s conclusion so closely 
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For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your 
moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake. (153) 
 
But of course it’s not a coincidence. She never had to read Pater…it’s exactly what the aesthetic 
aristocrat always knows.  
How then to explain the apparent effect on the “commoners” of the story, the brethren, 
Phillipa and Martine included. One of Dinesen’s lighter works, the story concludes warmly as 
such comedies do. The Brethren, overtaken by some spiritual effect of their physical 
enjoyment—and presumably of alcohol (and frankly it is hard to tell which has had the greater 
influence)—hold hands (again, as drunks do), and sleep the next day till the late afternoon. The 
point hardly bears repeating. In the interim, they proceed to admit their faults and pettiness. (53) 
 It may be supposed that physical joy has unlocked the community’s piety. But in light of 
the foregoing interpretation, I would suggest that in fact what has been given to them is less the 
gift of piety, of bliss, and more a subconscious awareness of realities transcending their petty 
dogmatism. It is not their lot to know the kind of pleasures of Lowenhielm or Papin—it is, 
frankly, impossible for them ever to begin to understand such things. Rather, briefly touched as 
by the wing of aesthetic pleasure, the pettiness of their conflicts has become viscerally apparent 
even as they are inevitably incapable of escaping the very ideology which cultivated those 
conflicts. In the realm of experience, their arguments were as banal as their food was bland, and 
Babette has given them the gift of feeling, rather than knowing, that there is more to life than 
either ideas or the sort of menial existence that excessive allegiance to ideas creates for them.  
 The same conclusion may be made about the sisters’ epiphany, though theirs is more 
ambiguous and complex. Phillipa’s exclamation, with which the story concludes, gives us insight 
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into the effect of art upon a non-aristocratic sensibility, and opens the possibility that perhaps 
aristocracy may be developed if not innate. Martine has already experienced her ambivalent 
epiphany at Lowenhielm’s farewell— when he claims that every night he shall sit down with her 
in spirit, because anything is possible, she replies simply that yes “anything is possible,” which is 
something her father had said. We are left to wonder what effect upon her stifled nature his 
address has had. One doubts that she has felt is as he has, but the optimism of the words, if not 
the tone of her reply, leads one to wonder whether in fact, she might have been like him.  
 Phillipa’s comment is still more ambiguous. Echoing the words of Papin’s letter she says 
to Babette, “Yet I feel this is not the end! I feel Babette, that this is not the end. In Paradise you 
will be the great artist that God meant you to be…Ah, how you will enchant the angels!” A 
cursory reading gives one the impression that she has accepted the value of physical pleasure, 
and its transcendent appearance in art, as worthy of holiness. This may be. But it is equally 
apparent she has not fully understood what art is. Imitating Papin’s words in a not entirely 
appropriate context, it seems she is grasping to articulate a revelation that is not quite at hand. 
For when Papin wrote the words, he was writing to Phillipa, who had forsaken whatever possible 
talent she had in favor of her father’s ideology. In her case, it is Papin’s Romantic dream that 
somewhere, somewhere else, somewhere as impossible as heaven, that talent may find its 
fruition. But of course Babette has found her genius’ fruition on earth—the only place where it 
could ever exist. Phillipa still seeks to validate the art she has been blessed to experience by 
subordinating it to her ideology, and though it bespeaks a touching acceptance on her part, it is 
an acceptance that cannot admit of understanding or experience. Babette’s art is aristocratic 
precisely because it is superior to ideology—the aristocratic nature is ultimately neither moral, 
nor political, but mystic, divine in a sense utterly divorced from any ideas or ends but itself.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The Aesthetic Imperative 
 
It has been the unfortunate result of our inquiry to observe that though beauty, as it is incarnated 
in the various arts, is aristocratic in nature—that it exists within a hierarchy of excellence, of 
greater or lesser luster, with no regard or deference for any concerns but the existence of that 
excellence, be they social, political, or moral—it is regrettably clear that, the richer are the 
splendors the beauties of the world as achieved by the hands of men, so too will a higher 
proportion of modern men deny the existence of those very beauties in order to satisfy their own 
offended vanity. This maybe has been too long a journey to illustrate the most obvious of 
contentions, that people are full of envy, that the ugly envy the attractive, the weak the strong, 
the simple the wise, etc—and yet, the matter is not so simple. Because the predominant manner 
of thought in our time, which doubts all things, all beliefs, even all feelings and sensations, has 
given a very powerful weapon to the envious, which they have wielded with such unrelenting 
violence that even those passionate lovers of beauty have come to doubt some of the most potent 
sensations of their lives.  
 The hypothesis of hatred toward beauty is not provable insofar as there can be no study in 
which people would readily admit it, and it should be fairly obvious that few if any who follow 
the pattern described know they are doing so...they merely latch onto a theory that satisfies an 
inner urge. It is left to the reader to ascertain whether this interpretation is believable.69  Which is 
 
69 Yet it is important to note that this form of democratization has not coincided with previous rebellions, it is 
entirely characteristic of our time. Of course it might be proposed that only recently has this mode of oppression—
“aesthetic oppression”—been understood. But the fact must be pointed out—and though this fact does not absolutely 
 
Amir Dagan 237 
to say that the hatred of Narcissus being a predictable affair, even as the extent of its reach is 
surprising, our goal has never been to shame his enemies so much as to free us from their 
influence, that we me say beauty the more clearly, and be happier ourselves. Theirs has been a 
mission of spite; ours is one of joy.  
 For those who may yet pursue that joy, unoppressed by decades of doubt, we drink your 
health. For others it is not so easy a task, as Richard Brettel describes in two brief, depressing 
anecdotes, very characteristic of our age 
 
A friend of mine – an important art historian – once told me that he was walking through 
an exhibition of contemporary art with another important art historian and friend, who 
called a particular work of art they saw together “beautiful” and then instantly felt guilty, 
as if he had used a taboo word. My friend found the whole thing odd, given that art 
historians traffic in aesthetic pleasure and its histories. But a taboo nonetheless remains. 
One bright student… came up to me one day and asked why I never said that anything 
was “beautiful.” “You use the words ‘great’ and ‘important,’ ‘radical’ and 
‘revolutionary,’” he said, “but never ‘beautiful.’” He had put his finger directly on what 
might be the central conceptual taboo of contemporary art history. (Brettel, 4-6) 
 
 
negate the previous supposition, it does make it much, much less likely—that the hatred of objective standards in the 
present is not confined to any particulate political ideology, but rather shared by those who see oppression 
everywhere and those who see our society as essentially free, as a society that decidedly does not require further 
democratization (that is, of a right-wing sort). The fact that these two absolutely opposed political forces share the 
same opposition to aesthetic non-relativism suggests that their aesthetic position is motivated less by conventional 
politics and more by a broad desire never to feel inferior...precisely the definition of Ortega’s mass man. 
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Surely this is a sad state of affairs, reminiscent in its way of times and places where religious 
prescriptions kept people’s bodies away from the pleasures of love. Yet even if we agree that the 
source of such inhibitions were attacks rooted in narcissism, this does not in itself heal the 
injuries those attacks have inflicted.  
 Admittedly in recent decades there has been a degree of reaction against normative anti-
aestheticism. Yet this reaction has been largely either confused or simply unsuccessful. In the 
latter camp, we can place the New Formalist movement in poetry, which might seem related to 
this thesis, but is actually quite distinct. To say analytically that aesthetic objects must be 
understood primarily with regard to their form is not the same as trying to establish a 
predetermined set of forms with which to organize material—in this example, if form is the key 
to beauty, what the new formalists pursue (only with regard to their movement, not in individual 
examples of their work) is more akin to pattern70. Aesthetics are not intrinsically linked to any 
pattern, nor is the mode predominant in periods during which aesthetic ideals were first 
expressed necessarily the ideal manifestation of those ideals. 
 More relevant perhaps is a critical movement such as New Aestheticism. Yet New 
Aestheticism, for all its analytical merits, seems either to apologize for concerning itself with 
beauty or addresses it in concerns in terms of contemporary theory. Here I argue that, insofar as 
it can be observed, beauty is not contingent on any particular ideology but rather on the object 
itself. Joughin and Maplas suggest treating art as an autonomous entity whose nature is not 
dependent on other ideologies, but nevertheless find value in the art object as it contributes to 
understanding of non-aesthetic ideas: “the transformative cognitive potential of the aesthetic and 
its world-disclosing capacity mark the emergence of art as autonomous self-validating entity 
 
70 That is, we may say a sonnet is beautiful, but it is not beautiful because it is a sonnet. If the form of this sonnet is 
beautiful, the degree to which it is a sonnet is merely its pattern.  
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during modernity and make a new type of truth possible, producing new means of expression and 
unleashing the creative potential for new forms of social cognition.” (12) More extremely, 
Caroline Levine observes that form should be used “in literary studies to include patterns of 
sociopolitical experience.” However true this might be in making arguments about sociopolitical 
experience, it is diametrically opposed to the idea of form as non-referential experience. In a 
sense, formalism of this type is essentially apologetic—it justifies the aesthetic by asserting its 
relevance to non-aesthetic concerns.71 
 A still more relevant attempt to recapture beauty is found in Frederick Turner’s 1991 
book Beauty: the Value of Values.  Turner admits that beauty is out of fashion, in the way Sontag 
and Brettel have explained, “old-fashioned, like a country girl wearing her mother’s dress.” (1) 
He proceeds to explain how both right and left wing politics have undermined the belief in 
beauty: whereas the right de-natured beauty in the direction of the merely pretty, the left did so in 
the direction of the merely sublime.” (31) In this genealogy, the right feels shame at the injustice 
of life it perpetuates by escaping to a realm where such moral shame is nonexistent, while the 
left, in a situation similar to Nietzsche’s ressentiment, feels shame at the possibility it is 
inadequately excellent within the oppressive systems dictated by the right, and so identifying 
anything upheld by that oppressive society, as itself a source of oppression, turned art into “the 
fire of burning traditions. (32) As he himself says, the left wing rejection of beauty is the more 
interesting, and I believe the more pervasive (despite my own far left politics).  
 
71 I should add that formalism isn't even the right word for the extension if Paterian criticism—there is no such a 
term in music criticism—and to call a method of observation formalist is to diminish the central component of an 
artwork or experience by implying that form is a particular, refracted dimension. Rather—though form is a term that 
has accrued a sense of dryness, and should not be used interchangeably—it intrinsically refers to the quality that 
distinguishes the beautiful from objects composed of similar material or content. 
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 Turner posits that beauty is present across all cultures (which is obviously true) and 
innate to human activity. He wishes to establish that beauty is an objective reality, a hypothesis I 
will discuss at the end of this essay. Yet his explanations of beauty’s objectivity are, if not 
apologia, fundamentally contrary to the spirit of disinterestedness or “uselessness” which make 
beauty the peculiar mode of existence that it is. He suggests that pleasure in beauty is a reward 
for, “the exercise of the peculiar spiritual skills demanded by the human ritual…the 
acceptance…of the shame of mortal self-awareness….the special integrative sensibility...to the 
general …theme of the universe,” (59)  and ultimately the possibility for men to deepen their 
sense of the universe. This argument develops to view beauty as the engine or catalyst of 
evolutionary processes that advance human perception and interaction with the universe. “Most 
beautiful of all, perhaps, is the brain process of a human being that can experience [tree branches 
and ferns and flowers, a Midsummer Night’s Dream, Maori tattoos, the Magic Flute, et al]; and 
that process is itself evolutionary[…].” (128). This is all very inspiring, but is it beauty? Or is it 
awe at the complexity and mutability of the world, and the possibility of humanity’s greater 
immersion in that world? For all his extolling of beauty, Turner seems himself afraid to enjoy 
something that doesn’t have anything to do with understanding or knowledge, something that is 
gloriously useless. There seems to be an internalized fear in our culture against something devoid 
of utility, of productivity in a material sense, of progress, or of moral or political value. And so 
we will have to pursue some other path is we are to re-establish aesthetic validity as a mode of 
perception and judgment. 
 
Suppose a man has a beautiful wife whom he adores, while another man, perhaps less 
desirable than the first, envies venomously the distinction he believes the husband receives by 
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merit of his wife’s returned attentions. The envious man—Iago—may tell the husband many 
things, that she is unfaithful, or that she does not love him, or that she is not beautiful at all. 
Perhaps the husband is weak, perhaps he becomes neurotically obsessed with her faithfulness. 
Perhaps he wonders whether what he had admired all along wasn’t worth his admiration? Have I 
been deceived? he thinks. Perhaps he thinks it shouldn’t matter, that if he likes her, if she’s good 
enough for him, then that’s enough. But he wants it to be objective—somehow he can’t enjoy it 
if it isn’t also true. That in itself may be a weakness, but it also just seems that what he admired 
deserved his admiration. She is so beautiful, he thinks. How could anyone ever deny it? 
 Let us suppose this husband were gifted with evidence that Iago’s evil advice was 
calumny, was false, was based in envy—maybe he heard Iago chortle and say, “I’ll badmouth 
her, I’m lying, and the husband is so gullible,” or perhaps he found a note saying much the same. 
Surely it would bring him some relief. But then the doubt has done its poisonous work, and 
logically, he thinks that just because Iago was envious doesn’t mean that what he said was 
necessarily wrong. Even if Iago himself thinks he’s lying, perhaps what he says is true. And 
suppose fifty men said the same calumny against his wife, all his hangers-on, unattractive men 
with ornery, unattractive girlfriends and wives, and he knew them all to be envious, to be 
questionable sources of knowledge, of questionable honesty, or even perhaps unclear about their 
own motives….none of this would necessarily redeem his wife from their accusations, would it? 
Nor would it condemn her. But we must face the reality that when a doubt has been introduced 
and repeated so incessantly, it is hard to return by mere force of will to a pre-lapsarian state. And 
when the husband considers his current situation, it becomes clear he will never be able to prove 
his old beliefs perfectly to himself—there will always be some doubt, or an awareness of the 
possibility of doubt. Is he to spent every moment in her company harping at her, begging she 
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assure him of her faithfulness? Is he to spend all his time, when in the company of other men, 
asking them to assure him of her beauty? How many millions of irritating questions can such a 
man ask before he is sure of her affections? How can he ever be certain that she is as beautiful to 
others as she is to himself? 
So we come to ask, is beauty real? Is there any possibility of its objectivity? Can we save 
it from the sense of doubt that seems to render its very existence inconsequential? Other 
questions must precede this last and most significant: 
 
1.Does the experience of beauty exist? 
2. Is the mere experience of beauty itself created in full by culture?  
2a. A corollary of the second: is the experience of beauty politically offensive or 
oppressive? 
3. Can the beauty as experienced be addressed by judgments of taste that are hierarchical 
in nature. 
4. Can there be any basis for intersubjective judgments?  
5. Is there objective beauty?  
 
1. It seems the only self-evident answer is that we experience beauty. Though the nature of what 
we call the experience of beauty is not yet certain, we may be certain beyond doubt that the 
experience exists. Before determining whether beauty is true, we have to consider practically our 
experience of it. It seems beyond debate that that people enjoy pleasure from particular stimuli of 
sight or sound. When Kant says beauty is disinterested, or Pater in his more poetic way that, “all 
art aspires to the condition of music,” they are describing a particular sensation, that brings with 
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it a peculiar enjoyment. What does it bring? All language here is platitudinous. It brings pleasure, 
yes, but of a special kind, as Kant showed us, a peculiar, disinterested kind. It makes us not 
forget the world, as Schopenhauer said, and the unpleasant countenance of truth, but rather 
allows us to enter a moment of existence beyond those considerations. It effaces the angst and 
despair of reality. It lets one see the god that does not exist. Those who do not experience it, we 
can only pity. 
 
2. But if we can only pity the man who has no experience of beauty, that does not preclude the 
possibility that beauty is itself illusory in origin. Are these pleasures really the disinterested 
pleasures which Kant describes so eloquently?  Should we pity them their barrenness and 
blandness of their existence, or they pity us our gullibility, our malleability? Because it is 
commonly claimed that our aesthetic tastes are simply the product of cultural influences, neither 
objective insofar as they describe our preferences and certainly not with regard to any permanent 
qualities in the objects themselves.  
It would appear that if beauty, and not just art, is itself “the condition of music,” that it 
would not innately be wedded to social conditioning, as its true nature is non-referential but to 
the organization of its own forms, its own materials. It is true that we accrue new understandings, 
that over time the beauties we experience and allow ourselves to experience change and grow, 
and so can not be considered in any way innate to us, but this is quite as it should be—beauty 
resides outside of us, and we are but capable of experiencing it given the limitations of our own 
capacities. And if we observe the way in which we let new, unknown beauties into our ken, the 
process seems wedded to the beauties themselves more than any outside influence. Much in the 
manner Fry described, Charles Rosen gives an anecdote from his youth. He had been a devotee 
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of Beethoven and Wagner, and the first time he heard a quartet by Bartok he felt physically ill. 
And indeed the language of unfamiliar beauty can be disorienting, rather like a child smoking a 
cigarette or drinking a glass of whiskey, or like Plato’s cave-dwellers who, upon entering the 
sunlight, find that it blinds them before their eyes have become amenable to its illumination.  
But again, our Iago might explain this away. Can’t the husband merely wish his wife was 
beautiful or faithful, and deceive himself into believing it simply because he wishes to have a 
beautiful wife, or wishes the woman he came to love was someone beautiful? And it is true that 
it is not uncommon that people seem to change their views by merit of propinquity. Doesn’t the 
close contact with someone often lead to an alteration in one’s perception of them, so they seem 
more attractive, or intelligent, or kind? And then we wonder whether it is that familiarity has 
revealed something that brief acquaintance kept invisible, or whether that familiarity has made us 
so comfortable with their person it has given us a false impression of their apparent excellence.  
 Similarly might we find all sorts of reasons for those experiences of beauty that seem at 
first so simple and direct. Perhaps I wanted to believe that, say, Schoenberg was excellent, 
merely because it was prestigious to enjoy something so difficult, because that difficulty made 
the enjoyment of his music elite and rare. Or perhaps it is the belief described earlier, the idea 
that new beauties require effort, that has made me convince myself those things requiring effort 
are worth the effort for their beauty. And if I reply that no, the theory which prods me onward 
has come to me via my own experience…can’t it just as easily be argued it I only believe the 
theory came to me, but that it too is a subtle or insidious form of indoctrination, that it came from 
Fry or others like him, and has entered and possessed me to the point that I convince myself it is 
the nature of my experience, when in fact my experience has all been marching in blind 
obedience to an outside idea.  
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 To live now is to have Iago whispering to us that what we think we love, we do not 
actually love, that our pleasures and joys were nothing, that the beauty which has let us transcend 
however briefly our earthly pain or tedium was nothing of the sort at all. This is what we call a 
hermeneutics of suspicion, and sometimes the suspicion is deserved. It is not self-evident that 
beauty merits such suspicion.  
The proposition that beauty is culturally determined implies that it is a completely 
fabricated sensation contingent on culture. This may mean that when a person exists within a 
given culture, he has sensations that are real, for him, but that contingent upon that culture, they 
have no merit outside that culture.  
Let us explore this. Cultural influence can work in a number of ways: it can dictate a 
particular taste, or it can create a preference for a taste. These two propositions are not the same: 
for whereas in the first, the taste is entirely an imposition, in the latter, the tendency towards 
having taste at all is innate, and only the selections which will be absorbed by that taste are 
directed. The perfectly rational idea that a culture creates preferences towards particular taste 
presupposes that the individual has an inclination towards a larger number of tastes, and that his 
culture merely steers him to a smaller set of objects that will satiate his appetite for beauty. 
By that measure, we must ask: if a culture affects an individual oppressively, does it 
simply dictate his aesthetic tastes, meaning that, without cultural influence he’d have no taste? 
Or perhaps have a different one entirely? Different how? Might the limitations imposed by 
cultural influence be akin to the influence of culture upon language? Which is to say, someone 
raised in France or China or the United States will learn a certain language, but cognitively is 
capable of having learned any of the others, and would have done so had he been born 
elsewhere. Just as the mind is capable of learning any language, but may have been raised 
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learning but one, so too might we say that cultural limitations of taste do not entail the true 
nature of the individual’s capacity for taste and enjoyment, but are the inevitable limitations of a 
being that neither omniscient nor omnipresent. Perhaps an immortal would eventually absorb all  
culture without any influence of upbringing—as for the mortals, they must make do with what 
they have, which is something rich, for any given culture, and open to the acquisition of foreign 
culture as well. All things being equal in man’s physical makeup, culture is no inhibition, so that 
a white child might, raised by Chinese parents, learn Chinese as well as an African child, raised 
in the West, has no disadvantage in learning a western language or becoming a concert pianist or 
opera singer. What has been termed a limitation (culture) is only an orientation, directing an 
individual toward one use of his capabilities or another.  
It’s true we perceive beauty not to as a construction in the way that language is. Now one 
may propose that beauty is as arbitrary as this or that language. Perhaps this is so. But all we 
have seen so far is that, whether beauty is absolute or contingent, all men are capable of 
accessing the (possibly contingent) beauty of any culture, and so the cultural difference is a 
negligible variable with regard to suspicion—if beauty is to be enjoyed in a disinterested fashion, 
then preference can have no oppressive dimensions, only particularized ones. Just as one 
language and another may perform the same function of language (albeit not in totally identical 
ways) an African mask, a symphony by Brahms, a lyric by Saigyo, all may achieve a state of 
beauty, also dissimilarity. Beauty is heterogeneous in its incarnations.  The western students 
applauding the sitarist might never grow to access his music to the greatest extent of which a 
man is capable, but they can access it with study just as I can learn Japanese. And so cultural 
difference is no negation of beauty...to say it negated beauty is to say that I live in a valley 
bordered by an impassible mountain, and that we hear others living beyond the mountain, but 
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because neither can traverse it, the other valley does not exist. It does not definitely exist, but the 
simplest and likeliest explanation, as we converse with one another over the rocks, and toss 
drawings and writings over, is that there is something men have accessed that I may as yet not be 
able to. Our culture does not create our sense of beauty, but merely directs us to some among its 
myriad incarnations. 
Even so, this does not mean beauty does exist,  only that relative differences do not entail 
that it doesn’ . Let us return to language, rather different than beauty but useful as an analogy, a 
way of understanding cultural difference. Languages are all different, but the fact that dissimilar 
structures originating in different historical circumstances function for similar purposes implies 
some innate capacity in the mind despite difference.  Similarly, we ought for our purposes to 
momentarily forget aesthetic distinctions and note all cultures enjoy the needless creation and 
appreciation of beauty. Sure, they all ascribe unique meanings to their works, but they all create 
art, without which those meanings would still exist. This means all cultures cultivate a quality 
separate from meaning, the “condition of music,” for the purpose of disinterested enjoyment. 
How could it be otherwise, when all people, universally, enjoy that condition outside of their 
cultures’ various creations, in art, in nature, in other people, in chance moments where something 
“grows fair in hand or face.” This means that the capacity for the enjoyment of beauty is 
universal among men and women. And that influence is not a shackle, anymore than are the 
limitations of one’s own experience—they only do not give us all, but what they do give is not 
illusory by nature of its specificity. 
 
3. Yet, Iago says, this only means that all are capable of disinterested pleasure, but not that 
judgment is legitimate. Sure, you like what you like freely, but how can you judge? How 
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compare? Isn’t the desire to judgment a conceit, a desire merely to insist that what you have 
freely enjoyed is preferable, for no other reason that you in fact want what you prefer to be 
superior? 
 Which brings us to the third question: though all men and women can enjoy beauty, their 
experience in no way undermined by the accident of particular birth or cultural influence, can 
their various enjoyments be bound together under any kind of standard of judgment? Because 
doesn’t that judgment presuppose a universal standard?72 
A music critic and composer mentioned previously, Donald Francis Tovey, approached 
the mass man’s blindness to aesthetic influence with a disdain that, if appropriate, perhaps does 
little to convince: 
 
It is not my intention to prove that it [Brahms c-minor piano quartet] is a great musical 
tragedy; it is absolutely impossible to prove that it, or Hamlet or the Sonata 
Appassionata, or the Agamemnon, is a great tragedy, or that any work of art is beautiful 
or great.  If a man chooses to say that the Sonata Appassionata is vulgar or frivolous or 
ugly, there is no logical means of driving him to admit that he is wrong, so long as he 
gives no reasons for his statement; and then it is only his reasons which can be confuted. 
The position itself is impregnable from its impertinent meaninglessness. But what can be 
done is to show that certain lines and catchwords of criticism are unsound or ambiguous 
and certain difficulties in the formations of opinions are very apt to be overlooked.” 
(Chamber Music, 204-5) 
 
 
72 Here we should recall Kant’s definition of a reflective judgment.  
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The crux of the difficulty in the defense of aesthetics as experience is the accurate claim that 
“there is no logical means” of convincing someone else of the reality of a particular experience, 
let alone our judgment of that experience.  Yet Tovey’s exasperation with the “vulgar” position 
is as comprehensible as Babette’s innate sense of her aristocracy. “If you can’t see it,” he seems 
to say,” well, I can try to show it to you. Then again, that rather depends upon you, and who you 
are,” in which the variable of “you” pertains less to the subjectivity of individuals than to their 
measurable excellences and deficiencies in perception. Yet Tovey is caught in a trap too, into 
which the anti-aesthete will claim all aesthetes must fall. If the aesthete proposes that those 
unaware of the legitimacy of aesthetic judgments are, so to speak, in Plato’s cave, upon what 
basis can those who see the sun be certain that it is the sun they see, and not simply another 
puppeteer’s shadow which they believe to be the sun? The whole thing seems rather like any 
belief in a non-empirical proposition, for which the best metaphor might be belief in god. The 
believer says, “I believe because I am certain. I see it,” to which the skeptic Iago replies, “Well, 
I’m not convinced your certainty isn’t a delusion of your own making.” 
By that token, Tovey’s demand the skeptic (here, a man who believes Beethoven’s 
Appasionata is ugly or, in our own time, a more sophisticated sort who believes all higher 
qualities ascribed to Beethoven are mere inventions) provide his reasons for skepticism is not 
epistemologically rational, and the skeptic can reasonably reply, as an atheist ought to a believer, 
that it is the believer’s duty first to provide his reasons for the legitimacy of his believe, not the 
disbeliever’s duty to explain his disbelief. Yet we may also assert that the demand for reasons is 
not consistent with Tovey’s more astute summing of the problem: there is no logical means of 
showing someone something he cannot see. In this respect Tovey was in the historically enviable 
position of not having to worry very much about these questions—clearly the mass men were 
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beginning to complain but they hadn’t yet come to run things. We are less in a position of having 
to prove artworks can be great, than having to convince that there can be such a thing as 
greatness, hierarchy, accurate judgment of aesthetic excellence in the first place.  
 It is also true that to defend something is already in a sense to be defeated. The reason for 
Tovey’s condescension is the same as Proust’s assumption his claims are incredibly obvious—
the “slight degree of self-acquaintance.” And it is perhaps between the logical impossibility of 
proving the existence of beauty, and the recourse to the obvious, that we can discover how 
beauty is legitimate, as are our judgments respecting it. For the first question is an 
epistemological one, and begs the question, what do we know, logically? Are there things that 
cannot be proven logically, and yet which we may know with some confidence? Is a confidence 
about these matters different than the belief in nonexistent things (to those, who feel that way, 
God)? And can our self-acquaintance, can certain self-evident features of experience as it is 
lived, not as it is theorized by our impudent overwrought intellects, give us insight into how 
sanely to approach this problem?  
His final suggestion is a model of sanity. It can not be logically proven, no, and, the mass 
man being a model of recalcitrance, any ideas outside his already established set of ideologies 
will no doubt not only fall upon deaf ears, but actually offend. And yet, what more is there to do 
than offer some guidance in accessing those sensations which one has been blessed to access 
oneself? It is in this process we can see for ourselves the foundation of the awareness of 
legitimacy of judgment. We must be able to make claims are not falsifiable. Dwight Macdonald, 
a critic of mass culture in its early days, saw the distinction between provability (or, as the 
positivists would say, falsifiability) and demonstration, and how only the latter was logical with 
regard to the discussion of aesthetic judgment.  In his “Triumph of the Fact,” he notes an 
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obsession in American culture with inert factuality, meaningless statistics, which I would 
contend is just simply the last abasement of a propensity towards utilitarian scientism which 
dominates our popular discourse: 
 
It was a Fact, at the moment this essay was written, that Mickey Mantle of the Yankees 
had a higher batting average than Ken Boyer of the Cardinals—one that could easily have 
been proved by turning to the figures, which were .388 and .343 respectively—but it is 
impossible to prove that William Faulkner has a higher batting average than, say, J. P. 
Marquand. An umpire, like a scientist, deals with measurable phenomena according to 
generally accepted rules, but the critic works with standards peculiar to himself, although 
they somehow correspond to standards each of his readers has individually developed. 
From the purely factual-scientific point of view, the wonder is not that there is so much 
disagreement in aesthetic matters but that there should be any agreement at all. 
Agreement is possible, however, because, while Faulkner’s superiority over Marquand 
cannot be proved, it can be demonstrated. This is a different operation involving an 
appeal—by reason, analysis, illustration, and rhetoric—to cultural values which critic and 
reader have in common, values no more susceptible of scientific statement than are the 
moral values-in-common to which Jesus appealed but which, for all that, exist as vividly 
and definitely as do mercy, humility, and love. (Macdonald, 213-4) 
 
The difference in batting averages bears a base resemblance to more elevated demands of 
falsifiability, and it is this prevalence of emphasis on empirical factuality that has been used as a 
stick to beat the notion of judgment in beauty and art. Naturally it is not possible to say that 
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Beethoven is superior to Taylor Swift, or Woolf to Maya Angelou, in the way it is possible to 
distinguish batting averages or height or volume or any of a series of more complex material 
realities. But neither is the phenomenon of beauty a simple material reality, but a transfiguration 
of the material of said reality, imbued with aesthetic quality, and so our judgment is not 
addressed to the fact that an object simply is but in what manner that object is manifesting itself 
to us. Macdonald proposed demonstration rather than proof, which he himself requires a basis 
akin to Kant’s sensus communis. And what is demonstration but an attempt, if not to reproduce 
exactly, then to draw another into an experience comparable to that which the demonstrator has 
himself already experienced? Beauty is not a fact insofar as it manifests itself to our intelligence. 
I can not relate beauty, only my experience of it—and as explained in chapter two, it is not 
translatable, and so to discuss it is not to discuss fact except perhaps the fact that it has existed 
somewhere, elsewhere. When I say that so-and-so has a batting average, the interlocutor 
understands precisely the reality of the phenomenon I am describing. But to say so and so is 
beautiful is only to inform someone of the possibility of an experience about which they know 
nothing but that it might exist. And so Macdonald says the task of the critic is less to prove the 
value than to lead us towards the fulfillment of experiencing that value. 
 
4. We now must explore the nature of that subjectivity which we will suppose permits of this 
demonstration. It would appear that the dominant empirical and utilitarian worldview has 
oversimplified the matter, creating the impression that anything which does not meet positivist 
criteria of falsifiability is purely subjective. But this sort of rigid dogmatic adherence to a 
definition, which as with all philosophical definitions is an inherently imperfect approach 
towards truth, has produced a remarkably unsubtle error in reasoning. It is true that scientific 
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experiment (with all its many errors) is a more verifiable method of evaluating objective 
reality—fact, as MacDonald says—than others available. But, though this is not to say other, 
unscientific methods, are equally verifiable, neither does it relegate those endeavors into pure 
subjectivity. To assert this is obviously Manichean, which tends towards lazy retreats into a 
simple, dualistic cast of mind. If empirical science is the apogee of the verifiable (again, often 
wrong, though the current best method), it is not science but a blind, uninquisitive, doubtless, 
unphilosophical impulse that relegates all unscientific endeavors into the realm of pure 
subjectivity.  
Even without considering the difficult realm of aesthetics, it is quite clear that all 
unprovable statements are not equivalent in truth value, nor all equally subjective.  Suppose 
someone claims they have seen god, or flown by their own power to Jupiter and back. While not 
impossible, it is a statement that is likely inaccurate without verifiabililty. Yet if another person 
says they see purple where the majority see green, they may be inaccurate (as indeed, are all), 
and inconsistent with what others see, inconsistent with the object as seen by the properly 
functioning human eye, all sight a function of the individual organism’s interaction with the 
physical world. It may or may not be true, and it is not true of the object, (no more than green 
itself is a property of our perception), but it may be true of their sight, and this is not the same 
sort of subjectivity—while it is unique to the subject, it is phenomenologically true of his 
experience. If a third man asserted that what he saw was purple, and it were possible to measure 
what he saw, and it was not purple, this would be subjectivity of the first kind73. The one who 
genuinely saw green where the object was purple—his subjectivity has an objective, 
phenomenological dimension—it merely was an innaccurate assessment of the world without. 
 
73 This example obviously presupposes that the individuals in question know what others mean by green and purple. 
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Now it will be argued: even if not subjective, what he sees is not right! And here is the 
malignant influence of utilitarianism. Because aesthetics is not about an accurate evaluation of 
information, but an accurate evaluation of an organization of the matter of life. If the man who 
sees purple where there is none, and we can see what he sees, the shade of purple is different 
than any that has existed in the natural world, is that not a shade of purple that is unique? And by 
that standard, are there not different organizations of colors that are unique, and of notes, in 
harmony, and in time, and in the succession of words, are these not different from one another. 
We have not yet proven the objectivity of judgment, but so far shown that there lies a realm of 
materials, and their order, whose existence is not subjective even if they have nothing to do with 
the accurate evaluation of factual, material existence. There is a realm whose basis is not to serve 
the utilitarian purpose of knowledge, but merely exists, without accurately describing the world, 
and is not identical with relativism or subjectivity. 
 Let us keep in suspension Macdonald’s astute point that the basis for Jesus’ appeal has 
no more logical basis than does the aesthetic one, especially considering it is, metaphorically, 
Jesus’ appeal that has currently eclipsed the appeal of beauty. But first we must address 
(returning to corollary 2A) the bete noire of “shared cultural values,” which also facilitates 
needless misreadings of Kant’s ideas, and indeed all universalizing tendencies formed in the 
west, or by men, whites, white men, etc. It will be argued that the cultural values which appear to 
be shared are in fact hegemonic (as with many of the counterarguments to which this book 
replies, they are so prevalent, so essential to the attitudes of the current moment, that they hardly 
require elucidation—they are, so to speak, on the tip of every tongue). The values Kant referred 
in his elucidation of common sense were, no doubt, his own, the shared European heritage of 
which he himself was a part, and which at the time displayed a profound if understandable 
Amir Dagan 255 
ignorance of cultures other than his own (how few of us are well versed in things outside our 
purview? How well do literary critics understand, for example, the scientific principles on which 
they offer social commentary?) Danto discusses Kant’s criticism of the morals of those tribes in 
the South Seas encountered in James cook’s voyages— 
 
“What relativists regard as differences in culture Kant will regard as but the differences in 
development on the model of the differences between child and adult (41) 
 
—and then shows how Kant extended these prejudices into his idea of reasonable taste: 
 
Much that would be liked directly in intuition could be added to a building, if only the 
building were not [meant] to be a church. A figure could be embellished with all sorts of 
curlicues and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattoos, if only it 
were not the figure of a human being. And this human being might have had much more 
delicate features and a facial structure with a softer and more likable outline, if only he 
were not (meant] to represent a man, let alone a warlike one. (77) 
 
No doubt this is unbecoming to our sensibilities, and most of us would readily contest it (though 
it must be admitted, it’s Kant’s right to like what he likes…he might just not always be right). 
But it is entirely disingenuous to throw the baby out with the bathwater, the principles with the 
assumptions prevalent at the historical moment the principles were formulated. It is not unusual 
at the current moment to think there is no such distinction, that everything is a product of 
context, but even by Danto’s externalist definition this is only a recent development applicable to 
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recent artistic productions, and in any case its an opportunistic argument with self-evident 
fallacies. As stated with regard to Gadsby’s condemnation of Picasso, are we so morally 
fastidious when a bad man comes up with medicine, or builds a bridge? Why here? The 
argument is manipulative and in bad faith.  
It takes next to no mental effort to make the very slightest adjustments to the context of 
Kant’s theory and reformulate it quite as Fry described the capacity to permit new beauties to 
enter our experience. Kant didn’t like non-European art—the worse for him, but that doesn’t 
mean that different forms or styles are barred from the sensus communis simply because the man 
who coined the term could not access them. Imagine the limitations we would impose upon 
ourselves if we held every human being who has contributed something excellent to our mode of 
life up to the scrutiny of our own sanctimoniousness. We’d still be in the cave…without any idea 
of sanctimony for that matter, only the sensations of hunger and of cold.  
 So, when Macdonald discusses “cultural values which critic and reader have in 
common,” these must be construed broadly to mean the value of the enterprise of judgment as a 
whole, which exists not for the vain pleasure of pronouncing judgments but for the broadening of 
experience itself. To judge means to differentiate, to differentiate means that we can tell good 
from less good from bad; it means, practically, the possibility of increasing the sum of good or 
worthwhile things to our experience. And of course this can include the art of pacific islanders. 
We now must look at the penultimate question we need to confront, namely, whether we should 
believe in the universality of aesthetic judgments in light of the possibility of intersubjective 
experience, As Kant puts it:  
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Whenever we make a judgment declaring something to be beautiful, we permit no one to 
hold a different opinion. Even though we base our judgment only on our feeling rather 
than on concepts; hence we regard this underlying feeling as a common rather than as a 
private feeling. But if we are to use this common sense in such a way, we cannot base it 
on experience; for it seeks to justify us in making judgments that contain an ought: it does 
not say that everyone will agree with my judgment, but that he ought to. Hence the 
common sense, of whose judgment I am at that point offering my judgment of taste as an 
example, attributing to it exemplary validity on that account, is a mere ideal standard. 
With this standard presupposed, we could rightly turn a judgment that agreed with it, as 
well as the liking that is expressed in it for some object, into a rule for everyone. For 
although the principle is only subjective, it would still be assumed as subjectively 
universal (an idea necessary for everyone); and so it could, like an objective principle, 
demand universal assent insofar as agreement among different judging persons is 
concerned, provided only we were certain that we had subsumed under it correctly. That 
we do actually presuppose this indeterminate standard of a common sense is proved by 
the fact that we presume to make judgments of taste. But is there in fact such a common 
sense, as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or is there a still higher 
principle of reason that makes it only a regulative principle for us, in order to bring forth 
in us, for higher purposes, a common sense in the first place? In other words, is taste an 
original and natural ability, or is taste only the idea of an ability yet to be acquired and I 
therefore I artificial, so that a judgment of taste with its requirement for universal assent 
is in fact only a demand of reason to produce such agreement in the way we sense? In the 
latter case the ought, i.e., the objective necessity that everyone's feeling flow along with 
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the particular feeling of each person, would signify only that there is a possibility of 
reaching such agreement; and the judgment of taste would only offer an example of the 
application of this principle. These questions we neither wish to nor can investigate at 
this point. For the present our task is only to analyze the power of taste into its elements, 
and to unite these ultimately in the idea of a common sense. (89-90) 
 
The criticism of this theory is too obvious to require much summary. As Gerard Gennette puts it, 
the theory “flies in the face of the most commonplace observation.” (66) What on earth would 
this common sense look like? No doubt Eurocentric, white, etc ad nauseam. But even if we can 
get past the ordinary complaint, it is quite evident that people don’t agree on very much of 
anything. How can we ever hypothesize that there would be a commonality binding our 
innumerable judgments?  
 The problem, as seen here, lies in Kant’s use of the word “ought.” The popular imagining 
of beauty depends upon the disbelief in any objective, whether in the objective reality of beauty 
residing in the object, or the objective reality of intersubjective beauty, or common sense. 
Because the popular argument against beauty’s existence is that one’s evaluation is totally 
subjective or relative, in the eye of the beholder, just as about taste the popular belief is de 
gustibus non disputandem. Naturally this ubiquitous relativism takes different forms, from the 
man on the street’s “who sez,” to the scholar’s interrogation of cultural discourses. But all are 
based fundamentally on the sense that there is no way of measuring beauty objectively. Kant 
attempted to avoid this problem by proposing intersubjective validity, but though 
epistemologically this makes greater sense—or at least seems more conceivable—than saying 
the object itself is beautiful—it runs into exactly the same problem. We can’t prove it, we can’t 
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even attempt to describe the universal rules (which is anyway why aesthetic judgments are called 
by Kant reflective judgments), so why bother?  
 
4 and 5. Why indeed? Well…because beauty is hardly the only thing with this falsifiability 
problem. Let us return to the word “ought.” Kant says we “ought” to have our taste flow into a 
universal judgment or common sense, that is, our own judgments and taste are ever reaching 
towards this undiscoverable truth. Somewhere there is this common sense, and though it will 
never be known as such, it guides our understanding of beauty at its best, piece by piece, century 
by century, our blind individual groping towards a heightened perception and the striving of 
cities and of nations, of artists and connoisseurs, all lead to privileged moments of clarity in 
perception and taste and the unique incarnations of beauty formed of gifted men’s intellect and 
hands, and this, we suspect, has come nearer to the truth of beauty, nearer to the objective 
universal than have other things.  
 Let us, following Macdonald’s allusion, compare this to the popular imagining of 
morality, which is not so dissimilar from its application in academia as some intellectuals might 
believe. The average person not a sociopath believes, to some degree, that killing is wrong, life is 
precious etc, that kindness is preferable to cruelty, that life has a sanctity, and these might be 
extended in our time to beliefs in justice, fairness, the desire for equality. It is apparent that the 
assumptions upon which these simple moral intuitions and beliefs are based have no more 
rational grounding or evidence than does the existence of objective beauty. In fact Hume laid this 
bare in his Treatise on Human Nature: 
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In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that 
the author proceeds for some time of in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am 
surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, 
or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be 
observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, 
I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small 
attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the 
distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is 
perceiv'd by reason. (part iii, section 1) 
 
If the material world, the world where knowledge is empirical and falsifiable, is the is, then the 
dimensions of the material world to which we assign values is the ought. It is not the purpose 
here to review the literature of debate around Hume, because this is not a matter specific to the 
investigation of his philosophy, but rather of the pattern of logic that at once denies beauty and 
embraces the good. When one says, “life is precious,” we may reply, sure, life exists, but whence 
this “precious?” When one says, “killing is wrong, we shouldn’t do it,” some one else may ask,  
“why is that exactly?” To which the first responds because, “because it’s not good.” And I 
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suspect this is rather farther than most have gone in their investigations.74 This is why 
Dostoevsky says that if there is no god, all things are permitted—rationally, there is no basis for 
morality, no way to get from the world of the falsifiable to the world of moral judgment.  
 For those critics of art who we first saw in Sontag’s essay, in the critics of Balthus and 
Gauguin, in Hannah Gatsby and her kind throughout the internet, is there not underlying their 
critique an ought, the existence of which one has no more means of proving than one does the 
existence of beauty?  Because the desire to prevent the ugly from feeling inadequate, or a push 
toward democratic values, or a desire to protect children from sexual abuse, or the hatred of 
misogyny or the protection of women against rape, et al, is all based on an ought (one ought not 
have inequality, one shouldn’t molest, rape, etc). And so too are political and social movements, 
in criticism and without, based on these principles of ought—there should not be class inequality 
(Marxism et al), sexism (feminism), colonialism/imperialism (postcolonial criticism) etc…each 
social or political mission must, at its root, be born of a seed of ought which is as objectively 
improvable as is the existence of beauty. 
Kant was disturbed by Hume’s skeptical disruptions of old assumptions, particularly 
those related to the logic of causality, and his claims regarding the unbridgeable separation of is 
and ought must be disturbing to minds of a similar cast.  In the realm of epistemology, Kant was 
to contrive an immense apparatus for addressing Hume’s doubts, but in the realm of morals, the 
situation was, as he described it, practical. It is fascinating the way that Kant, perhaps the 
apotheosis of dry, even pedantic intellect, privileges the practical over theoretical reason in his 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals—it recalls the way Proust doubted the “intellect’s” 
capacity to judge of art, as described in the first pages of this study: 
 
74 This is not to say that people don’t argue about what is or isn’t good, only that the idea there is a good is not 
questions and informs such arguments.  
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Yet we cannot observe without admiration the great advantage which the power of 
practical judgment has over that of theoretical in the minds of ordinary men. In 
theoretical judgments, when ordinary reason ventures to depart from the laws of 
experience and the perceptions of sense, it falls into sheer unintelligibility and self-
contradiction, or at least a chaos of uncertainty, obscurity and vacillation. (72) 
 
That final description seems fitting for the postmodern world, which theorizes so incessantly one 
hardly knows whether to trust the reality of the most basic sensations. But neither Kant nor 
Proust is one of those sentimentalists praising the salt of the earth—in the very next paragraph 
Kant advises that ordinary reason is not sufficient, that practical philosophy is essential, because 
”innocence is a splendid thing, only it has the misfortune not to keep very well and to be easily 
misled.” (72) And of course the proportions between the wisdom discovered by either intuition 
or reason or experiment or the complex of unpredictable patterning formed of their relations 
seem rather a hard thing to predict. But that is not our question. What Kant and Proust suggest is 
merely that theoretical reason can often be wrong, and often in a very particular way, it 
“depart[s] from the laws of experience and the perceptions of sense, [and] falls into sheer 
unintelligibility and self-contradiction,” or, as Proust implied of Saint-Beuve’s theorizing about 
literature, it defied the “slightest degree of self-acquaintance.” 
 So, suppose that someone believes in a faith and then is told that belief has been a 
construction, the doubt-in-faith may seem valid. But when we are told that certain physical 
sensations are illusory, it is, perhaps, the doubter whom we must doubt. Just as our legal system 
has become a tortured, convoluted apparatus, unrecognizable from the just purposes for which it 
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had come into being, winding its way around new complexities, its principles branching off to 
new and strange conclusions, and those branches and vines growing ever more entangled, until 
the light of justice can not be seen through the thick forest of the law, so too, Kant suggests, can 
reason obscure the duty to do good, and reason cause a thinker to emphasize, “a mass of alien 
and irrelevant considerations [which] cause [his judgment] to swerve from the straight path.” 
(72) And these too are the sort of convolutions and doubts Iago has whispered to us, about which 
we must ask whether they were valid, or mere confusions imposed upon our natural self-
acquaintance.  
 It must be admitted that in common practice, the over-intellectualizing of morality is 
hardly an epidemic, and though it is questionable that most intellectuals would admit the root of 
their morality to be an “ought” as unproven as the practical judgments of ordinary men, that is, 
upon the slightest scrutiny, all that can be said for certain of the matter. Perhaps these judgments’ 
origin is empathy (as I believe), perhaps love for one’s mother expanded in concentric circles 
until it encompasses all of man and becomes a universal law. Whatever the origin of moral 
notions, they cannot at the last be justified by reason: is and ought are separated, by their very 
nature, the one being a matter of existence, the latter an entity we judge to be imbued with extra-
material value. Kant's solution to this problem, if such we want to call it, is his famous 
categorical imperative—“I ought never to act in except in such a way that I can also will that my 
maxim should become a universal law” (70)—a statement which need not concern us in its 
specificities, but rather in the fact that it is by imperative that we practically assert those values 
which we cannot prove, which seem beyond mere individual subjectivity, but which cannot be 
shown to be unfalsifiably true in any empiricist or positivist fashion. Speaking more broadly than 
Kant’s particular rule, it stands to reason that practically everyone—ordinary fellow, academic, 
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philosopher, statesmen, activist, humanist, etc—who fancies himself moral, when he is governed 
by his moral sense, if that sense may be construed as not entirely perverted or evil,75 is obeying 
what he believes is a universal law for which he can offer no reasonable justification. 
 Kant imagines this man to be inundated with the confusing mass of self-reflexive thought 
that Proust saw obscuring one’s literary intuitions, and which me may locate in the central, 
common feature of the popular anti-aesthete, “you can’t prove it.” And to this general problem of 
intellect obscuring something known, he offers the notion of imperatives:  
 
Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has to the 
power to act in accordance with his idea of laws—that is, in accordance with principles—
and only so has he a will. Since reason is required in order to derive actions from laws, 
the will is nothing but practical reason…..if reason solely by itself is not sufficient to 
determine the will; if the will is exposed to subjective conditions ( certain impulsions) 
which do not always harmonize with the objective ones; if, in a word, the will is not in 
itself completely in accordance with reason….then actions which are recognized to be 
objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determining of such a will in 
accordance with objective laws is necessitation. (80) 
 
Kant attributes these imperfections to the interjection of imperfect subjectivities. It is not our 
purpose to speculate. But we can broaden his hypothesis merely to say that complex systems will 
 
75 Naturally some people reject morality for self-interest, and others, I suspect, out of intellectual affectation. In my experience, people 
affect relativism because they are relatively safe. If one is really prepared to live his beliefs, then the rejection of his ought should expect 
the rejection of others’ oughts, a scenario that might be uncongenial to him. In fact such ideas are more congenial to a brutish sort of man, 
who thrives in the absence of moral standards . Were the protection of society to disappear, would the doubters of ethics be comfortable 
with their moral relativism? Are they strong enough to survive a world where all desires are equally acceptable? Let’s be real, as they say.  
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compound even the slightest imperfections, and that in philosophy, in human thought, 
imperfections are innate. So, as we said, with the example of human law, myriad imperfections 
of individual decisions compound into a system that often seems a monument to injustice, or in 
engineering where a slight error in calculation might cause a bridge or building to collapse. Or as 
in Kant, the way the subjective desire for this or that will pervert reason to make it seem like 
one’s actions are in accordance will universal moral law. Kant reformulates Hume’s ought as an 
imperative, a command to obey:   
 
Now an action done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence of inclination, and 
along with inclination every object of the will; so there is nothing left able to determine 
the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure reverence for this practical 
law[.]) 68-69  
 
The conception of an objective principle so far as this principle is necessitating for a will 
is called a command  (of reason), and the formula for this command is called an 
imperative. All imperatives are expressed by an ‘ought’ (Sollen). By this they mark the 
relation of an objective law of reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by this 
law in light of its subjective constitution (the relation of necessitation). They say that 
something would be good to do or leave undone[. ](81) 
 
Though Kant’s terminology may seem to us dry, pedantic, oppressive or outdated, it functions 
here less as a philosophy we must obey than a reality we must confront. Why are morals imposed 
from without? Because we simply cannot prove them. Who, at the end, can argue with this 
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somewhat unpleasant reality? We have an ethical sense, but no way to prove its validity—our 
shoulds and oughts, which may perhaps be formulated biologically, appear to us as immutable 
commands without rationale or evidence, and yet, we as moral beings feel compelled to obey 
them. In fact, despite the absence of evidence, the impossibility of ever rationalizing or proving 
our moral laws, the ethical man will impose an imperative to legitimize the reality of ethics in the 
first place. And if they feel it is universal without proof, is that not also intersubjective, or 
common sense? 
 Let us compare this moral situation with that of aesthetics as it is experienced by those 
who deny the objectivity of beauty.  People have moral or altruistic intuitions, and they have 
aesthetic experiences. Each yield, individually or culturally, the tendency towards 
generalizations or laws. And yet beauty is treated as mere subjective taste. No one who believes 
that men and women should be equal, or people of different races or sexual orientations, or that 
people should not be needlessly killed or tortured or oppressed or live in exacting and hopeless 
financial servitude, et al, looks upon these beliefs as anything but unchangeable laws, as realities 
of value demanding obedience, and this despite is the fact that they are no more probable than 
aesthetic judgments. We can chart a simple analogy: 
 
    Morals   Aesthetics 
Empirical reality  is    is 
Judgment   ought    beauty 
 
Each takes the material reality of is and imparts or perceives a value, in the former ethical, in the 
latter aesthetic. Let us impose upon the former (ethical) worldview an argument akin to that 
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made by the anti-aesthete. A man says he thinks that men and women should not be equal. We 
might say this is his subjective, ethical taste. Would his opponent, who believes in the equality of 
men and women, accept that in this instance, his position is merely subjective taste?  But of 
course, there is no rational recourse—in the realm of is, of empiricism, of falsifiability, all value 
is contingent, and neither men nor women can be said to have greater innate value than an insect 
or a stone, because value does not exist as such. Nor, for the feminist, would a relativistic 
cultural defense seem sufficient—if she lived in the world of the handmaid’s tale, her objections 
to that culture would no doubt be based on what she perceived as unchanging ethical 
propositions, universal laws, and this despite the fact that they cannot be proven. And she would 
be right.76 
We have established the following about beauty: that we experience it, that our 
experience is of a disinterested character, that, as Pater says, “all art aspires to the condition of 
music” because beauty is divorced from interests outside its own manifestation, that it has what 
Kant calls purposiveness without a purpose—the appearance of a rule without the rule given 
(hence the reflective judgment on unknown universal laws), that we can demonstrate if not prove 
these judgments, and that if there were a rule, an objective order, the innumerable, dissimilar 
manifestations of beauty would make the discovery of that order infinitely beyond the human 
intellect’s capacity to synthesize. Place this information beside a description of morality, 
scrupulously (one hopes) observed, sanctimoniously imposed by all those who argue against the 
legitimacy of beauty and aesthetic judgment. Are we not witness to grave, rank hypocrisy? 
 
76 Similarly, if one believes in these moral positions, the fact that previous civilizations do not is no contradiction, 
but can function quite as Fry’s aesthetic propositions do—we learn to see the beauty of an object heretofore ugly to 
us, we learn the moral law. This does not imply linear progress, only that neither moral nor aesthetic reality is 
contingent upon particular beliefs.  
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 The question, practically, is not whether either ethics or aesthetics is unfalsifiably 
objective, but rather why it is that ethics are treated as objective by merit of imperative whereas 
universally, aesthetics are not. And yet quite the same leap is required from is to ought as the 
leap from is to beautiful, a gap unbridgeable by reason or experiment. To choose one illogic over 
the other appears, at the last, itself a mere matter of taste. Which leads to a paradox for those 
ethical anti-aesthetes—if taste is arbitrary, so too is their preference for the illogic of ethics over 
the illogic of aesthetics, and all judgments, ethical as well as aesthetic, must be deemed arbitrary 
and contingent.  
It is obvious that it would be perfectly rational to accept both ethics and aesthetics as 
subjective, contingent, relative, but not one and not the other. Either we treat certain claims, 
whether ethical or aesthetic, as though they have objective validity despite the fact that they are 
not unfalsifiable, or we treat neither. Those who wish to treat neither as such are being perfectly 
rational, but theirs is likely too dark, too hollow a view of life for most to bear. And besides, 
their rationality is in many ways irrational and dogmatic with regard to the varieties of human 
experience and its nature, which may indeed find its end, its telos, both in ethical action and, yes, 
the disinterested appreciation of the beautiful. For what indeed distinguishes man but his 
capacity to transcend what merely is, and what defines his unique existence but his desire to rise 
above mere necessity? 
I propose here an aesthetic imperative. We have the sensations, we have expertise to 
make judgments, and if there were a universal rule, it would be too complex for us to know. So 
the simple solution, which people had done prior to the new relativism, is to treat beauty as 
though it is objective, and not to bother much about its objectivity while we engage with it or 
evaluate its varying excellences. We must envision beauty as though it conforms to a universal 
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law. Only then will we be able to free our experience of it from the incoherence of our own 
intellects, and accept the boon which beauty offers us.  
Pater concludes his Renaissance as follows: 
 
Great passions may give us this quickened sense of life, ecstasy and sorrow of love, the 
various forms of enthusiastic activity, disinterested or otherwise, which come naturally to 
many of us. Only be sure it is passion — that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, 
multiplied consciousness. Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the 
love of art for its own sake, has most. For art comes to you proposing frankly to give 
nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those 
moments' sake. 
 
Of these claims, several are open to question. Is art truly the greatest of the passions? Does it 
truly yield the greatest fruit of multiplied consciousness? This is the sort of question that likely 
will never be answered, and it is of greater practical use to us to observe that it can be mentioned 
in the same breath with love. And it is perhaps characteristic of Pater and his sense of the fleeting 
rush of sensation, that he sees art as existing purely for moments of experience and nothing 
more. But it is telling the way his phrase has been forgotten, and replaced by the earlier, and 
utterly irrational l’art pour l’art, art for art’s sake. It was obviously never for the sake of art that 
men struggled, or that their labors brought such ecstasies and sorrows, but for themselves. And if 
we are able to turn from the quotidian view of experience, and see what “very slight 
acquaintance already teaches us,” that there is such a thing as beauty, that art is the activity of 
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man characterized by beauty, and that these things should bring us not shame or resentment, but 
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